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This is an ethnographic study of a coffee-growing community in Honduras, which was 
in the midst of a transition to economic reliance on migration to the United States from 
2001 to 2004, when field research was conducted by the author.  The author focuses 
on the origins and contemporary dynamics of Honduran emigration, and explores the 
impact of emigration on local society and culture.  He argues that migration has led to 
a profound sense of confusion within a single community, identified by the 
pseudonym of "La Quebrada."  In this town, migration is generally described in 
negative terms, and migrants are often seen as the cause of socioeconomic crisis, 
rather than its victims. 
 
The author describes two local responses to emigration in La Quebrada: the rise of 
evangelical churches and the establishment of a fair trade coffee cooperative.  
Evangelical churches offer solutions to many of the social problems caused by 
emigration, and fair trade production offers an economic alternative to migration for 
coffee farmers.  He draws a parallel between local criticisms of migrants as the source 
of social decline, the explanations of social crisis offered by the evangelical churches, 
and the philosophy of fair trade.  In each case, people express concern about the 
manner in which their community has been integrated into the global economy, but 
they believe that individual behavior is the only viable source of social reform.  This 
 emphasis on the individual, abstracted from social totalities, limits the political 
potential of these movements.  The author concludes that these movements articulate a 
sense of popular anxiety over the community's future, and a desire to refashion society 
for the collective good.  However, the forms that these popular responses have taken is 
based on a belief that no political institution can mediate between the individual and 
the global market.  The tendency to conceptualize sociopolitical reform in 
individualized terms, he argues, reflects macro-level cultural changes that have 
occurred around the globe in the past twenty years.   
 
 
 
  iii 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
Daniel Reichman was born in Mt. Chase, Maine in 1976.  He was educated in the 
public schools of Sharon, Massachusetts, and he attended Franklin and Marshall 
College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.  He received bachelors degrees in anthropology 
and Spanish in 1998.  At Franklin and Marshall, he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa 
and captain of the men's cross country team.   He began graduate studies at Cornell 
University in August of 2000, after working in business.  In  2001, he received a 
Graduate Research Fellowship from the National Science Foundation.     
 
He currently resides in Arlington, Massachusetts with his wife, Amy, and daughter, 
Beatrice. 
  iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I thank the students and faculty of the Cornell Department of Anthropology.  In 
particular, Terry Turner, Dominic Boyer, Andrew Willford, and Jane Fajans have 
provided valuable advice and critical insight along the way.  Ted Bestor was a great 
mentor in the early stages of this research.  I also thank María Cristina García in the 
Departments of History and Latino Studies, and the directors of the Latin American 
Studies Program for their support.  Phil Arneson, Terry Tucker, and other members of 
the Cornell International Agriculture Program realized the importance of this research 
and introduced me to Honduras. 
 
I owe a debt of gratitude to Michael Billig and Misty Bastian at Franklin and Marshall 
College.  They got me started in anthropology, and have provided the type of 
education, support, and friendship that make small liberal-arts colleges special. 
 
In Honduras, I thank the Honduran Instituto de Antropología e Historia for  providing 
institutional support.  I owe special thanks to Teresa Campos de Pastor and her staff at 
the Museo de Antropología e Historia de San Pedro Sula for their generosity and 
kindness.   
 
Finally, I thank my family.  My parents encouraged curiosity and independence.  Amy 
and Beatrice have made every day a joy. 
  v
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Figures       vii 
 
Preface       viii 
 
Introduction 
Globalizations and Postmodernisms    1 
 
Chapter 1 
From Diffusion to Globalization: 
Anthropological Theory and Cultural Change  34 
 
Chapter 2 
American Dream, American Work: 
Realities and Fantasies of Undocumented Migrants  66 
 
Chapter 3 
The Needy, The Greedy, and the Lazy   97    
 
Chapter 4 
The Ashes of Progress:  
The Cold War and its Aftermath in Honduras  134   
  vi
 
Chapter 5 
Broken Idols:  Religious Belief, Mediation and Action 164 
 
Chapter 6        
Justice at a Price: Fair Trade and the  
Apotheosis of Market Rationality     210 
 
Conclusion         
Global Sociality and the Politics of Particularity  261 
 
Bibliography       272 
    
  vii
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1 
"Earn Like in the United States" Flyer   73 
 
Figure 2 
Cartoon From El Tiempo     80 
 
Figure 3 
Central America 
Entry Without Inspections (EWI) Chart   101 
 
Figure 4  
Official Seal of  Creciendo en Gracia   192 
 
Figure 5  
Cartoon from Creciendo en Gracia website   193 
 
Figure 6  
Creciendo en Gracia Convention Poster   196 
 
Figure 7  
The Faces of Coffee      229   
  viii
Preface 
 
The pages that follow are the result of ten months of field research conducted in 
Honduras between 2001 and 2003.  Virtually all of my time in the field was spent in a 
town which I will call La Quebrada, a rural community of 4,500 people in west-central 
Honduras.1  Readers familiar with Spanish will note that the name "La Quebrada" 
means both "the stream" and "the broken article."  I have chosen this pseudonym for 
two reasons, one descriptive and the other evocative.  The town is located high in the 
mountains near the source of one of Honduras’ major rivers, and it is bisected by 
several streams that eventually drain into the Caribbean, which lies approximately one 
hundred miles to the north.  Therefore, "the stream" describes a notable geographic 
feature of the community.  
 
More importantly, the sense of being broken implied by La Quebrada reflects the 
period of crisis in which the community finds itself, a motif which will appear 
throughout the present work.  The title of this work is an obvious allusion to this 
motif, and I intend for the image of "broken idols"--literally iconoclasm--to be taken 
in two senses.  In one sense, "broken idols" refers to rejection of Catholic religious 
symbols by the town’s growing Protestant population.  Metaphorically, it refers to the 
replacement of an old social order with a new one.  As the coffee economy in La 
Quebrada is replaced by dependence on wages earned by migrants working in the 
United States, the "idols" of a previous generation lose ground to new ones.  On a 
theoretical level, social theorists in the postmodern era have engaged in many sorts of 
                                                 
1 Honduras is divided into thirteen departamentos, analogous to U.S. states.  Each departamento is 
composed of municipios, which are smaller administrative units equivalent to counties.  La Quebrada is 
the county-seat of its municipio. The municipo is divided into pueblos, aldeas, and caseríos  (towns, 
villages, and homesteads). 
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idol-smashing, claiming that postmodernity and globalization have ushered in a new 
historical era that requires new theoretical models.  This work is a product of the 
current moment of iconoclasm in anthropology.   
 
I regret the loss of specificity and historical detail that is an inescapable consequence 
of the use of pseudonyms (Wolfe 2002). I have invented names in order to protect the 
identity of many townspeople who are involved in illegal activities such as human 
smuggling and undocumented immigration.  The only real names included in this 
work belong to historical figures, scholars, and religious leaders.  Some readers may 
find the names unusual, but they are all names that actually exist in La Quebrada, put 
into combinations of my own making. I have tried to capture the tone and rhythms of 
life in La Quebrada without giving too much away.  I have made my best effort to 
provide a picture that can be used for comparison and interpretive context, but I 
apologize to those readers familiar with Honduras who will no doubt wish for more 
fine-grained detail about my research site in order to evaluate my findings. 
 
Despite my best efforts, Honduran specialists will be able to determine the community 
in which this study is based.  It would be impossible to write an ethnography without 
providing some specific details that a determined reader could use to identify the real 
name of La Quebrada.  Even the most well-covered tracks can be followed by a skilled 
sleuth.  I ask that future commentators respect the standard of privacy to which I strive 
in this work, and refrain from publicly revealing the town’s name or identifying the 
real names of the people described here. 
 
 
 
  x
Notes on Method 
 
This work is based on three periods of research in La Quebrada: one month in 2001, 
eight months in 2003, and a month in 2004.  I first visited La Quebrada in the Summer 
of 2001 as part of a rural development project carried out by Cornell University, the 
USDA, and USAID in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. The U.S. government 
appropriated emergency relief funds to Honduras after the storm, and Cornell’s 
International Institute for Food and Development (CIIFAD) managed various 
participatory development programs as part of the reconstruction effort.2  I briefly 
investigated how local social relations and village politics affected the creation of an 
ecological coffee cooperative that had been established with the support of USAID 
and the USDA and was trying to enter the "fair trade" market. 
 
During that initial stay, I observed that most coffee farmers showed little interest in 
"fair trade" compared to other strategies to escape economic crisis.  A far greater 
number of farmers were abandoning agriculture altogether and choosing to migrate to 
the United States illegally.  At the same time, many people who remained in La 
Quebrada were flocking to new evangelical churches that offered spiritual solutions to 
life’s problems.  I began to see fair trade coffee production, migration, and evangelical 
religion as related reactions to social crisis.  All presented "ways out" of hardship 
based upon specific worldviews; I wondered why certain people or social groups 
would pursue one strategy over another, if they were discrete groups at all.   
 
                                                 
2 The bill in the House of Representatives that provided relief funds was HR 1141, "Central America 
and The Caribbean Emergency Disaster Recovery Fund" passed January 6, 1999.   
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At the same time, I saw the prevalence of these practices as symptomatic of something 
called "globalization," but I was not sure why.  These three particular social responses 
to crisis--migration, religious change, and socially-conscious commodity production--
all seemed to be signs of the times.  La Quebrada had always faced periods of 
economic crisis: Why had these three particular strategies only emerged in the recent 
past, and how did these particular forms of action relate to global sociocultural trends? 
This case allowed me to synthesize three topics that have become important parts of 
the anthropology of globalization--migration, neo-traditional religious revivals, and 
global commodity chains.  The fact that all of these phenomena occurred 
simultaneously in one small town made La Quebrada a perfect research site.   
  
When I began my second research stint, the coffee co-operative had collapsed.  One of 
its leaders had been brutally murdered in a domestic dispute unrelated to the 
cooperative, and coffee prices were at historic lows.  As the cooperative floundered, 
migration and evangelical religion continued to flourish.  I began to research both 
migration and evangelical religion concurrently.  I started out, somewhat reluctantly, 
with a formal research plan.  There was little data on Honduran migration patterns, 
and I wanted to get an empirical "lay of the land." I created a questionnaire and tried 
to interview as many returned migrants, potential migrants, and family members of 
migrants as possible, with the help of a research assistant. I recorded some interviews 
when given explicit permission to do so, and I always assured participants of 
confidentiality, detailing the goals of my research.  
 
I was reluctant to proceed in this way, but felt that I should at least attempt to follow a 
formal methodology before moving to the more informal style of fieldwork that was 
my natural preference. I was reasonably sure that the surveys wouldn’t work--either 
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people would be unwilling to talk or the responses would be superficial. However, a 
comprehensive survey would have been a valuable source of information on Honduran 
migration patterns, so I proceeded, with a fall-back plan.3   
 
The formal strategy proved to be an unfortunate mistake. My social-scientific posture 
and somewhat bureaucratic explanation of the purpose of my investigations created an 
uncomfortable social distance between me and the people I interviewed early in the 
project.  I was able to complete about thirty interviews, but the responses seemed 
forced and uncomfortable.  About two months into my second research period, rumors 
spread that I was either working for the CIA, immigration authorities, or some other 
agency trying to deport people from the U.S.  This was an understandable rumor that I 
had anticipated going into the project and had made every effort to disprove.  I knew 
that such rumors would circulate (rumors are unavoidable when strangers show up in a 
small town asking questions), but I mistakenly assumed that the rapport I had 
developed during my preliminary research would help to diffuse them. 
 
Unfortunately, three local men that had I had interviewed were apprehended and 
deported from  Mexico while trying to migrate, and some people speculated that I had 
tipped off the authorities.  The gossip became too widespread to ignore, and a few 
people abruptly stopped talking to me.  Some neighbors told me that the local coyote 
(human smuggler/criminal boss) thought that I was investigating migration in order to 
shut down his criminal business, and I feared for my personal safety.    
 
                                                 
3 The fall-back plan was to focus on a small group of trusted friends, use their introductions to expand 
my social network, and base the study on natural social interaction and conversation.  
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By that time, I accepted the fact that the sensitive nature of my research required great 
personal trust, and that I would be better off focusing on the experiences of a small 
group of trusted friends than on a large sample of strangers.  I had become friends with 
a successful returnee (returned migrant) named Javier Montoya who lived a few 
houses down from me.  He had returned home to La Quebrada after spending two 
years in the U.S. only a month before I arrived, and I had befriended his family during 
my first research trip.  He consistently vouched for me to other people and, over time, 
he introduced me to a wide spectrum of people involved in the migrant phenomenon, 
including the once-threatening coyote, who ended up being a valuable and cooperative 
source of information.4  Thus, my method was basically to befriend as many people as 
possible and use my relatively natural social interactions with them as the empirical 
basis for this study.  I now consider some of these people to be lifelong friends, and 
we remain in close contact.     
 
The local religious groups were a relatively easy topic for research.  Due to their 
proselytizing philosophy, they were eager to talk to me and explain the meaning of 
their faith.  I attended religious services at three churches, and had almost daily 
discussions with church members and clergy.  Again, I found that informal discussions 
and attendance at services provided more valuable information than formal interviews.  
For the members of these churches, I was a somewhat mysterious target of 
proselytization, because I am Jewish and there were no other Jews in town.  I was 
hesitant to reveal my religion at first, due to the possibility of prejudice, but my 
                                                 
4 My key informant was a close friend of the coyote and personally introduced me to him in order to put 
an end to the rumors and suspicion.  We also countered the rumors with logic.  My defense was as 
follows: If the U.S. government really wanted to infiltrate the smuggling business, why would they send 
an obvious outsider (me) instead of a Honduran on the inside who wouldn’t arouse as much suspicion 
as a gringo?  Furthermore, why would I say outright that I was there to study migration if I was part of 
some clandestine plot?  Would I really be that stupid? As soon as Javier (my key informant) decided 
that I was telling the truth, this defense proved to be convincing and the rumors died down.  
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Jewishness proved to be advantageous.  I was able to have fruitful discussions about 
the similarities and differences between Judaism and Christianity that provided a 
productive point of departure for further understanding.5   
 
After the initial failure of my formal research plan, I stopped recording interviews.  I 
did not even take notes during most conversations.  When I finished a significant 
conversation or interview, I would jot down notes or memorable quotes when I had a 
free moment.  I would then go home and write narrative summaries of interviews on a 
laptop computer, usually after 9 PM, when the town’s nighttime curfew went into 
effect and I was stuck inside my home.  Without a recorder or notebook, I was able to 
interact naturally with people in town, and this approach proved to be much more 
effective than uncomfortable out-of-context interviews. 
 
As with any methodology, this approach had strengths and weaknesses.  I was able to 
get rich personal accounts from a small sample of people, but this group was not 
"representative" of the community in the statistical sense often used by social 
researchers. I made an effort to interview men and women of all ages, religions, and 
social classes, but I have no statistical evidence that my sample mirrors the general 
profile of the town’s population.  Young men (under age forty) are probably 
overrepresented. This is the group of people that is most likely to migrate, and it was 
the group closest to my own age, and easiest to approach in an informal way.   So 
there is good reason for young men to constitute a disproportionately large part of the 
                                                 
5 For example, Judaism and Protestantism share the value of "idol-smashing."  Two evangelical 
preachers drew parallels between Abraham’s destruction of the religious icons in Ur, which is only 
alluded to in the Bible, and the Evangelical rejection of Catholic iconography.  Both religions prohibit 
symbolic representations of divinity, and use this rejection to demarcate the differences of their faith 
from others.  This discussion led one preacher to conclude that Pentecostal Baptists and Jews were 
basically the same, due to their iconoclasm. 
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sample.  A small number of women that emigrated to the US, but only two had 
returned to La Quebrada.6  The number of females considering migration is certainly 
rising, but I was only able to interview four women that migrated illegally during my 
fieldwork because so few had returned to live in La Quebrada.7  
 
Despite these blind spots, I am certain that the experiences of the people I describe 
here are in some way representative of struggles faced by many people in similar 
situations all over the world.  I chose to write about this little town because its story 
connects several important threads of life under globalization (itself a disputed 
concept, as I will discuss in the following chapter).  I hope that this work makes these 
connections clear and explains La Quebrada’s importance for anthropological theory 
and international political practice.  Although certain points of my fieldwork were 
punctuated by fear, frustration, and confusion, I never doubted that the people of La 
Quebrada had an important story to tell. 
                                                 
6 This is similar to the pattern found by Sarah Mahler in El Salvador (2003).  Men are far more likely to 
return to Honduras than women.  I explain the reasons for this patter in Chapter 2. 
7 By my count, there are between forty and fifty women from La Quebrada who have migrated illegally 
to the US. 
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Introduction 
Globalizations and Postmodernisms 
 
On October 27, 1999, the United States Library of Congress added the subject heading 
"Globalization" to its catalog.  According to its description, "Here are entered works 
on the complex of linkages and interconnections between countries and societies that 
make up the world system."  (LOC, October 1999).  The library’s scheme of 
categorization stands as a grand archive of intellectual classification, a cosmology of 
the scholar’s world that imposes order and logic on a field of disparate phenomena.  In 
the Levi-Straussian sense, the subject headings tell U.S. what books "go together" in 
the intellectual cosmos.  Changing times and new forms of social interaction demand 
new classificatory schemes, and the library’s addition of "Globalization" gave sanction 
to the notion that there was something about the so-called "world system"--circa 1999-
-that called for a new conceptual category.8  What was it?   
 
This is a difficult question to answer.  The term "globalization" always seems to be 
used with some embarrassment by scholars, due, I think, to the absence of a precise 
definition and the air of millennial novelty that surrounded the term and its rapid 
adoption by the popular media post-1989.  In my first year of graduate school, I recall 
a senior anthropologist at Cornell approaching me before a class called "Anthropology 
of Globalization" and asking me what, exactly, "globalization" was.  I offered a 
confused, roundabout response that did nothing to diminish his skepticism, and none 
of the other dozen-or-so students in the room could add much clarity.  I am sure that 
                                                 
8 Clearly, there was great demand for this new category.  As of 2005, there are over two thousand works 
listed under the LOC’s "Globalization" subject heading.  Another interesting feature of this definition is 
that it uses network metaphors ("linkages," "interconnections").  Recently, several scholars have noted 
the tendency for people to frame contemporary society as a network, arguing that computer networks 
have become the framing metaphor for social relations (Hardt and Negri 2004:142; Riles 2000:3-5). 
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our confusion was the result of the genuine complexity of the topic and not our own 
intellectual shortcomings.     
Generally speaking, globalization refers to the economic, social, and cultural 
integration of the world into a single society in which the global market has replaced 
the nation-state as the fundamental integrative institution of social life (Turner 2002).  
There are three main ways of delineating globalization from other historical eras: the 
first emphasizes economic integration, the second focuses on geographic mobility, and 
the third, cultural homogenization.   
 
Within economics, the most significant element of globalization is the power of 
transnational financial institutions to determine the future of national economies.  This 
has diminished the power of nation-states to make autonomous economic decisions, 
and has subordinated many political functions to the demands of financial markets.  
The primary social dimensions of globalization involve the new communities and 
alliances that have been shaped by migration and the increasing ease of transportation 
and communication, made possible by technological advances. The most important 
cultural dimensions of globalization are the global spread of mass media and mass-
produced consumer goods, which has resulted in the homogenization (some would say 
Americanization) of tastes and life-styles around the globe.  At the same time, various 
religious, ethnic, and cultural movements fight to reassert "tradition" in the face of 
encroaching cultural homogenization.  One could draw historical analogies between 
these elements and past phenomena, but they would fail to do justice to the novel 
aspects of their present manifestations. 
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The main theoretical problem facing scholars of globalization is how best to 
understand the relationship between the economic, social, and cultural dimensions of 
globalization.  Contemporary anthropologists have tended to focus on the social and 
cultural aspects of globalization apart from economic forces.  Concepts such as 
"diasporic public spheres," (Appadurai 1996) "hybrid cultures," (Garcia Canclini 
1995a, 1995b) "flexible citizenship" (Ong 1999) and other forms of transnational 
identity are ways of explaining how new social formations brought about by 
transnational migration and the mass media have led to new cultural understandings of 
people’s (or "a people’s") place in the world. Generally, globalization is seen as a 
process that challenges the theoretical linkage between culture and society, ideas and 
material relations.  How can one even conceive of a society in a world where people, 
things, and ideas circulate in such complex and chaotic way, and older forms of social 
identity like nationality or class have lost their centrality?     
 
Herein lies a central contradiction that has plagued the study of globalization: Most 
people recognize that global society has become more integrated than ever, yet the 
structure of this integrated whole seems too complex to grasp. Most people recognize 
that the global market has increasingly drawn the world into a single social system, but 
the nature of that system and the way that it shapes cultural practices is less 
understood.  This is due to the incredible complexity of the contemporary global 
economy and the lack of an adequate theory of how post-industrial economies 
function.  There has been a string of important studies on the cultural practices of 
economic elites in the global economy, as well as commodity chain studies that 
explain the form and function of global networks in particular instances, but these 
studies tend not to employ any abstract model of "the system."  Anthropologists often  
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describe the contemporary global system as "neoliberal" without specifying how 
neoliberalism differs from other types of capitalism.  
 
Some resort to hyperbole, basically characterizing neoliberalism as "pure" or 
"extreme" capitalism.  Graeber, one of the most insightful anthropologists of 
globalization, writes, "the era of the triumph of the World Market [is] one in which the 
most gigantic, totalizing, and all-encompassingly universal system of evaluation 
known to human history came to be imposed on almost everything" (2001:89).  
"Neoliberalism" is presented as capitalism on steroids, without much historical or 
economic perspective on its unique features. 
 
Although changes in the global market now frame almost all anthropology of 
globalization, anthropologists have curiously turned away from economic literature.  
Some have tried to adapt world-systems Marxism to the present (e.g. Roseberry 1989; 
Kearney 1996; J. Friedman 1994; Freeman 2000), but end up unable to maintain a 
"core-semi-periphery-periphery" model of the post-industrial world. Kearney (1996) 
explicitly tried to address the inadequacy of the world-systems perspective to capture 
the global present, and ended up arguing in favor of "chaos theory," due to the shifting 
subject positions of people in the global economy and the difficulty in creating fixed 
categories or structures.  Oaxacan peasants who migrate to the U.S. are his principle 
example, and he argues that the category "peasant" should be replaced by "polybian," 
a word that describes people who "move in and out of multiple niches…and adapt 
their being to different modes of existence" (1996:141).  Kearney’s conclusions about 
globalization are examples of what Hiro Miyazaki has called "the aesthetics of 
indeterminacy," a theoretical trope in anthropology used to highlight the fact that the 
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complexity of globalization defies categorization and should therefore embrace 
indeterminate, flexible categories.  
 
The absence of contemporary economic literature in anthropology is partly due to the 
fact that economics has become dominated by rational choice approaches that ignore 
the social, historical, or cultural structuring of subjectivity.  However, I would argue 
that the recent work of economists and economic historians has much to offer 
anthropologists looking for a historically and empirically informed definition of 
globalization.  French economists Gérard Duménil and Domenique Lévy (2004) place 
the rise of neoliberalism in historical context, and see the past twenty five years as an 
era in which financial capital (as opposed to industrial capital) has become the 
hegemonic class in both economics and politics.9  Duménil and Lévy define finance as 
the class "whose property materializes in the holding of securities (stock shares, 
bonds, Treasury Bills, etc.), and financial institutions (central banks, banks, funds, 
etc.)" (2004:16).  They claim that from the end of World War II until 1979, the power 
of industrial managers (as opposed to capital owners) rose significantly, leading to 
wage increases, full employment, and social protection for workers in the advanced 
countries.  Since 1979, they argue that "finance" has regained hegemony over 
industry, and that the reassertion of the hegemony of finance is the defining element of 
neoliberalism.   
 
Duménil and Lévy offer convincing statistical evidence that the monetarist policies of 
the late-seventies and eighties provided financial capital with a strategy to overcome a 
structural crisis caused by declining rates of profit in the seventies.  By raising interest 
rates in 1979, and escaping or dismantling the regulatory constraints that were 
                                                 
9 On this point, the follow Ernest Mandel (1996). 
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developed during and after the New Deal, financial capital regained the profit rates 
that it had achieved before the crisis.  This success came at the expense of 
nonfinancial capitalists and workers.  Industrial profits were used to pay off high 
interest rates.  Real wages stagnated in France, England, Germany, and the U.S. from 
1979 until the present, ending a period of rising wages that occurred from 1960 until 
1979 (Duménil and Lévy 2004:46).  During this period, the profit rates of financial 
corporations have risen astronomically, and the value of financial assets now dwarfs 
the net worth of non-financial companies (Duménil and Lévy 2004:110-112).   
 
Duménil and Lévy have countered the common-sense idea that contemporary finance 
fuels economic production and creates employment.  Instead, they argue that finance 
drains resources that might be directed towards industrial production by siphoning off 
profits to interest payments and dividends.  They write, "…profits distributed in the 
form of interest and dividend payments do not flow back to the nonfinancial sector to 
contribute to investments" (120).  According to their findings,  short-term financial 
speculation enriches investors and destabilizes the economy, but it does not create 
employment.  Simplified to its core, Duménil and Lévy’s argue that globalization has 
allowed rent-seeking classes (finance) to replace productive classes (industrial capital) 
as the hegemonic sectors of society under globalization.10    
                                                 
10 There is an ongoing debate among Marxian scholars over whether financial speculation can be 
viewed as a form of production.  Duménil and Lévy  believe that all value is based on the 
transformation of nature through human labor power, and that finance is therefore a form of rentier 
extractivism that cannot rightfully be called "production."  Among anthropologists, Fernando Coronil 
(1997) has also taken this position.   Recently, Hardt and Negri have argued that finance should be 
considered a form of production because the knowledge produced by financial speculators adds to the 
total intellectual capacity of humanity and could potentially lead to centralized management of the 
world economy (2004).  Hardt and Negri developed a theory of "immaterial production" to apply to 
knowledge work, and see finance as one component of this general type of labor (2001, 2004). 
  
I believe that the idea that "money can create money" severs the process of value creation from its 
material referent  to an unacceptable degree.  Although knowledge work is clearly a form of labor,  we 
must not lose site of the fact  that the post-industrial knowledge economy basically manages and 
streamlines processes of material production, exchange, and distribution.  Knowledge work is a form of 
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Thus, the key element of globalization is the subordination of the modern nation-state 
to international financial markets, and the reemergence of unregulated capitalism on a 
global, rather than national, level.  "Leveling the playing field" for finance does not 
necessarily lead to capital investments that help national economies, as argued by 
many proponents of free-marketism.  If the "modern" idea of progress was based upon 
the mixed economy, class-compromise and the development of governmental policies 
oriented towards an ever-expanding alliance of social classes, then globalization truly 
represents a new era of "economic postmodernity," due to the increased power of an 
ever-narrowing class of speculative capitalists to define the terms of sociopolitical life.  
Just as significantly, this process has been ideologically accepted as a natural 
consequence of technological change.  The macroeconomic changes described by 
Duménil and Lévy have led to changes in the political and cultural spheres. 
 
I do not use the term "neoliberal" to describe the contemporary economic system for 
several reasons.  First, the term is confusing to American readers who associate 
"liberalism" with New Deal-type social democracy.  Neoliberalism, by definition, is 
supposed to have supplanted such state-led, nationalistic projects.  In other parts of the 
world, especially Latin America, "liberalism" is associated with laissez faire, but the 
term has an opposite meaning in the United States.  More importantly, the term 
"neoliberalism" fails to address some elements necessary to the contemporary 
economic system that are anti-liberal--such as restrictive immigration laws, corporate 
                                                                                                                                            
production, but it is ancillary to the processes of material transformation upon which it depends.  The 
work of Steve Fraser (2005) provides an especially insightful look at how financial speculation has been 
viewed by intellectuals throughout American history.  Fraser shows that there has long been historical 
debate over the social costs and benefits of financial speculation.  Certainly, financial knowledge is a 
form of intellectual production (as was the development of management science during Marx's day), but 
this knowledge is still an instrumental part of the total process of capitalist production.     
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welfare schemes (such as deposit insurance and bankruptcy protection), protective 
tariffs, and subsidies.  These factors undermine principles of free-marketism, but they 
are absolutely vital to the maintenance of the economic order of globalization.  To take 
an obvious example that is especially relevant to this work: If globalization were truly 
neoliberal, labor would have the same mobility as capital, enabling workers to migrate 
is search of higher wages with the same ease that businesses can relocate in order to 
cut costs.  For a system to be truly organized according to market-principles, this 
would be minimal requirement.   
 
What does all this have to do with a little town in Honduras?  
 
A central point of this work is that the systemic economic changes outlined above 
(what I will call economic postmodernity) have produced systemic cultural changes 
that center on popular understandings of the relationship between individuals and 
nation-states. The case of La Quebrada provides a striking example of how various 
cultural phenomena--in a place far removed from the center of the global capitalist 
order--bear the ideological imprint of these economic transformations.  The goal of 
this research is to understand the relationship between the cultural and economic 
elements of globalization in a single Honduran community, and relate the experience 
of this community to more general patterns.  
 
I focus on three phenomena that could be considered paradigmatic aspects of the 
"globalized" present and have become some of the most widely studied topics within 
the anthropology of globalization: labor migration and remittance economies, religious 
revival movements, and international commodity chains (in this case, "fair trade" 
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coffee).11  In strict terms, migration is a "social" phenomenon (ie, dealing with the 
actual interaction of people and groups), religious change is "cultural" (ie, dealing 
with forms of knowledge and belief) and coffee production is "economic" (ie, dealing 
with the acquisition of the means of subsistence).  However, all three are instances 
where society, culture, and economy are inseparable.  I focus on these themes because 
they are instances where cultural practices are directed towards the resolution of 
economic problems.  They are three popular responses to economic crisis that are 
rooted in cultural experience.   By bringing these three phenomena under a single 
analytic lens, I intend to theorize the nature of the relationship between postmodern 
economic and cultural change in Honduras. 
 
This work is organized as follows: Chapter 1 places the study of globalization within 
the context of anthropological theory.  I argue that the study of global cultural change 
continues longstanding theoretical debates within the discipline and should not be 
considered a break with the past or an intellectual fad.  Much of the contemporary 
debates over globalization recast older topics into new language.  The next two 
chapters introduce the reader to the contemporary realities of life in La Quebrada, 
focusing on how migration and the remittance economy are changing local culture.  
These two chapters interweave diachronic and synchronic approaches to migration, 
combining fine-grained ethnographies with regional history.  Chapter 4 puts La 
Quebrada’s contemporary political situation in historical context, describing the 
history of social movements in Honduras since the fifties.  Using the biography of one 
of La Quebrada’s most prominent activists as a model for the country’s historical 
experience, I argue that the shift from the state-driven, nationalistic social programs to 
                                                 
11 Of these three themes, religious change is the least historically unique.  However, I will argue in 
Chapter 5 that the specific ideological content of these religions is related to contemporary political 
economic changes. 
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local-level, NGO-driven activity is an immediate consequence of Cold War politics 
and Honduran militarism.  The purpose of this chapter is to show how contemporary 
social movements rest upon particular understandings of the relationship between state 
and nation that have emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War. Chapters 5 and 6 
describe two social movements that have arisen from this depoliticized climate, 
evangelical religion and fair trade coffee production.  When viewed in conjunction 
with the historical argument presented in Chapter 4, these chapters suggest that 
religious change and fair trade are functionally similar to other social movements that 
have existed in Honduran history, but shift the terms of sociality from groups to 
individuals. In general, the mid-twentieth century idea of "development" has 
transformed into "crisis management," a situation in which any activity that generates 
income is considered "progress" and larger issues of social equity are shifted to the 
background or ignored altogether.12   
 
In the Conclusion, I argue that the new churches and fair trade are particular examples 
of more widespread sociocultural changes that have occurred under globalization.  
Here, the argument returns to the theoretical debates introduced above and discussed 
in detail in Chapter 1.  I argue that the historical explanation of Honduran social 
movements and the Cold War presented in Chapter 4 does not sufficiently explain why 
contemporary social movements have taken the narrowly-focused form that they have.  
To adequately explain why contemporary social practices tend to be based upon a 
particular relationship between the individual and a larger social whole, one needs to 
begin with an understanding of the structure of post-industrial societies and the 
general political economic conditions under which these ideologies have developed.   
                                                 
12 The concept of a shift from "development to crisis management" comes from Andre Gunder Frank’s 
essay, "The Underdevelopment of Development" (1999). 
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Any attempt to link cultural changes to economic changes runs the risk of economic 
reductionism.  How, exactly, does an economic ideology diffuse through virtually all 
domains of society and culture?  Can we speak of "neoliberal culture" or, in my terms, 
the culture of "economic postmodernity" without resorting to the old Marxist base-
superstructure teleology?  If the sociocultural phenomena I describe in Honduras 
reflect the social order of economic postmodernity (and I believe they do), how does 
this ideology become so pervasive?  This is perhaps the most difficult theoretical 
question of all, and it is where anthropology can make its most important contribution.  
At all points in this work, I address the historically specific, complex origins of 
migration, religious change, and fair trade.  The complex origins of the phenomena 
defy unicausal theorization.  However, I try to move beyond a particularistic 
interpretation and develop abstract conclusions that recognize common patterns in 
contemporary responses to economic crisis.  The move from particular cases to 
general patterns is, by definition, speculative.  But some speculation is necessary to 
get a complete picture of the case I describe.  Though some may see the move from 
particularity to generality as "reductive," I see it as a productive and necessary part of 
anthropological theory. 
  
 
 
Continuity or Rupture?  
       
Before continuing, it is important to recognize the historical genesis of globalization as 
a concept.  For decades, theorists such as Braudel, Wallerstein, Gunder Frank, and 
Wolf have used Marxian theory to argue that a global capitalist world-system has 
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existed for at least three-hundred years (and up to five thousand years), and without 
their work, it is unlikely that the term "world-system" would have made it into the 
Library of Congress definition of globalization.  The great technological innovations 
that define the "global" era--satellite communications, computers, genetic technology-
-can be seen as mere extensions of previous revolutionary inventions like the 
telegraph, railways, or applied chemistry, that do not alter the expansionary character 
of capitalism.  This argument could be supported by only a brief glance at the English 
edition of the "Manifesto of the Communist Party," written in 1888 (or Smith's The 
Wealth of Nations, for that matter).  Marx and Engels made arguments about the 
unprecedented aspects of high-tech capitalism over a century ago which echo 
contemporary descriptions of globalization.    
 
In the place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have 
intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations.  And as in 
material, so also in intellectual production…The bourgeoisie, by the rapid 
improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of 
communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into 
civilization…Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of 
chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, 
clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers…what earlier 
century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of 
social labor?" (Marx 1978:476-77).   
 
Replace the word  "bourgeoisie" with "Western world." Change "barbarian nations" to 
"traditional cultures," and remove the clunky term "civilization," with, say, 
"modernity," and part of this passage would read: "The Western world, by the rapid 
improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of 
communication, draws all, even the most "traditional," cultures into modernity."  
Sounds a lot like globalization.13  
                                                 
13 After writing this, I saw that this selection from Marx was used by Daniel Bell (1996) to make a 
similar point.  The same quote appeared in Thomas Friedman’s celebration of globalization The World 
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Similarly, the spread of Western tastes around the globe is not entirely new. Colonized 
peoples emulated European lifestyles for centuries, and Europeans likewise imitated 
the exotic "Oriental" styles publicized in popular books, photographs, and printed art, 
or displayed at expositions and fairs. The masses of migrants that traveled back and 
forth between America and Europe at the turn of the century packed away Sears and 
Roebuck catalogs in their steamer chests.  Hollywood films spread throughout the 
world in the early twentieth century, and people listened to radio programs in the most 
remote parts of the world after the popularization of the transistor in the fifties.  The 
global reach of satellite television and the internet may have unprecedented aspects, 
but it has many historical antecedents as well. 
 
These continuities can only be taken so far.  The economic system that underlies these 
global movements has many novel elements.  The rising power of global financial 
markets was set into motion in the seventies, but it did not fully develop until 
instantaneous information transfer was made possible by satellite communications and 
the internet.  The power of global financial markets was famously described as an 
"electronic herd" by Thomas Friedman in the bestselling book The Lexus and the 
Olive Tree  (2000).  "The herd" consists of transnational investors, who shift large 
sums of money en masse based on real-time information about markets and current 
events.  Under these conditions, nation-states must always consider the impact of their 
decisions on global markets.  Liberal authors, like Friedman, tend to see the 
integration of national economies into a global market as a positive development that 
keeps governments economically "honest," allows entrepreneurs to escape local 
                                                                                                                                            
is Flat (2005) , and in a review of the same written by John Gray in the New York Review of Books, 
August 11, 2005. 
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institutional obstacles, and engenders fair competition (e.g. Friedman 2000:13).14  
Governments must avoid causing conflicts that might precipitate financial crisis, and 
the risk of mutually assured economic destruction keeps government in line.  The 
market serves as an dispassionate referee that judges the behavior of states according 
to objective standards. 
 
Critics of the liberal vision see capitalism regulated only by the rules of the market and 
minimal international law as a detriment to the citizenry at large.  The search for profit 
becomes the basic organizing principle of social life, and the mid-twentieth century 
class compromise is weakened. As Daniel Bell writes in his 1996 "Afterword" to The 
Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (first published in 1978): 
 
…the market has become the arbiter of all economic and even social relations (as in 
corporate obligations to employees) and the priority of the legal rights of ownership 
and property over all other claims, even of a moral nature, has been renewed 
(1996:84).  
 
He continues: 
 
During the New Deal years and after, the economic relation was transformed 
somewhat…to become a social relation that instituted rights other than property…But 
in recent years, the social realm has been shrinking and the "naked" economic relation 
has been assuming priority, especially in the rights of the "shareholder" (even though 
the shareholder is an individual who moves in and out of a company quickly, seeking 
the highest financial return) as against a "stakeholder" who may be an individual who 
has worked for a company for twenty years only to find his or her place wiped out 
overnight (1996:85). 
 
                                                 
14 Thomas Friedman is a liberal in the classical sense.  He is often described as a neo-conservative in the 
American popular media.  In contemporary American usage, "neo-conservatives" tend to be neoliberals, 
confusing though it may be. 
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Bell continues to describe other notable changes in American society that he observed 
between 1978 and 1996. One is the prevalence of "unease and insecurity" among the 
middle class, caused mainly by the threat of corporate downsizing, globalization of 
production, and distrust of government.  Despite this growing economic instability, he 
argues that "cultural divisions have become the salient axes of division" in industrial 
societies, replacing class politics (332).  The political energies of the middle classes 
are directed towards cultural issues of identity, religion, or morality, rather than 
economic concerns.  He writes that the "politics of particularity" now characterize 
both the Left and Right in advanced capitalist countries, as narrowly-focused issues 
such as "family values" or identity politics replace more broad-based political 
movements. 
 
Terence Turner (2002) makes many of the same observations as Bell, but takes the 
argument a step further.  Whereas Bell saw middle-class alienation and "the politics of 
particularity" as cotemporaneous but not causally related, Turner argues that both are 
consequences of economic globalization.  According to Turner, globalization has 
eroded the link between the state and the nation in advanced capitalist countries. States 
must now direct their policies towards a small transnational capitalist class, and this 
shift leaves members of the middle classes who are employed in industries that are 
deemed "uncompetitive" in the global marketplace marginalized from institutional 
politics.  These marginalized sectors direct their political energies to cultural politics 
or New Social Movements outside of the institutional boundaries of the state, which 
no longer seems to represent them.  Turner writes: 
 
The globally-oriented elites who direct or strongly influence the policies of many 
contemporary states, and who act as mediators between the global economic system 
and the internal economy of the state…have little basis for identification or sense of 
national community with economically unproductive or uncompetitive elements of the 
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national population…They no longer depend on the legitimation of their power within 
the state on an ideological claim to represent all citizens of the nation… 
 
The efforts of alienated citizens to create new vehicles for their civil and social values 
outside of the formal political structure, meanwhile, have led to the great 
multiplication of New Social Movements [which] stem directly from the quest by 
alienated citizens for forms of civic and political action commensurate with their 
social values, which they feel can no longer be realized through the institutional 
political structures of nation-states (65). 
 
Turner connects several cultural phenomena--such as NSMs and identity politics--to 
the "dehyphenization of the nation-state," which has been caused by economic 
globalization.  I agree with Turner on this point, but would explain it in more general 
terms.  While globalization has led to increasing integration in the economic sphere 
(the electronic herd), the cultural sphere (the mass media), and the social sphere 
(migration/communications technology), the political sphere has become increasingly 
fragmented.  International governance has become moribund and ineffective, and 
popular political movements tend to deny the power of states to manage the global 
economy.  
 
Another crucial aspect of contemporary politics in the hegemonic countries is the 
widespread belief that certain kinds of governmental intervention in the economy hurt 
the general populace. A new kind of "shareholder populism" has developed among the 
U.S. middle classes, with important ideological consequences.  The dependence of the 
middle class in the U.S. on mutual funds and stock for their retirement incomes, 
college savings funds, etc. has contributed to the belief that "what is good for Wall 
Street is good for Main St" (Fraser 2005). The economic future of the middle class is 
now tied to growing corporate profits, so the future of the nation seems to rest on the 
success of financial capital. In this milieu, any political project that hurts the 
competitiveness of the financial sector is ideologically conceived as a blow to the 
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middle class.  This has allowed real wages in the U.S. to stagnate or fall while profits 
rise, with virtually no political animosity directed towards the financial class (except 
in the case of corporate scandals).  The old antagonistic relationship between capital 
owners and workers/managers has been transformed, and a new "historical bloc" (in 
the Gramscian sense) of financial capitalists and the middle class has been created.15  
As historian Steve Fraser (1995) has argued, the new high status and popular 
legitimacy given to speculative Wall Street capitalists is a recent cultural consequence 
of these changes in the capitalist order. People look to the captains of industry for 
moral and political leadership.   
 
When viewed in historical context, economic globalization has produced a political 
imbalance.  The progress made by modern states in domesticating capitalism in the 
interest of "the nation" during the twentieth century is turned back.  No international 
legal system performs the regulatory function of the modern state.  Companies 
establish offshore affiliates to avoid taxes, relocate to Third World nations to avoid 
labor standards, or hire undocumented migrants to cut costs.  At the same time, there 
is no guiding political project that reconciles the tremendous potential benefits of 
economic integration with the tenets of social protection developed in the twentieth 
century.  There is no "global New Deal" in theory or practice.16  While regulating 
institutions such as the WTO exist to facilitate the free movement of capital around the 
                                                 
15 The strength of this historical bloc promises to become even greater if U.S. social security accounts 
are privatized, which would tie the fate of virtually all U.S. citizens to the performance of the stock 
market. 
 
16 The lack of a political project that reconciles global economic integration with state-level nationalism 
is especially apparent in the split between "new" free trade Democrats in the US, who favor market 
liberalization, and "old" factions of the party who seek to "keep jobs at home" and protect industrial 
workers from foreign competition with tariffs and subsidies.  This division has come to the fore during 
debates over free-trade agreements like NAFTA and CAFTA.  It is a significant political battle in which 
a faction of the national middle class linked to global finance and management and another linked to 
national industrial production struggle for control over the Democratic party,.  
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globe, there is no institutional counterweight to institutionalize social relationships at 
the global level.  In this political climate, globalization favors a small transnational 
class.  As Duménil and Lévy write with some over-statement, "the rule of the so-called 
international markets is nothing more than the rule of capital" (2004:2).  
 
 
Depoliticization in Honduras 
 
As Bell and Turner have noted, the eclipse of state-level nationalism by the demands 
of the global market has had important political and cultural consequences in the 
advanced countries, especially the rise of "the politics of particularity."  Many of the 
same patterns are found in Honduras, albeit in a different form, due to the absence of a 
significant middle class, the country’s peripheral position in the global order, and the 
direct, violent impact of the Cold War.  Despite these important differences, the 
changing relationship between nation and state is evident in the three phenomena I 
describe in this work.  Consider the following:  Beginning in 1990, Honduras, like 
many developing countries worldwide, instituted a sweeping wave of structural 
adjustment policies designed to limit the role of the public sector in the economy and 
bring inflation under control (Noé Pino 1995).  These policies ended three decades of 
agrarian reform projects, and dramatically weakened the political power of the 
country’s agricultural sector, which employed the majority of the population and was 
therefore politically equivalent to the middle class in the core countries. Since 1990, 
migration to the U.S. has almost completely replaced populist movements and agrarian 
politics as the most prominent path to rural development for struggling farmers in rural 
Honduras (detailed in Chapters 2 and 3).  The basic issues of economic inequality that 
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motivated the entire agrarian reform movement have been replaced by attempts to 
"make remittances work" for the benefit of rural communities.   
 
At the same time, evangelical Christianity has replaced "social Christianity" or other 
forms of progressive Christian developmentalism that were powerful forces in the 
sixties and seventies (Chapter 5).  Whereas the earlier Christian Social Movements--
whether democratic or Marxist--focused on social inequality and secular politics, the 
contemporary evangelicals view sin and salvation as  basically a matter of  individual 
choice. Similarly, "fair trade" has replaced the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), 
a treaty that regulated world coffee prices through mainstream political institutions 
from 1962 until 1989 (Chapter 6).  The ICA involved states in the maintenance of a 
relatively stable economic system, while contemporary "fair trade" frames social 
justice as a choice made by individual consumers.   
 
In each case, the state is no longer seen as an institution that could or should promote 
social equity and development, and the individual is seen as the basic source of social 
reform.  The earlier movements rest on a theory of progress in which the state plays a 
role in establishing or maintaining a class compromise in the interest of the survival 
and reproduction of national society.  In each of the contemporary movements, 
individuals no longer see the state playing a role in maintaining social equity.  I 
believe that these three phenomena are examples of a systemic transformation in the 
terms of citizenship that is a consequence of economic globalization.  In the absence 
of a transnational political strategy to regulate or manage global capital, individuals 
have developed pragmatic, albeit limited, avenues to social change.    
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The Other Side of Economic Postmodernism 
 
The changing relationship between state, economy, and society is only half of the 
story.  A second element of economic postmodernity centers on the changing nature of 
production itself.  The character of capitalism has been changed in significant ways by 
media technologies. The laws of the production of surplus value through intensified 
capital and applied knowledge have been challenged by new forms of symbolic 
production.  The process of value-creation has been unmoored from physical space 
and time, most clearly exemplified by the increasing commodification of symbolic 
forms through consumer marketing, branding, and advertising.  Due to the 
proliferation of satellite technology and the consolidation of the media into global 
corporations, first world image-makers have unprecedented power in crafting the 
values, aspirations, and aesthetic tastes of people all over the world.   
 
This point was key to management scholar Theodore Levitt’s landmark article "The 
Globalization of Markets," which was published in the Harvard Business Review in 
1983 and is considered to have launched the term "globalization" into elite discourse.  
Levitt focused on the power of advertising to create new desires among consumers 
worldwide, and offered a strategy for corporations to capitalize on the power of global 
marketing by aggressively creating demand for a uniform, mass-produced product.  
Levitt writes, "Almost everyone everywhere wants all the things they have heard 
about, seen, and experienced via [new media technologies]…the world’s needs and 
desires have been irrevocably homogenized."  It is as if to say, "The world was once 
divided between people who desired mass produced commodities and those who did 
not.  Now, thanks to the mass media, everyone wants the same things."  Levitt, an 
expert on marketing, is attempting to tell business leaders how to manage the local 
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needs of consumers while recognizing the global homogenization of consumer tastes.  
His conclusion became a dictum that spread from the pages of a management journal 
to bumper stickers and t-shirts around the world: "Think globally. Act locally."  How 
fitting that one of globalization’s most prominent political slogans was invented by a 
theorist of marketing!  
 
The idea that values are created by the commodification of symbols seemed to place 
the world of perception and representation above materiality.  This concept reached its 
apogee in the dot-com boom of the late 1990s, in which wealth was seemingly created 
out of thin air. Skyrocketing stock values were decoupled from any referent, a process 
described by economist Robert Shiller as "irrational exuberance" (Shiller 2000).  The 
material aspect of value-creation was surpassed by the primacy of brand-image, 
"buzz," and other media-based methods of producing value through the use of symbols 
and imagery.17  The brand, what had once been merely a symbol that referred to a 
certain maker of goods, became a product in and of itself.   Even the opponents of 
globalization focused on the most highly mediated forms of capital as targets of 
dissent.  The so-called anti-globalization movement rallied around Naomi Klein’s 
book "No Logo" (1999) and chose ubiquitous corporate brands such as Nike, 
McDonalds, The Gap, Starbucks, and Wal-Mart as its main enemies.  One wondered 
whether the brand or the productive reality that stood behind the brand was the real 
opponent of sign-smashing activists.     
 
The process by which the ideal surpassed the material was deemed a key aspect of 
cultural postmodernity, and it is on this point that the cultural and economic spheres of 
                                                 
17 In finance, for example, the traditional methods of evaluating a company’s value by its balance sheet 
were replaced by rampant speculation based on hype and media reports.  Celebrity financial analysts 
could decide the fate of a corporation based on a well-timed media appearance or press release.  
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postmodernity intersect.  Frederic Jameson’s definitive work on postmodernity (1991) 
emphasized the role of the media in the production of individual subjectivity.   
Baudrillard’s (1994) concept of the "hyperreal," in which symbols are completely 
separated from their referents and all experience was simulacra, was the most extreme 
analysis of the influence of the media on postmodern cultural life.  "Cultural 
postmodernity" involves the effect of the mass media on the production of values, 
beliefs, and identities.  In its more extreme forms, it uses the ubiquitous presence of 
the mass media to argue that the division between the "real" world of materiality and 
the "fantasy" world of representation has collapsed. 
 
III. Modern Anthropology in a Postmodern World 
 
Arjun Appadurai, the most influential anthropologist of globalization, follows the 
cultural postmodernists in emphasizing the relationship between mass media and 
social consciousness.  He argues that the flow of people and media images around the 
world has dramatically changed individual and collective subjectivity, allowing people 
to imagine "possible lives" that were once beyond the reach of comprehension.  
Television and film have broadened horizons, changed consumer appetites, and, most 
importantly, changed people’s concepts of membership in a wider community--that is, 
their identity--creating a situation whereby:  
mediascapes…offer to those who experience and transform them…a series of 
elements (such as characters, plots, and technical forms) out of which scripts can be 
formed of imagined lives…These scripts can and do get disaggregated into complex 
metaphors by which people live as they constitute narratives of the Other and 
protonarratives of possible lives, fantasies that could become the prolegomena for the 
desire for acquisition and movement" (1996:36). 
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Appadurai argues that the dual forces of the mass media and migration have 
deterritorialized social interaction and created new forms of belonging that are 
centered upon "the imagination," a faculty that he argues is driven by the media in the 
age of globalization.  While no one would dispute that the migration and the global 
reach of television and film has had a dramatic effect on values and beliefs in far-flung 
places, the degree to which the fantasy world of the media interacts with material 
reality in specific contexts is unclear. Appadurai’s emphasis on "imagination" as a 
determinant of social action fails to adequately account for the relationship between 
imagination and the particular material contexts in which people formulate their 
perceptions of the world.  In this work, I will emphasize how "deterritorialzed" 
movements of people, things and ideas ultimately are grounded in the concrete 
processes of social life, in an attempt to synthesize the study of local relations of social 
reproduction with a study of deterritorialized global processes.     
  
Appadurai developed the concept of "global flows" in the first three essays of 
Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (1996), which were all 
originally published between 1991 and 1993. He urges scholars to think of today’s 
world as possessing "no boundaries, structures, or regularities," using a fractal model 
that emphasizes the flows and overlaps among cultures and explicitly rejects the 
"Marxist paradigm" (47).  Therefore, this model is focused on indeterminacy, 
requiring a study of processual flows that have no common direction or structure.  
Movement and disjuncture--rather than structure--become the model.  Because of the 
complexities of global capitalism, he argues that "our current theories of cultural chaos 
are insufficiently developed to be even parsimonious models at this point" and that the 
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anthropology of globalization should be "radically context dependent" and not 
systemic (47). 
 
In this work, I argue that the anthropology of postmodern phenomena can be "context 
dependent" while remaining committed to systemic theory.  I agree with 
anthropologists who argue that orthodox Marxism and world-systems theory fail to do 
justice to the realities of globalization, but believe it is possible to synthesize the study 
of particular contexts with a move toward the development of general theories.  By 
integrating the work of economists on the post-industrial economy with 
anthropological studies of postmodern cultural phenomena in a particular case, we can 
begin to develop a theory of global culture that recognizes common patterns and 
linkages between social relations and cultural forms. 
 
I use the term "postmodern" in an unusual way.  I separate epistemological 
postmodernism from descriptive postmodernism, and this work is not postmodern in 
the epistemological sense. Epistemological postmodernism is a philosophical position 
that denies the existence of objective reality and the human capacity for empirical 
reason. This position foregrounds representational practices and the relationship 
between truth claims and systems of power, critiquing modernist grand theory.  
Epistemological postmodernists employ representational strategies that highlight the 
contingent and constructed nature of knowledge as it is produced and expressed 
through language.  In contrast, descriptive postmodernism recognizes that 
postmodernism has validity as an ideal-type that is used to characterize the 
contemporary capitalist world-system in relation to the past.  I value the critical spirit 
of epistemological postmodernism, and a great deal of this work is devoted to a critical 
interpretation of contemporary concepts of justice and progress that, from a certain 
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perspective, could be seen as constructions.  However, I believe that these 
interpretations reflect a reality that reaches beyond the text.  Much of this dissertation 
is devoted to defining postmodernism as an ideal-type, a task that would not interest 
epistemological postmodernists because it draws conclusions about external reality.   
 
Like most anthropologists, I have based this study on sustained everyday interaction 
with a small sample of people. I take the understanding of individual action to be the 
starting point for my analysis.  At all points in this work, I have tried to describe the 
conscious motivations behind people’s behavior.  This emphasis on the individual 
does not mean that I see people as entirely rational actors, nor do I believe that 
anthropologists should only describe others’ descriptions of their subjective intentions.  
However, an emphasis on subjectivity (or inescapably partial representations thereof) 
must be a starting point if ethnographic fieldwork has any value at all.  Anthropology 
is at heart an intersubjective endeavor, through which people grasp the nature of 
reality in dialogue with others.   
 
Throughout this work, I have included a series of "Ethnographic Profiles" that are 
intended to provide the reader with a sense of how individuals in La Quebrada 
perceive their worlds.  Such descriptions, by their very nature, are constructions that 
have a strategic/rhetorical element.  I am representing specific people, and these 
representations have an artificial aspect.  This artifice is inherent in all language and is 
especially important to highly-crafted texts like anthropological dissertations.  I don’t 
see any way around these representational dilemmas, nor do I think they should 
paralyze ethnographers.  "Ethnographic Profiles" are selective representations, but I 
have made my best effort to accurately and realistically depict people’s life-worlds.  
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These profiles are not based on "composites"--they tell the stories of real people in La 
Quebrada, with certain minor details changed to protect anonymity. 
 
Ethnographic Setting: La Quebrada 
 
Honduras is an ideal location to examine the unique elements of contemporary 
globalization viz a viz other phases of global capitalism. Its history is intertwined with 
the rise of Western capitalism, and there are no pre-modern/modern/post-modern 
"Rubicons" that separate one era from another.  The country’s history has been one 
long process of transnational interaction:  After the decline of the Maya around 1300 
AD, modern-day Honduras was colonized by Spain in the sixteenth century.  The 
country, along with the other United Provinces of Central America,  gained 
independence in 1823, led by modernizing liberals that were influenced by the 
North/South American and Haitian revolutions.  Post-independence, Honduras was 
greatly affected by British mercantile interests, and became heavily indebted to French 
and English banks after a failed attempt to build a transoceanic railroad during the 
California Gold Rush of the 1850s.18  By the twentieth century, U.S. mining 
corporations came to prominence, and later multinational fruit companies held sway 
until the mid-twentieth century, leading to the popular, (and to Hondurans, deeply 
offensive) perception of Honduras as a "banana republic."  
 
In presenting this sketchy historical chronology, I am only trying to highlight the fact 
that Honduras has been tied to transnational processes for centuries, and most of the 
literature that describes its history is written from a point of view that focuses on its 
                                                 
18 Only fifty-seven miles of railroad were ever completed, and Honduras did not pay off its debt to the 
European banks until 1953 (Euraque 1996a: 4) 
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relations of dependency to larger, more dominant countries, be they Spain, Mexico, 
England, or the United States.19  Any analysis of Honduran history must transcend the 
boundaries of the nation-state.  It has been "globalized" for at least five-hundred years. 
 
Nevertheless, once I began my fieldwork, I saw things that had no historical 
analogues: Rural families relied on wire transfers from relatives in suburban New 
Jersey to buy food and clothing; illiterate coffee growers talked about marketing their 
coffee directly to European consumers who valued "fair trade"; families began to 
follow the teachings of a Miami-based "apostle" who broadcast weekly sermons over 
the internet. One goal of my research was to understand the current wave of cultural 
changes in relation to Honduran history.  
 
Honduras lies at the southern extreme of what Julian Steward called the 
Mesoamerican culture area, which is characterized by the cultural influence of the 
Maya.  However, most of Honduras does not fit within the Mesoamerican culture type 
due to its relative lack of Maya influence on present day cultural life.20 Its marginal 
status in the post-war area studies model, developed by Steward and others, has led to 
its marginal status in the ethnographic literature.  The anthropological study of 
Mesoamerica has meant the study of Mayan cultures for the past half century, and 
studies of acculturated mestizo groups are scarce.  With the exception of the region 
surrounding Copán and the border with Guatemala, there is relatively little Mayan 
cultural influence in rural Honduras: Spanish is the predominant spoken and written 
                                                 
19 Historian Darío Euraque (1996a) has strongly challenged historiography of Honduras that ignores 
domestic politics and regional interest groups.  By focusing on international connections, I am not trying 
to downplay domestic politics; I highlighting the fact that Honduras has always had a particularly close 
relationship to hegemonic powers at different historical moments, and that "globalization" has long 
historical roots.    
20 In archeology, this is not the case.  Honduras occupies a central place in the study of the ancient 
Maya, but contemporary Honduras has far less indigenous influence than Guatemala or Mexico. 
   
 28
language; Roman Catholicism or Evangelical Protestantism are practiced without 
indigenous cultural syncretism; and there are few ritual practices linked to the Maya or 
any other indigenous tradition.  There are some Mayan language terms used in daily 
conversation, such as comal (cooking surface or hearth), milpa (subsistence maize 
plot), tecomate (water jug made from gourd) and cipote (slang for child), but there is 
far less indigenous cultural influence in rural Honduras than in the Mexican and 
Guatemalan communities that have dominated the anthropological literature on 
Mesoamerica (e.g. Tax 1953; Redfield 1965, 1973; Redfield and Villa Rojas 1965; 
Foster 1965, 1967; Warren 1998; Eber 2000; Cahn 2003; Annis 1987; Fischer 1999).21  
 
La Quebrada’s citizens are mainly mestizo (alternately called ladino), people of mixed 
Native American and Hispanic ethnicity.  There is one family of Lenca indians living 
in town and one Garífuna family in a small hamlet that lies just outside of it, but apart 
from these exceptions, the town is rather homogenous in its ethnic makeup.  In this 
regard, La Quebrada is typical of most of inland Honduras, which is 90% mestizo22.  
The town is located in the center of the country, almost equidistant from Honduras’ 
two major cities, Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula.23  Tegucigalpa is the country’s 
                                                 
21 Central American countries with relatively little Mayan influence are under-represented in the 
anthropological literature.  There are few works on the mestizo cultures of Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras.  Some notable exceptions to this pattern are Richard Adams (1956, 
1957, 1979) Roger Lancaster (1988, 1992), Florence Babb (2001, 2004), Deborah Sick (1999), William 
Loker (2000), Susan Stonich (1993) David Pedersen (2002, 2003) and Sarah Mahler (2003).  This body 
of work is small compared to the amount of research on Mayan regions of Mexico and Guatemala.   
22 In addition to the mestizo majority in Honduras, the following indigenous communities deserve 
mention: The Lenca regions of the departments of La Paz, Lempira, and Intibucá, the Jicaque 
communities in the department of Yoro, the Garífuna communities of the north coast, the Chortí Maya 
regions near Copán, and the Miskito, Pech, and Tawakah communities of the eastern departments of 
Olancho and Gracias a Dios.  
23 Honduran economist Mayra Falck (2002) places La Quebrada within the "developed T" of Honduras, 
a T-shaped region along the North Coast and the central region that receives the greatest attention from 
development workers and the state, due to its proximity to urban centers and paved roads.  Compared to 
communities in the hinterland provinces of Gracias a Dios, Lempira, and Olancho, La Quebrada is not 
isolated.   
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political and cultural capital, while San Pedro is Honduras’ industrial and commercial 
center.  Tegucigalpa’s importance grew out of mining concerns which began in the 
Colonial period (1550-1820), while San Pedro Sula’s growth has been linked to the 
twentieth century banana industry and, more recently, a boom in export-oriented 
manufacturing (Euraque 1996a).  La Quebrada is provincial--the great majority of 
adults have traveled to cities at some point in their lives, and the town’s commercial 
and political leaders do so weekly.  Many coffee farmers rely on credit from urban 
banks or coffee brokers that buy and transport coffee from farm to market.  Road 
repairs in 2002 cut the travel time to both cities from nine hours to four hours, and 
since then a daily bus has traveled from La Quebrada to both cities, a development 
which has made its links to the city stronger in recent years.    
 
Although the town is geographically central, it is not representative of an 
autochthonous Honduran "folk" culture.  The town has only existed since the late 
1950s, when a U.S. lumber company began harvesting pitch-pine trees (pinus 
oocarpa) and milling lumber for export to the US.  Most of the community’s current 
population descended from migrants from other parts of Honduras (or El Salvador) 
and arrived in the fifties and sixties.  It is not a place to study "tradition" in the 
common sense of time-honored, culturally transmitted practices which characterize a 
defined social unit.  For instance, the classic example of a folk tradition in rural Latin 
America is the feria patronal, an annual religious feast honoring a community’s patron 
saint.  Unlike almost every other Honduran town, La Quebrada does not celebrate its 
feria patronal.  The only activities which bring the community together involve the 
public schools or the local soccer team.  Although there are several wealthy families, 
they are not descendents of a "blue-blood" elite, but are typically people who profited 
in the coffee trade in the recent past.   
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Despite its geographically central location, La Quebrada is still an out-of-the-way 
place--a dusty and disorganized scattering of tin-roofed, cinder block homes and pine-
board shacks sitting at an altitude of 4000 feet.  Prior to the recent arrival of bus 
service, one had to hitchhike in and out of town, relying on the generosity of the few 
people who owned pickup trucks, or sitting on top of tons of coffee sacks in a trailer. 
Although there are no tourists in La Quebrada, the town has two small hotels which 
mainly house traveling salesman or visiting government workers in rooms that are 
little more than concrete cells.  Though founded as a lumber-cutting town, La 
Quebrada’s economy is now based on coffee production, and during the harvest, the 
town fills with seasonal laborers, traveling merchants, and coffee buyers.24  During the 
harvest months, there are enough people to support a weekly outdoor market, several 
billiard rooms, and dozens of general stores.  During the "dead season,"  La Quebrada 
is a sleepy and depressed place, where a couple of passing vehicles may provide the 
day’s only entertainment.  Although the stores may be open, their inventories dwindle 
down to the bare necessities and the market stalls sit empty along the plaza and 
surrounding streets.  In the words of a close friend, "During the slow months (March 
to October), you can only live here if you are drunk or in love."      
 
La Quebrada sits within thirty miles of the Represa Hidroeléctrica Francisco Morazán, 
the largest hydroelectric dam project in Central America, which was funded by the 
World Bank (IADB) and completed in 1986.  Though the dam serves as an 
omnipresent reminder of the presence of the Honduran state and its international 
                                                 
24 There are two types of seasonal laborers.  One group comes from nearby villages that are located in 
valleys, where coffee cannot be grown.  They typically arrive in large trucks each morning and are hired 
as day laborers in the center of town.  The other group consists of workers who stay for the season.  
They tend to have relatives in town who they stay with, or they set up temporary labor camps near 
coffee farms owned by people with whom they have developed ties over the years.  
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patrons, La Quebrada is generally neglected by the government and has the chaotic 
feel of a frontier community.  Despite the proximity of the hydroelectric dam, the 
town did not receive electrical service until 2001, fifteen years after the dam was 
completed (See Loker 1999).  The electricity produced by the dam powered industrial 
development in the North Coast, but the rural communities around the dam did not 
reap any benefits.  The dam’s reservoir severed La Quebrada’s overland connection to 
the north, where most coffee was sold, processed, and exported.  The dam project 
essentially isolated the community from its most important commercial link for almost 
twenty years, forcing coffee farmers to make a circuitous trip to sell their crop to 
exporters or sell to middlemen.   
 
The entire municipio has no telephone, despite being home to more than 8000 people.  
Trash lies scattered all over the ground.  Livestock and stray dogs roam the streets at 
will.  Mills dump coffee pulp into the mountain streams, which leave the ground pure 
just a few hundred meters above La Quebrada but run brown with filth just below the 
town. Only one street is grated and in good repair.  The other roads are impromptu 
jeep paths that are often impassable after rains.  Though located in a physically 
beautiful environment with a pleasant, cool climate, La Quebrada is in many ways a 
neglected, forlorn place.  
 
I must emphasize that all of my fieldwork in La Quebrada took place during a severe 
slump in the world coffee market that followed a major natural disaster (Hurricane 
Mitch)., The atmosphere of crisis and despair was pervasive, and the coffee project 
that originally brought me to La Quebrada was intended to provide an economic 
solution to this crisis.  It had little effect, and many prominent coffee families were 
selling their land to finance undocumented emigration to the United States.  A human 
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smuggler--coyote de la gente--had replaced a coffee buyer--coyote del café--as the 
town’s wealthiest resident.  Migrant remittances were quickly becoming the most 
important source of income for families.  Migration was a dangerous business, and one 
that left dozens of families in disarray.  People could be robbed, killed, or raped en 
route, or detained for long periods of time in Mexico or the US.  Parents were apart 
from their children for years, even decades, often with little more than an annual 
phone conversation to connect them.  No matter the physical and emotional hardships 
one encountered along the way, migration seemed like the most viable path to 
progress for many people in La Quebrada. 
 
The only source of hope and vitality in La Quebrada seemed to come from the 
growing Protestant churches. Just before I arrived in the field in 2000, an evangelical 
faction took control of local politics and banned the sale of alcohol, ended the 
traditional feria patronal, and instituted a town-wide curfew.  The pastors often used 
the rhetoric of vice and sin to explain the crisis in La Quebrada.  By living a life of 
piety and strictly following the word of God, people could be delivered from hardship.  
From this perspective, asceticism provided a way to improve one’s situation.  At the 
same time, the religious movement was rather heterogeneous, spanning the spectrum 
from puritanical Pentecostalism to an "anti-ascetic" form of evangelical religion which 
had no concept of sin.  These churches preached doctrines of personal empowerment 
that gave people a spiritual "way out" of crisis. 
 
The central argument of this work is that the cultural responses to economic crisis in 
La Quebrada reflect a particular understanding of the social world that bears the 
imprint of economic postmodernity.  In each case, people understand complex social 
problems as the product of individual actions, and they formulate individualistic 
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solutions to these problems. The absence of collective secular politics is striking when 
placed in the context of twentieth century Honduran history.  I will try to make this 
case in the chapters of this work that deal specifically with La Quebrada (Chapters 2, 
3, 4, 5, and 6).  Before I continue with the ethnographic case, I will explain the 
theoretical genealogy of the study of globalization.   
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Chapter 1 
From Diffusion to Globalization: Anthropological Theory and Cultural Change 
 
 
Is it possible to frame an analysis of globalization without relying on the categories 
"local" and "global?"  Few would argue that the study of the intersection between the 
local and global has become a dominant sub-genre of twenty-first century 
anthropology (Kearney 1996).  In much contemporary work, these concepts have been 
used to relate the particular to the general, with "the global" referring to the capitalist 
west, seen as clashing, intersecting, or at least interacting, with the particular "local" 
places in which anthropologists study.  In many ways "the local" has become a code 
word for cultural difference, while "the global" is a cipher for market-driven 
homogeneity.  Much of the anthropology of globalization is devoted to the study of 
cultural changes that are consequences of participation in the capitalist market, almost 
always conceived as a clash of "local" and "global" phenomena.   
 
In many ways, the "local/global" dichotomy recasts longstanding theoretical debates 
into new language.  Local is to global as particularism is to holism, and as diachrony is 
to synchrony.  The perceived opposition between local and global is actually a 
struggle to integrate particular ethnographic cases (the local) into general theoretical 
frameworks (the global), and to capture the specific histories of local cases while 
remaining committed to some synchronic theory of a self-regulating global whole.  
This is the latest incarnation of two of the most fundamental theoretical debates in 
anthropology, synchrony vs. diachrony and particularism vs. holism.       
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There is a misperception that anthropologists have only recently begun to reach 
"beyond the microcosm" and study transnational processes (Lewis 1998) so it is 
worthwhile to place the development of global anthropology within the history of 
anthropological theory. Throughout the history of the discipline, anthropologists have 
developed concepts to describe processes of intercultural hybridity.  Although these 
concepts build progressively upon one another, each is a somewhat unique way of 
talking about cultural change that reflects a particular anthropological zeitgeist.  
Chronologically, the theoretical concepts that are directly relevant to globalization are 
diffusion, which was in its heyday from 1900 to about 1935,  acculturation (app. 1935-
1945), and modernization (1950-1968).  As with any summary of intellectual trends, 
these theories only constitute a small sampling of the many hotly-contested and 
deeply-nuanced theories that exist at a given moment.  These concepts are important 
predecessors of the global/local trope, each of which intended to theorize diachronic 
intercultural processes.   
 
The postmodern rejection of grand theory harkens back to the beginnings of American 
anthropology.  Labeling anthropologists who choose "context dependent" studies over 
abstract theory "post-structuralist" fails to recognize the long tradition of historical 
particularism that has characterized American cultural anthropology since the 
nineteenth century and has co-existed with structural or social anthropological theory 
for most of the twentieth century.  For example, Appadurai’s version of "global flows" 
could plausibly be seen as diffusion for the postmodern age, due to its emphasis on 
processes of cultural interaction in particular cases and its rejection of general schemes 
of historical development.   
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Diffusion was a concept developed by Franz Boas, often associated with Robert Lowie 
(1920), to describe the process by which cultural traits (including technology, art, 
forms of social organization, folktales, and rituals) spread across geographic regions 
through historical contact between different cultures. In its early stages, diffusion was 
explicitly presented as an alternative to the evolutionary theories of Morgan, Tylor, 
Spencer and others, who posited that societies developed according to universal laws 
following internal evolutionary dynamics. Evolutionists, unlike the diffusionists, were 
not concerned with the way that technology was invented, adopted, and transmitted by 
real people in historical time.  Instead, they developed universal models that placed 
societies on an abstract evolutionary timeline from savagery to civilization.  Boas 
argued that such evolutionary laws had no empirical basis.  Instead, he wrote in his 
article "The Methods of Ethnology" (1966:282), 
 
Opposed to these assumptions is the modern tendency to deny the existence of a 
general evolutionary scheme which would represent the history of the cultural 
development the world over.  The hypothesis that there are inner causes which bring 
about similarities of development in remote parts of the globe is rejected and in its 
place it is assumed that identity of development in two different parts of the globe 
must always be due to migration and diffusion.    
 
Boas was stridently opposed to any untested universal theories of human development, 
and he emphasized the need to study the actual historical interaction of human groups.  
This could be accomplished through the study of material culture, archival evidence, 
comparative linguistics, and comprehensive field study.  The diffusionists studied the 
history of pre-literate peoples, and they used historical, linguistic, physical, and 
archeological evidence to reconstruct pre-modern cultural traditions, forming the "four 
fields" model of the discipline.  They did not focus on the dynamics of ongoing 
cultural change, but tried to reconstruct and catalog the history of cultural interaction 
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to develop ideal-typical models of uncontaminated cultural traditions.  The general 
goal of diffusionism was to challenge universal theories of evolution by categorizing 
and describing the appearance of cultural traits that spread around the globe through 
migration and other forms of cultural contact, such as warfare and trade.   
 
The concept of diffusion could plausibly be applied to  "globalization," because 
particular styles of music, art, dress, architecture, philosophy, ritual etc. have clearly 
diffused, i.e. "flowed," around the globe thanks to technological developments.  The 
Boasians share the postmodernists’ general skepticism towards grand theory, with the 
important qualification that the Boasians had no epistemological opposition to model-
making and valued scientific empiricism above all else.  The Boasians were opposed 
to "armchair" theoretical speculation, but not to theory in and of itself. They had an 
almost obsessively cautious approach to comparative theory based on a radically 
empirical epistemology.  Diffusion was dedicated to the understanding of "global 
flows" without any systematic model of their form and direction, and in this regard the 
two theories are rather similar, but one can only take the diffusion/globalization 
comparison so far. 
 
Anthropologists no longer merely describe or catalogue the diffusion of culture.  They 
analyze the dynamics of change itself and the impact of historical changes on the 
beliefs and practices of individuals and groups in particular cultural situations. The 
study of the internal dynamics of social groups and the integration of the individual in 
society was not a primary concern of the first generation of Boasians, but it was the 
focus of British social anthropologists who were their contemporaries, as well as 
second generation Boasians like Ruth Benedict who were deeply influenced by 
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psychology.  The study of the relationship between social dynamics and individual 
consciousness has since become the primary focus of anthropology.25   
 
Acculturation and Modernization 
The reconciliation of the synchronic British model of society and the diachronic 
American concept of cultural diffusionism was the major accomplishment of pre-
World War II anthropologists.  This synthesis was underway by the thirties under the 
rubric of "acculturation," another theoretical concept that bears much in common with 
globalization.   
 
It is hard for a contemporary anthropologist to imagine the gulf that existed between 
American (diachronic) and British (synchronic) approaches until the thirties.  The 
debate between diffusionists and functionalists reached its zenith in a 1935 exchange 
between Alexander Lesser, a student of Boas, and Radcliffe-Brown over the use of 
history in anthropology.  Even though the two sides were moving towards a synthesis 
at that time, stark differences in theory and method remained.  Lesser, couching his 
disdain for the functionalists, writes: 
 
The American position is associated with a definite conception of history.  The 
processes which control events lie embedded in time as well as place, hence the 
determining conditions and the associations and connections of events are in the past 
as much as (if not more than) in the present…Hence while investigation must begin 
with the case in the present, it cannot end there (1935:390).    
 
                                                 
25  Herbert Lewis (1998) describes the early attempts by Boas’ students to move away from strict 
historical particularism.  Kroeber joined with Robert Redfield in criticizing Boas’ use of history in an 
exchange in 1930 (Boas 1966).  Kroeber’s student Walter Goldschmidt conducted a study of social 
change in California agricultural communities in 1947, a sign of the theoretical flexibility of the 
Boasians and their increasing openness to functionalism.   
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Radcliffe-Brown pithily responded to Lesser with an affirmation of the 
complimentarity of the historical and functional approaches, writing: 
 
Turning from content to method, Dr. Lesser seems to find some conflict between the 
functional point of view and the historical.  This is reminiscent of the attempts 
formerly made to see a conflict between sociology and history.  There need be no 
conflict, but there is a difference. 
 
There is not, and cannot be, any conflict between the functional hypothesis and the 
view that any culture, any social system, is the end-result of a unique series of 
historical accidents.  The process of development of the race-horse from its five-toed 
ancestor was a unique series of historical accidents.   This does not conflict with the 
view of the physiologist that the horse of today and all the other forms conformed to 
physiological laws…One ‘explanation’ of the race-horse is to be found in its 
history…another in its physiology (1935:185). 
 
Despite their clear methodological differences, Lesser and Radcliffe-Brown both 
seemed to agree that synchronic and diachronic approaches were necessary to any 
holistic study of human life.  Anthropology could encompass both approaches, but a 
synthesis of American historical particularism and British social anthropology seemed 
unlikely.   
 
By the late thirties, American anthropologists Robert Redfield and Melville 
Herskovitz began to adopt many of the ideas of British social anthropology and 
sociology, focusing on the internal dynamics of particular societies and the 
relationship between the individual and the group. Whereas the diffusionists focused 
on the historical development of a society, the functionalists analyzed the internal 
logic of a society at a particular moment in time.   
 
Redfield studied at Chicago with Edward Sapir, a student of Boas, and he was 
influenced by Radcliffe-Brown and sociologist Robert Park (his father-in-law).  
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Redfield embraced the synchronic study of sociocultural life, and his early fieldwork 
was a study of the Mexican town of Tepoztlán during the post-revolutionary period. 
Rural Mexican society was changing rapidly, due to a rural modernization program 
directed by President Lázaro Cárdenas.  Incorporating Durkheimian theories of urban 
disintegration from sociology, Redfield was the first anthropologist to explicitly focus 
on processes of cultural change as they occurred, focusing on the impact of 
modernization on "folk" culture and village society. 
 
Herskovitz’ interest in cultural change was based on his studies of the cultural links 
between West African cultures and African-Americans in Haiti.  He identified 
religious practices, forms of kinship, and myths that had been brought to the New 
World by slaves and had survived with some modifications for centuries.  He studied 
the syncretic mixing of African and French cultures in Haiti, and sought to develop a 
theoretical language to describe processes of change.  Although he was trained as a 
diffusionist, he recognized that anthropologists needed a way to describe processes of 
change in particular instances in order to develop a general theory of cultural change. 
 
Herskovitz, Redfield, and Ralph Linton were appointed by the Social Science 
Research Council to develop a research program for the study of acculturation in 
1936.  In a Memorandum that outlined the concept, they wrote that, "Acculturation 
comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having 
different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in 
the original patterns of either or both groups." (Hersovitz, et al 1937:149).  The 
authors described the study of cultural contact as a process that required the use of 
historical data as well as in-depth functional understanding of present phenomena.  
The general intent was to understand how societies responded to cultural change, and 
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how the process of change was influenced by the particular characteristics of both 
groups.  In addition to providing a theoretical synthesis between functionalism and 
diffusion, the newfound interest in acculturation opened up new locations for 
fieldwork. 
 
Earlier generations of anthropologists believed that cultures that were relatively 
unaffected by interaction with the modern world were most suited to research, and 
they tended to avoid field study in places that had prolonged contact with European 
society.  As Margaret Mead wrote in her introduction to Coming of Age in Samoa, 
peasant communities "belong essentially to the historical tradition to which the 
complex parts of European or American civilization belong" (Mead 1973:5).  They 
were contaminated cultures--not exactly European, but not exactly "other"--and were 
therefore unsuitable for anthropological investigation.  Redfield’s work in Mexico and 
Herskovitz’ in Haiti were exceptions, but anthropologists usually focused on non-
acculturated groups rather than peasant societies that were influenced by colonialism.  
The immediate successors of Redfield and Herskovitz, scholars like George Foster and 
Sol Tax, conducted the first ethnographic studies of peasant societies of Latin America 
in the early forties.    
 
Beyond the Microcosm: Steward and Wolf 
At the same time, Julian Steward was developing a different method of analyzing 
cultural change that would also shape the legacy of the discipline, especially 
anthropologists’ interest in the relationship between small social groups and the global 
capitalist market.  Steward was a materialist who drew inspiration from Marx, Engels, 
and Lewis Henry Morgan, reintroducing evolutionary thinking to anthropology.  
Steward believed that environmental factors determined the development of different 
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cultures, and sought to develop a comparative theory of cultural change as adaptation 
to environment.  He developed the "culture area" concept, which attempted to describe 
the common cultural traits of large geographic areas.  Steward argued that small 
societies were modularly integrated into more expansive networks of interaction, in 
which the parts contained some aspects common to the larger whole, but were not 
mere microcosms of the larger society of the "culture area."  As Eric Wolf (1982) 
writes, "…the concept is not processual but structural.  It suggests an architecture of a 
whole and its parts, which remain to be specified after the fact.  The model is thus a 
"hollow" representation of societal complexity, theoretically applicable to all complex 
sociocultural wholes.  Yet it makes no statement about any process generating the 
structure" (Wolf 1982:15).   Theoretically, Steward’s culture area could apply to a 
global world-system, but he only extrapolated his analysis to the regional level and 
"remained silent about the penetration of capitalism" on non-western cultures (Wolf 
1982:15). 
   
Steward tested his regional approach in a large-scale study of Puerto Rico that began 
in 1947.  The study was intended to develop a theoretical model of national culture in 
complex societies, using a set of coordinated community studies.  By studying the 
different sub-cultures of a complex society (Puerto Rico), the group would develop an 
empirical model of national culture.  What common elements could rightly be called 
parts of Puerto Rican culture?  Steward’s students, Eric Wolf, Sidney Mintz, Robert 
Manners, Elena Padilla, and Raymond Scheele each studied a community with a 
different economic base (e.g. coffee, sugar, fishing) in order to find common elements 
of Puerto Rican culture and to understand the manner in which small social units were 
integrated into a larger whole.   
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The Puerto Rico study set the framework for the study of the effects of capitalist 
penetration on peripheral societies.  Eric Wolf and Sidney Mintz would carry 
Steward’s theory of regional integration to its logical conclusion by applying world-
systems theory to anthropology.  This was a consequence of their field experience in 
Puerto Rico--Wolf studied a coffee municipio, and Mintz a sugar hacienda in the midst 
of industrialization.  Both experienced Puerto Ricans’ dependency on the capitalist 
market first-hand. They developed theories of proletarianization that would apply to 
peasant societies around the world (Wolf 1956; Roseberry 1989:148).  In doing so, 
they laid the theoretical groundwork for "peasant studies" (see Wolf 1966, 1969), an 
important branch of the discipline in the seventies and eighties that would be a major 
theoretical influence for the study of globalization.26  
 
Wolf’s Europe and the People Without History is the definitive text in the 
anthropology of global capitalism.  In it, Wolf lays the groundwork for a "world-
systems" anthropology that traces how changing structures of economic production in 
the West affected "micro-populations" around the globe.  Wolf argues that global 
capitalist expansion created many of the social formations that, up until the 1980s, had 
been treated as timeless and isolated by social anthropologists or studied by 
ethnohistorians and diffusionists in a manner that separated indigenous histories from 
the history of Europe.  These historical anthropologists, though interested in historical 
connections between peoples, offered no theory of historical change (Wolf 1982:19).  
Quoting Alexander Lesser, Wolf clarifies the difference between his Marxist 
historicism and that of the Boasians, writing:  
                                                 
26 Michael Kearney’s Reconceptualizing the Peasantry (1996) is an important attempt to adapt peasant 
studies to the contemporary world.  In it, he argues that the category of "peasant" is no longer useful. 
Due to the multiple and highly mobile positions of people in the global economy, it is now difficult to 
call a specific group "peasants" based on their position within a determinate mode of production.   
   
 44
Alexander Lesser…asked years asked years ago that ‘we adopt as a working 
hypothesis the universality of human contact and influence’; that we think ‘of human 
societies--prehistoric, primitive, or modern--not as closed systems, but as open 
systems"; that we see them ‘as inextricably involved with other aggregates, near and 
far, in weblike, netlike connections’ (1961:42).  The labors of ethnohistorians have 
demonstrated the validity of this advice in case after case.  Yet it remains merely 
programmatic until we can move from a consideration of connections at work in 
separate cases to a wider perspective, one that will allow U.S. to connect the 
connections in theory as well as in empirical study (Wolf 1982:19). 
 
Wolf’s theory of history is based on a particular use of the "mode of production" 
concept to create a Neo-Marxist model of universal history.  Whereas Wolf had 
criticized Steward’s theory of cultural integration for its ignorance of the world-
historical processes that generated social structures, Wolf’s theory focused on these 
processes.   
 
The key to Wolf’s theory was the "mode of production." Modes of production are 
"specific, historically occurring sets of social relations through which labor is 
deployed to wrest energy from nature by means of tools, skills, organization, and 
knowledge" (Wolf 1982:75).  He delineates three modes--capitalism, the tributary 
mode, and the kin-ordered mode--but his main emphasis is the manner in which 
capitalism interacted with the other two modes.  His use of the mode of production 
should not be confused with that of structural Marxists such as Louis Althusser and 
Maurice Godelier.  The French structuralists used the term as an abstraction that 
described the articulation of different levels of a social formation.  They were not 
concerned with history or the actual interaction of modes of production, but only with 
the rationalist explanation of how the various spheres or "instances" of society--
"economic, juridico-political, ideological, theoretical"--were part of a self-
reproducing, abstract system (Roseberry 1989:158).  
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In contrast to the rationalist, static approach of the Althusserians, Wolf was interested 
in tracing how changing structures of economic production in the West affected 
"micro-populations" around the globe.  Mercantile expansion and, later, capitalist 
production, drove Europeans around the world in search of labor and raw materials, 
transforming every society they came into contact with.  Global expansion was 
predicated by the demand for commodities in Europe, such as tea, cotton, sugar, and 
precious metals, and the expansion of these industries affected, either directly or 
indirectly, every society studied by anthropologists. 
   
Wolf’s work gave anthropologists the theoretical language to analyze the relationship 
between particular ethnographic cases and the macro-level processes of global 
capitalism.  It placed the study of the global capitalist market squarely in the sights of 
anthropologists and provided a theoretical framework for understanding the 
connection of commodity consumption with production in peripheral societies (see 
Nash 1979; Mintz 1985; Roseberry et al 1991; Striffler 2002b, 2005; Chatterjee 2001).   
 
Wolf’s version of global anthropology had a strong political agenda that cannot be 
ignored.  The rise of "peasant studies" in anthropology occurred in the late-sixties, 
with two influential texts (Peasants and Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century) by 
Wolf that predated Europe and the People Without History but contained the same 
theoretical orientation. Wolf and other Marxist anthropologists played important roles 
in the anti-war movement that engulfed American universities during that time.  
Anthropologists who focused on global capitalism emphasized the violent and 
oppressive aspects of European and American imperialism within the context of their 
opposition to Vietnam and other Cold War military interventions in Iran (1953), 
Guatemala (1958), Cuba (1962), Chile (1973), and other countries around the world.  
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The Marxian version of culture change was a critique of modernity that should be 
placed in the context of the American academy in the sixties.  Indeed, critiques of 
development and the relationship between anthropology and imperialism (e.g. Gough 
1968;  Frank 1969) provided theoretical armature to support the anti-imperialist 
sentiment that already existed in practice at major universities. 
 
The Marxian critique of capitalist modernity presented a challenge to modernization 
theory, another influential branch of anthropology that developed in the forties and 
fifties at Harvard’s Department of Social Relations, MIT’s Center for International 
Studies, and Cornell University, among other institutions.  Modernization theorists 
were interested in the role of culture in economic development, and often conducted 
studies with direct or indirect funding from U.S. government agencies working in 
post-colonial societies caught up in the throes of Post-World War II modernization.  
These anthropologists were influenced by Weberian and Durkheimian theory (via 
Talcott Parsons) rather than Marxism, and they tended to be either ethically-neutral or 
actively committed to US-led modernization programs.   
 
Anthropologists studying processes of modernization were most interested in how 
cultural values affected economic behavior, especially transitions to capitalism and 
rural-to-urban transformations.  In general, they did not view urbanization and 
modernization as culture loss or disintegration, nor did they explicitly criticize 
transitions to capitalism in the Third World as exploitative or imperialistic.  Their 
work was a stark contrast to the radical critique of modernization that was developed 
by the "peasant studies" school around the same time. 
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Given the political climate of the sixties, many critics labeled the modernization 
anthropologists as apologists for imperialism. While the most strident modernizers in 
other fields, such as W.W Rostow, unequivocally saw modernization and urbanization 
as progress, moderate thinkers, such as Clifford Geertz, developed a non-evaluative 
concept of culture change that maintained American cultural anthropology’s 
commitment to relativism and ethical neutrality.  For Geertz, and most anthropologists 
working in the Weberian tradition, modernization could not be viewed a priori as 
either progress or disintegration.  Modernization brought changes--such as legal 
rationalization and transitions to capitalism--and these changes would always be 
contested by different interest groups within society.  Some groups would inevitably 
bemoan the loss of tradition, while others would celebrate modernity, depending on 
the locally-specific meaning of these concepts.  The task of anthropology was to 
understand modernization as it occurred in specific contexts.   
 
Geertz criticized Redfield’s disintegrative view of folk-to-urban transitions as well as 
Marxian critical scholarship (Geertz 1973:93-129).27  According to Geertz, these 
theories failed to pay due attention to the meaning of social change to the people who 
lived through it.  The meaning of change to the anthropologist was one thing, its 
meaning to the subjects of anthropological research was quite another, and the task of 
anthropology was to describe the on-the-ground realities of cultural change without 
judging such processes according to ethnocentric normative standards or political 
agendas.   
 
                                                 
27 It is important to remember that Geertz’ most influential challenges to Marxism were published in the 
late-sixties and early-seventies, at the time when the anti-war movement was at its peak and these 
criticisms of Marxism seemed especially conservative, if not reactionary.  
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Geertz’ early work in Indonesia provides the clearest example of how the Weberian 
perspective can be used to understand cultural change.  His studies in Java and Bali 
stressed that culture, society, and economy must be seen as autonomous spheres of 
human life.28  Geertz saw the conflict and temporary crisis caused by modernization in 
Indonesia as the inevitable result of change.  Changing social realities would always 
clash with pre-existing understandings of the world, leading to confusion and conflicts 
of meaning as people sought to interpret the changes they were experiencing.  The key 
point is that Geertz did not see such conflict as disintegrative--as in Durkheimian 
anomie or Marxian alienation--conflict was simply a matter of the inevitable friction 
that accompanied times of radical change.  He explicitly challenged Redfield’s idea of 
the "disintegration" caused by urbanization.  This idea is most clearly expressed in 
Geertz’ first major publication, "Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example" 
(1954).  On modernization of the Central Javanese town of Modjukuto, he writes: 
 
In these enclaves of peasants-come-to-town (or of sons and grandsons of peasants-
come-to-town), Redfield’s folk culture is being constantly converted into his urban 
culture, though this latter is not accurately characterized by such negative and residual 
terms as "secular," "individualized," and "culturally disorganized."  What is occurring 
in the kampongs29 is not so much a destruction of traditional ways of life, as a 
construction of a new one; the sharp social conflict…is not simply indicative of a loss 
of cultural consensus, but rather is indicative of a search, not yet entirely successful, 
for new, more generalized patterns of belief and value" (1973:150).    
 
Geertz argued strongly that culture has a life of its own and cannot be explained as an 
effect of infrastructural forces (contra Marx) or social relations (contra Durkheim).  
His culture concept is based in on an understanding of human behavior from the point 
                                                 
28 In this regard, Geertz challenged Parsonian systems theory, which viewed culture, society, and 
economy as functionally inter-related.  In an "ideal" well-integrated society in the Parsonian sense, 
culture performed a "pattern-maintenance" function.  "Culture" was the system of values that reinforced 
an existing system of social relations (Parsons 1971)  
29" Kampongs" are neighborhoods of recently arrived peasants in Java. 
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of view of the individual actor.  He follows Weber’s verstehen sociology, an attempt 
to grasp the world-view of historically and culturally situated individuals and to 
describe the meaning and significance of their lived experiences.  On the one hand, his 
emphasis on culture as an autonomous entity followed the idealist tradition set by 
Benedict and Mead, but Geertz' version of culture was far less static and essentialist.  
Whereas the Boasians had an omnibus definition or culture as "learned behavior" or 
the total lifeways of a group, Geertz emphasized the need to understand cultural 
beliefs in particular historical contexts.  He did not view culture as a transcendent set 
of characteristics or dispositions that were passed down from generation to generation 
by members of a society.   
 
Geertz’ theory contains no critical perspective of "local knowledge," such as ideology 
or false-consciousness.  It is descriptive rather than evaluative (Geertz 1973).  The 
great virtue of Geertzian anthropology is its ability to describe the on-the-ground 
realities of sociocultural life as they are experienced by real people.  Its greatest 
weakness is its rejection of any abstract or systematic theory of how subjective 
perceptions are shaped by social relations not perceived or expressed by actors 
themselves (Roseberry 1989).  Geertz has repeatedly argued that anthropology should 
avoid theoretical abstractions and remain "close to the ground."      
 
Geertz’ work was celebrated, justifiably, for its elegant explanations of how cultural 
values affected and were affected by modernization in post-colonial societies.  
Geertzian anthropology provided a humanistic approach that meshed well with face-
to-face ethnography, due to its emphasis on the understanding of individual action in 
particular contexts. In contrast, most Marxian anthropology took "the system" as its 
primary unit of analysis and was too macro-focused to detail the effects of change on 
   
 50
the beliefs and feelings of individuals.  At times, it seemed to blur the line between 
anthropology and political economy (Ortner 1984).  
 
Marxian Responses to "Culture" 
 
In a well-known article summarizing intellectual trends in anthropology from the 
sixties to the eighties, Sherry Ortner concluded that anthropological theory in the 
eighties was moving towards a synthesis of Weberian idealism and Marxian 
materialism through various forms of practice theory.  Practice theory, though hardly a 
unified, coherent "school," focused on the relationship "between human action on the 
one hand and some global entity which we may call "the system" on the other" 
(1994:392).  Practice theory required the study of human action in definite contexts, 
interpreting how specific forms of action simultaneously are produced by and 
reproduce a specific, historically-situated abstract system.  Practice theory rests upon 
the anthropologist’s ability to contextualize situated action, moving from particular 
instances to general, even world-historical, processes.  Though various forms of 
practice theory differ in their definition of "the system" and stray from Pierre 
Bourdieu’s original formulation, all share the basic hermeneutic focus on relating parts 
to wholes.      
 
The first steps towards practice theory (using Ortner's broad definition) were made in 
the sixties, when anthropologists began to integrate Marxian  theory with a serious 
concern for the relationship between economic change and individual social 
consciousness.  Sidney Mintz’ A Worker in the Cane (which I discuss further in 
Chapter 5) is an important early example of this strategy. A Worker in the Cane, first 
published in 1964, is a life history of Taso Zayas, a Puerto Rican cane cutter who had 
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been Mintz’ informant and friend since the author began fieldwork in 1948.  Mintz 
argues that Zayas’ conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism followed a period of 
social and economic upheaval, during which the hacienda system that had governed 
rural life was replaced by modern industrial sugar production.  For the purposes of this 
discussion, this is significant because Mintz explained a cultural change (religious 
conversion) as the result of economic change. 
 
In contrast to Geertz, Mintz saw the modernization of rural Puerto Rico as a socially 
pathological phenomenon that led people like Taso Zayas to turn to religious solutions 
to resolve feelings of alienation and powerlessness.  As in Geertz’ ethnography, 
modernization led to conflict and change.  For Mintz, this process disempowered the 
Puerto Rican sugar proletariat, leading to the disintegration of social life and the rise 
of destructive individualism. Mintz had a critical interpretation of Puerto Rican 
industrialization that highlighted the alienating aspects of modernization.       
 
Mintz’ work was a preliminary step towards the reconciliation of Weberian studies of 
meaning with a Marxian critique of capitalism. In the seventies and eighties, 
anthropologists began to use Marxian theory to analyze cultural values within the 
general framework of class analysis, moving away from the economic determinism 
that characterized earlier versions of Marxist anthropology, such as the work of Leslie 
White and Marvin Harris. Marxian anthropologists on both sides of the Atlantic 
developed theories to analyze culture.  The three variants that directly influenced the 
anthropology of globalization were Bourdieu's practice theory and two versions of 
"cultural Marxism," one derived from Antonio Gramsci and Raymond Williams, and 
the other based on the writings of Walter Benjamin and Theodore Adorno.  Although 
these theories are quite different and are sometimes called "post-marxist," they are in 
   
 52
fact attempts to use Marxian thought to understand the relationship between class 
structure and particular forms of social consciousness. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu developed practice theory to resolve a fundamental problem with 
Marxian thought.  Weberian scholars had long criticized the Marxian concept of class 
by arguing that social power is determined by many factors besides property 
ownership.  Social status can be based on concepts of honor and prestige as well as 
material wealth.    Even within capitalist societies, a person can be wealthy and 
dishonorable or poor and honored, and social relations cannot be reduced to the 
ownership of the means of material production. This is especially true in non-capitalist 
economies without private property, money, or any other abstract measure of value.  
In such cases, power cannot be reduced to ownership of the means of material 
production.  Rather than viewing the importance of ideas as a challenge to Marxian 
materialism, practice theorists sought to explain cultural values as products of social 
relations of domination.   
 
Bourdieu developed the concept of "symbolic capital" to reconcile class, in the 
Marxian sense, with status, in the Weberian sense.  What if, he argued, values like 
"honor" were seen as a form of property that could be produced, exchanged, and 
distributed within a determinate class structure (Bourdieu 1977, 1984)?  Bourdieu’s 
concepts of social and symbolic capital have opened up new pathways in the analysis 
of social organization by removing "class" from the economic sphere, strictly defined, 
and placing discussions of symbolic value (or status-honor, to use Weber’s term) 
within an analytic framework of production, distribution, and exploitation.  His 
approach was dialectical: Concepts like honor, virtue, refinement, and grace could 
only be understood with reference to their opposites.  Values were predicated upon the 
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distinction between the valued practices of the dominant classes (high culture), and the 
"low" culture of the dominated. As Bourdieu writes in his conclusion to Distinction: 
 
What is at stake in the struggle about the meaning of the social world is power over 
the classificatory schemes and systems which are the basis of the representations of 
the groups and therefore of their mobilization and demobilization…the evocative 
power of an utterance which puts things in a different light…or which modifies 
schemes of perception…shows something else…a separative power, a 
distinction…drawing discrete units out of indivisible continuity, difference out of the 
undifferentiated. (1984:479).  
 
As this passage suggests, for Bourdieu, class relations were not only about control 
over material production, but also about the ability to attribute meaning to reality.  
Social power lay in the ability to differentiate valued categories from their opposites--
what he refers to as a "separative" power to create dominant systems of classification. 
 
Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice is explicitly presented as an attempt to 
synthesize Weberian subjectivism (the view that values should be best understood 
from the perspective of individual actors) with a Marxian emphasis on the 
determination of values by class relations.  The tendency to see "class" as constituting 
individual subjects  led Althuserian Marxists to take classes as "the" subjects of 
history and therefore ignore human subjectivity to an absurd degree.  Bourdieu’s work 
was an attempt to rescue subjectivity from Althuserrian rationalism without 
succumbing to subjectivism.   
  
For Bourdieu, individual beliefs and social value can be synthesized through the 
concept of practice (1977:1-71).  He criticizes structuralism and Althusserian Marxism 
for reducing human action to an effect of structural forces, and criticizes 
ethnomethodology and game-theory for viewing individual action as completely 
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improvisational and therefore separate from social constraints.  His concept of practice 
is designed to synthesize agency and structure by focusing on how individuals 
strategically maximize symbolic value in their everyday behavior.  Tacit behavioral 
dispositions--habitus--make the core values of a society explicit.  At the same time, 
repetitive patterns of action reproduce those values, while individual actors remain 
largely unaware of this process of reproduction.  Class structure determines meaning, 
and individuals unconsciously reproduce that system of meaning in their everyday 
activity.   
 
Bourdieu’s theory is quite similar to rational choice economics.  Instead of striving for 
economic gain, individuals strategically pursue social status (symbolic capital).  
Although Bourdieu allows for some degree of individual creativity, action is always 
directed towards ends that are socially determined, and people ceaselessly try to 
maximize symbolic capital.  In this theory, it is unclear how or if people can 
consciously determine values, and actors are left to unconsciously reproduce a pre-
existing system that is, in the final analysis, an effect of class domination.  "At the end 
of the day, there is no room for subjectivity, agency, consciousness, cultural 
symbolism, or meaning in Bourdieu, save as reflexive determinations of a self-
reproducing social structure and the eternal competition for relative distinction within 
it" (Fajans 1998:281).  Social life is reduced to the strategic pursuit of status-honor.  
Like rational-choice thinkers, who see individual action as the pursuit of marginal 
utility, Bourdieu develops a theory of maximization with socially-determined ends.  
Call it "irrational choice."  
  
The second major variant of Marxian anthropology was derived from Antonio 
Gramsci, Raymond Williams, and E.P. Thompson and was based on the concept of 
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hegemony (Gramsci) or "dominant culture" (Williams).  Whereas Bourdieu’s 
definition of culture was synchronic and rationalist (based on logical relations within 
an abstract totality), this second version of culture was diachronic and empiricist, 
focusing on the historical determination of values in relation to economic history.  Its 
general focus on the relationship between "high" and "low" culture was similar to 
Bourdieu’s empirical work in Distinction, but thinkers from this school were more 
concerned with describing historically particular cases than with abstractly theorizing 
the social dynamics of value and meaning. 
 
One of the most influential proponents of this version of cultural Marxism in 
anthropology was William Roseberry, who explicitly presented his work as a 
materialist alternative to Geertz’ version of culture as an autonomous sphere of social 
life (1989:17-29).  Roseberry’s cultural Marxism can be summed up without too much 
oversimplification by two famous dictums from Marx, both of which he cites in his 
essay "Marxism and Culture" (1989):  The first, from The German Ideology, is "The 
ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the 
ruling material force of the society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force" 
(Marx and Engels 1970:64 cited in Roseberry 1989:44).  The second dictum, also from 
The German Ideology, emphasizes the production of consciousness as an active 
material process--"The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not 
dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the 
imagination.  They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions 
under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced 
by their activity…"(Marx and Engels 1970:42 cited in Roseberry 1989:38).  
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For Roseberry, cultural values were considered to be the values of the dominant class, 
used to legitimate power relations at particular historical moments. Unlike more 
polemical versions of "false consciousness," such as that of Lukacs, Roseberry saw 
culture as something that had to be legitimated through a combination of coercion and 
consent, rather than through sheer domination and the mystification of the masses.  
Hegemony was, to some degree, a bargain between elites and popular classes that 
reproduced relations of power. In this regard, he followed Gramsci, for whom 
subaltern classes accepted the authority of dominant classes, both politically and 
ideologically, through the creation of class alliances or "historical blocs" (Gramsci 
1971).  Roseberry’s view of hegemony was more dynamic than that of James Scott 
(1985, 1986, 1990), who highlighted instances of peasant resistance in order to stress 
the "incomplete" nature of class domination.  In an exchange with Scott, Roseberry 
argued that, "Gramsci understood and emphasized, more clearly than did his 
interpreters, the complex unity of coercion and consent in situations of domination" 
(Roseberry 1994:358).  Contra Scott, Roseberry maintained that acts of resistance 
were always part of the hegemonic bargain, and should not be seen as challenges to 
the Gramscian formulation of hegemony. Hegemony, by definition, was always 
incomplete.    
 
Roseberry’s analysis was based upon the relationship between class relations and 
cultural values in particular historical contexts, such as the formation of historical 
blocs in Venezuela (Roseberry 1983).  In this regard, his work was more historical 
than sociological.  Whereas Bourdieu focused on social relations synchronically, 
Roseberry emphasized the historical determination of class relations, rather than 
attempting to formulate the dynamics of class domination. Roseberry had no theory of 
how class politics were internalized by individuals.  He followed Gramsci in focusing 
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on the state’s role in the production of individual subjects (through public education, 
for example), but consistently maintained that hegemony must be seen as a contested, 
dynamic process in particular cases (Roseberry 1994).  
 
The third variant of Marxian anthropology was derived from Walter Benjamin and 
Theodore Adorno’s critiques of the role of the mass media in the creation of social 
consciousness.  Both authors were preoccupied with the cultural and political 
consequences of the development of mass culture during the rise of German fascism.  
Like Bourdieu and Roseberry, they focused on the relationship between class politics 
and popular understandings of reality, emphasizing the sociopolitical consequences of 
photography and film (Benjamin 1968) and recorded sound (Adorno 1982).  These 
authors were rediscovered by American anthropologists attempting to answer the same 
questions that drove Bourdieu and Roseberry:  To what degree do symbolic values 
reinforce or challenge social relations? And, to what degree is culture autonomous 
from economy and society?  
 
The Frankfurt School authors reclaimed the Marxian concept of the fetish, which 
became a major point of reference for anthropologists.  Marx famously defined the 
commodity fetish as the process whereby "productions of the human brain appear as 
independent entities endowed with life, and entering into relations both with one 
another and the human race" (Marx 1978:321).  Marx believed that commodities take 
on a magical character under capitalism because they hide social relations of 
production behind an appearance of autonomous value. His concept of fetishism was 
based on the idea that the value of things is an inherently social creation that is 
misrecognized as the physical property of a material object, realized in exchange. 
Exchange value is expressed as a specific quantity of abstract labor, usually through 
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the symbolic medium of money.  People partially recognize their own labor-power in 
the commodity, but this is an alienated representation, and part of the seductive quality 
of goods comes from the desire to re-appropriate one’s productive powers (Sangren 
2000).    
 
For anthropologists, "the fetish" provided a way to critically analyze cultural forms not 
as collective representations of social relations, but as seductive misrepresentations 
that obscure the conditions of their production.  This form of analysis maintained 
some connection between social relations and cultural representation, and synthesized 
the functionalist tradition with a critical perspective.  Michael Taussig’s The Devil and 
Commodity Fetishism in South America (1980) is the most well-known and 
controversial attempt to analyze cultural change using the concept of fetishism.  
Taussig argues that popular images of the devil among recently-proletarianized 
peasants in Colombia and Bolivia are expressions of alienated social consciousness 
under capitalism. These representations provide a critique of capitalism that is 
contrasted against a rather edenic, trans-historical pre-capitalist idyll.  The peasants are 
only marginally integrated into capitalist society, and express their disdain for 
capitalism through fetishized devil imagery and other rituals.   
 
This work came under fire for its romantic vision of peasant life and slavery (Trouillot 
1986; Turner 1986) and its inaccurate historical accounts of peasant activism 
(Roseberry 1989:220-221).  Despite its flaws, this work is a significant attempt to 
develop a Marxian theory of cultural representations, based on a critical understanding 
of the relationship between "local knowledge" and class relations.  Cultural forms are 
necessarily tied to relations of domination, but they are not isomorphic representations 
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thereof.  Unfortunately, Taussig’s anti-capitalist zeal leads him to serious historical 
inaccuracies that detract from the overall value of the work.  
 
His work carries on a utopian aspect of Frankfurt School criticism, in which the 
cultural products under capitalism are seen as inauthentic "fetishized" reflections of 
the mode of production, while non-capitalist cultural products are somehow authentic 
and "natural."  Turner (1986) has argued that Marx’s concept of fetishism applies to 
non-capitalist societies as much as capitalist ones, because fetishes are alienated 
symbols that mediated productive activity in all societies. In his analysis, "production" 
is not used only in the narrow sense of capitalist economic production, but in the 
widest possible sense of total human activity.  Non-capitalist as well as capitalist 
societies employ alienated symbolic representations of productive activity.     
 
At this point, it is worth re-emphasizing the fact that all the attempts by Marxian 
anthropologists to develop a critical theory of class relations and culture were 
designed to challenge the Weberian/Geertzian definition of culture as a symbolic 
domain of human life that should be analyzed apart from social relations, production, 
and reproduction.  The entire project of these diverse forms of cultural Marxism was 
devoted to the development of a critical theory of culture that avoided economic or 
sociological reductionism, maintaining the critical relationship between ideas and 
social processes without the teleological baggage.   
 
By the mid-eighties, and to a greater degree the nineties, the very concept of "social 
relations" was being problematized by scholars who followed the Frankfurt School in 
emphasizing the importance of individual imagination and the electronic media in the 
formation of culture and worldview.  Perhaps deterritorialized media images and other 
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mediated symbols had become the point of reference by which people understood their 
place in the world?  Migration, travel, and economic transnationalism, in addition to 
the pervasive mass media, had made social relations so complex and indeterminate, 
how could one even talk of a totality with a determinate structure?  People constructed 
their vision of the world through an incredibly complex web of information that defied 
geography and materiality, so how could their values be understood in reference to 
social structure?  By the nineties, anthropologists began to question the utility of 
studying  situated communities, and embraced multi-sited approaches that traced 
various social processes across space and time in order to capture their complexity 
(Marcus 1998). 
 
Anthropology’s turn towards a focus on the relationship between mass media and 
cultural identity was greatly influenced by Benedict Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities (1991), which was first published in 1982. For Anderson, the modern 
concept of the nation was originally developed by "creole pioneers," an ascendant 
class of native-born bourgeoisie in the Americas who were denied positions of power 
by the Iberian-born colonial aristocracy.  These creoles could not join the ranks of the 
aristocracy because they were not born in Spain.  The rising creole bourgeoisie 
developed an ideological justification for overthrowing the aristocracy.  According to 
Anderson, the wars of independence in the Americas required a unifying concept of 
"nation-ness" based on natal ties to a specific territory.  The rise of newspapers and 
other print media allowed the nascent revolutionary class to construct an "imagined 
community" out of socially-differentiated and ethnically diverse groups in the 
Americas. Under the banner of "the nation," these groups banded together to end 
Spanish colonial rule in the wars of independence of the early nineteenth century. 
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Anderson’s analysis of nationalism led many anthropologists to focus on the role of 
various forms of media in the construction of national and ethnic identity.  Somehow, 
the original Marxian component of Anderson’s work was lost in the shuffle.  Scholars 
interested in "transnationalism" took Anderson’s understanding of nationalism, or 
what he called "long-distance nationalism’ in another context (1998), and applied it to 
migrant or diasporic communities that existed internationally, focusing on how 
concepts of ethnic belonging were either challenged or reinforced by the mass media 
(Ong 1999; Dávila 2001).  
 
Appadurai’s critique of the structural determination of values grew out of this 
intellectual milieu, and he drew greatly on Anderson’s concept of the imagined 
community. Concepts of group-identity, and the cultural values that stem from 
identity, had been reconfigured by "global flows" that existed beyond any social 
structure.  In such an environment, perhaps it is better to study the different values that 
are circulated and disseminated around the globe than to discuss the relationship of 
"culture" to a determinate set of relationships called "society."  In many ways, 
Appadurai’s challenge recasts the long-standing Weberian critique of Marxist thought: 
Instead of focusing on the role that a determinate social structure plays in the 
formation of subjective thought and action, Appadurai argues for a focus on the 
content of thought and action in specific contexts.   
 
 
Globalization: The Culture/Ideology Debate Lives On 
 
Appadurai’s contribution to the anthropology of globalization parallels Geertz’ work 
on modernization in many ways, and some of the same criticisms leveled against 
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Geertz have also been aimed at Appadurai.  Like Geertz, Appadurai has de-
emphasized abstract concepts of structure and has emphasized the need to understand 
the meaning of global cultural change in particular cases.  Some see Appadurai's focus 
on subjectivity abstracted from structural constraints as an ideological defense of 
neoliberalism. Just as Geertz' culturalism was criticized for its lack of a critical 
perspective on imperialism, Appadurai has been depicted as an apologist for free-
marketism.  
 
David Graeber (2001) has developed a polemical critique of Appadurai's work.  
Graeber concentrates on Appadurai's theory of value, the idea that the value of things 
should best be understood by a focus on the meaning of objects to different people or 
groups as they, the objects, move through various "regimes of value."  In practice, this 
theory requires a definition of value as individual desire, and a call for anthropology to 
focus on the meaning of commodity consumption in different cultural/historical 
contexts, rather than an emphasis on how value is produced within an abstract system 
of class relations (Graeber 2001:31).  This concept of value is one aspect of 
Appadurai's larger anti-structural theory that I have described in the Introduction (pp. 
35-38).  Graeber argues that Appadurai employs a consumerist concept of value that 
ignores the structuring forces of social relations.  He writes: 
The rejection of Marx, the emphasis on self-interested strategies, the glorification of 
consumption as creative self-expression…the end result is anthropology as it might 
have been written by Milton Friedman…Appadurai leaves one with an image of 
commerce as a universal human demiurge, almost a libidinal, democratic force…(33)  
 
Later in the work, Graeber takes his critique even further, focusing on the political 
implications of Appadurai's theory.  He writes: 
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…by now, at least, it is apparent to most people that when the 1980s and '90s are 
remembered, it will not be as the dawning of a new Postmodern Age…but rather the 
era of the triumph of the World Market--one in which the most gigantic, totalizing, 
and all-encompassingly universal system of evaluation known to human history came 
to be imposed on almost everything…Which in turn is what makes authors like 
Appadurai, who do address economics, so important: the neoliberal assumptions are 
all there, plain to see.  Behind the imagery of most postmodernism is really nothing 
but the ideology of the market: not even the reality of the market, since actually 
existing markets are always regulated in the interests of the powerful, but the way 
market ideologists would like U.S. to imagine the marketplace should work (89). 
 
Basically, Graeber believes that Appadurai's subjectivism serves to legitimate radical 
neoliberalism (anthropology as it might have been written by Milton Friedman).  I 
agree with some aspects of Graeber's criticism, but I think he ignores the deep 
historical roots of the debate between cultural particularism and social analysis that I 
have tried to outline in this chapter.  This debate stretches back to Weber, Durkheim, 
and Marx, and focuses on the possibility of theorizing "culture" apart from "society."  
Graeber's suggestion that Appadurai is a neoliberal apologist mirrors the criticism of 
Weber as "the bourgeois social theorist," due to the latter's lack of a theory of false 
consciousness.  This criticism  also bares much in common with the labeling of Geertz 
as an apologist for imperialism in the sixties.  In each case, the absence of a critical 
theory of culture is seen as a withdrawal from political debate, due to the fact that 
Weberian-inspired theory downplays the role of class relations in the production of 
consciousness.  Graeber's criticism of Appadurai's culturalist theory fails to seriously 
acknowledge that the latter's position applies to the analysis of culture in general, not 
only to neoliberalism or the culture of "globalization."  Graeber ignores the entire 
Weberian tradition in anthropology, which predated postmodernism and globalization.   
 
Throughout this work, I try to employ a critical theory of social consciousness, but I 
think the disparaging criticism of subjectivism is unnecessary.  Anthropologists who 
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choose to focus on meaning in particular contexts are not laboring under the 
ideological blinders of neoliberalism; they are carrying on a long tradition in 
anthropological thought that has taken on additional political baggage since the sixties. 
That said, I agree with Graeber's central point, stripped of its polemical flourishes.  
Like Graeber, I believe that anthropologists must try to overcome the great paradox of 
globalization--the existence of a single social system coupled with a denial that "the 
system" has any knowable guiding structure.  However, the study of the movement of 
people and things through various domains of the global system is an important step 
towards the development of such a theory, and much of the most important work in 
recent anthropology on migration and commodity chains has been concrete and 
particularist (e.g. Miyazaki 2003; Striffler 2002b, 2005; Bestor 2004).  The 
ethnographic portions of Graeber's book, on the other hand, brilliantly explain the 
differences between concepts of value in non-capitalist and capitalist societies, but 
they contain no examples from the contemporary capitalist world.   Despite Graeber's 
passionate call for a renewed emphasis on totalities, there is no real explanation of 
how "neoliberalism" differs from other eras of capitalism in Graeber's work,  only an 
assumption that neoliberalism carries the logic of pure capitalist rationality to new 
extremes. 
 
My own general goal is to synthesize an analysis of values in particular cases with a 
move toward a general theory of the relationship between culture and society under 
globalization.  In the following two chapters, I focus on a paradigmatic example of 
transnational "flows"--labor migration and the remittance economy.  I describe how 
transnational labor migration has led to changing value systems in La Quebrada, in an 
attempt to study global "flows" of people and ideas in a single community to 
understand the degree to which cultural changes are the product of social relations at 
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different levels of integration (local, regional, and international) as well as the flow of 
deterritorialized concepts of value and status in a specific case.  The next chapter 
describes the subjective perspectives of individual migrants, and how cultural, 
economic, and social factors shape their decisions to emigrate from Honduras to the 
United States.  Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the role of local class relations on 
migrant behavior, and how people in La Quebrada assert collective principles in a time 
of crisis.  Taken together, these chapters provide a micro-level account of migrant 
behavior, and underscore the fact that the tension between individuality and sociality 
still exists within the most deterritorialized and fragmented communities.     
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Chapter 2 
American Dream, American Work: Fantasies and Realities of Undocumented 
Honduran Migrants  
 
Chris Matthews:  When I was in the Peace Corps I calculated it would take 350 years 
for the country I was serving in to catch up to where we were in GNP in the sixties.   
Brent Scowcroft:  And that‘s a horrible thought.  That gets to one of the real problems 
in the world though, and that is the people where you were serving didn‘t know much 
about the United States.  Now they watch television every night.  Even in the 
boondocks they watch television and they see you shopping on Fifth Avenue and so 
on and so forth and they think, "Why am I not shopping on Fifth Avenue?"   
Transcript From Hardball, television news program, Dec. 2, 2004 
Many people are coming to this country for economic reasons. They're coming here to 
work. If you can make fifty cents in the heart of Mexico, for example, or make five 
dollars here in America, $5.15, you're going to come here if you're worth your salt, if 
you want to put food on the table for your families. And that's what's happening."  
President George W. Bush, Presidential Debate, Oct. 8, 2004  
 
The quotations above contain two common explanations of contemporary migration to 
the US.  Former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft gives a cultural 
explanation, focusing on the fact that increased knowledge of the riches available in 
the US, thanks to the global media, has altered individual and collective worldviews in 
"boondocks" around the world, leading to disillusionment and a desire for something 
more.  According to this form of reasoning, the arrival of television disrupts traditional 
concepts of status and value, leading to a revolution of rising expectations, which 
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Scowcroft calls "one of the real problems of the world."  Tocqueville argued long ago 
that rising expectations are effectively the same as declining fortunes--they set the 
stage for disillusionment and collective action.  George Foster also made this point 
forty years ago in his classic ethnography of the village of Tzintzuntzan in Chiapas:   
Because of scientific communication media, formerly isolated peoples become merely 
marginal.  They are increasingly dissatisfied with their lot but, sadly enough, it is 
extremely difficult to convert this dissatisfaction into purposeful seeking after new 
opportunities (Foster 1967:3). 
Technological change will always lead to changing values.  Roads, boats, railways, 
print media, and radio (to name just a few examples) have changed the way that 
people perceive the world.  In the present, ease of travel and international 
communication has certainly led to rising expectations for many formerly isolated 
groups who have now become "marginal" (to use Foster’s word) due to their 
recognition of participation in a wider world. 
International migration--as opposed to domestic migration from country to city, 
political reform, or revolution--is now the most common way out of this 
disillusionment for people in Central America.  Despite the well-known revolutionary 
activity of the EZLN in Mexico, the years since 1989 will almost certainly come to be 
remembered as the era in which migration replaced agrarian reform and revolutionary 
activity throughout Mesoamerica.30   In Central America this transition has been 
especially clear: the revolutionary tumult of the eighties led directly to the migration 
of the nineties and beyond (Hamilton and Stoltz Chinchilla 1991, 2001).  
                                                 
30 It is important to remember that the Zapatista rebellion was rooted in the failure of Mexico's agrarian 
reform project to live up to its promises, according to Neil Harvey (1997).  Regardless, the Zapatista 
movement has been limited to a small sector of Mexican society and its impact pales in comparison to 
that of rural emigration to the US. 
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What causes contemporary migration?  The economic explanation, voiced by 
President Bush in a presidential debate, views the decision to migrate as a common-
sense response to economic conditions. Migrants are motivated by relatively high U.S. 
wage rates and the chance to "put food on the table" for families.  (Note that Bush 
corrected himself to assure audiences that migrants were lured by the exact legal 
minimum wage of $5.15/hour.)  In this view, migrants weigh the benefits of U.S. 
wages against other factors and make a decision that "anyone worth their salt" would 
make.  They are not lured by Fifth Avenue finery; they just want to put food on the 
table, implying that they send earnings home to support kin.  These migrants are 
realists who are motivated by a conscious evaluation of risk and reward and not the 
pursuit of a television-fueled "American Dream."  In addition to providing an 
economic interpretation of migrant motivation, Bush’s words countered the 
reactionary discourse that labels undocumented migrants as free-loaders who drain 
public resources away from "productive" citizens.   
The cultural and economic explanations of migration have strong analogues in the 
social sciences.  In their classic synthesis of late-twentieth century migration to the 
US, Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut challenge the view "of migration as a 
consequence of foreign destitution and unemployment" (Portes and Rumbaut 
1996:10).  They argue that one of the key points of distinction between the "new" 
immigration of the late twentieth century and the "old" immigration of the late 
nineteenth century is that "contemporary immigration is a direct consequence of the 
dominant influence attained by the culture of the advanced West in every corner of the 
globe" (Portes and Rumbaut 1996:13).  In general, contemporary migrants are not 
directly recruited to come to America to supply labor for industrial expansion, as they 
were a century ago. Instead, contemporary migrants tend to have experienced a gap 
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between subjective expectations for success and lived experiences in their home 
countries.  They seek "a car, a TV set, and domestic appliances of all sorts" (Portes 
and Rumbaut 1996:13), and wish to improve their standard of living to fit rising 
expectations. Therefore, people with some education and income (in the case of 
urbanites), or assets (in the case of small farmers) are far more likely to migrate than 
the poorest of the poor, who are not exposed to the lure of popular culture and do not 
have the economic resources to migrate.  Portes and Rumbaut support their claims 
with evidence from Mexico (Cornelius 1977) the Dominican Republic (Bray 1984, 
Grasmuck 1991) and Haiti (Stepick and Portes 1986).   
The case of migration in La Quebrada confirms many of elements of the typology of 
immigrants developed by Portes and Rumbaut (1996:8-27). Migrants with some 
economic means (especially small farmers) are generally more likely to migrate than 
the truly destitute.  They fit within the category of "labor migrants," developed by 
Portes and Rumbaut to describe illegal migrants who perform menial labor in order to 
return home and "reestablish or gain a position of social respectability" in their home 
countries (Portes and Rumbaut 1996:18).  However, migration has become 
increasingly possible for landless people as well as small farmers.  It is now a common 
practice for members of all social classes and has become such a pervasive 
phenomenon that it is difficult to point to a set of sociological characteristics that 
might lead a person to migrate. In this regard, Portes and Rumbaut may have 
underestimated the prevalence of migration among the poorest sectors of society.  
Their explanation of the importance of Western cultural hegemony and rising 
expectations is correct, but the same factors that affected urban professionals and 
farmers in the eighties and nineties now impact landless people, due to the ubiquity of 
media technologies.  
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For example, electricity, satellite TV and the internet reached La Quebrada in 2000-
2003, and few people are immune from the influence of popular culture.  Even though 
the poor may not own a TV or have electricity, the impact of these technologies 
diffuses to them.  In addition to this technological change, poor people are attracted to 
the U.S. by evidence from their local surroundings.  The "first wave" of migrants from 
La Quebrada (from the late eighties to late nineties) achieved some success.  People of 
all classes have witnessed the fruits of their success (new homes, vehicles, etc.) and 
this has had an ideological impact on all the entire community, fostering a "culture of 
migration" that reaches all levels of society.  Not only has technology ratcheted 
expectations upward, but the success of "first wave" migrants made attainment of new 
status goals a possibility for members of all classes.  Now, migration is not a last 
resort or a strategy for downwardly mobile people to reclaim lost status; it is "the thing 
to do" for young people, especially young men.         
In this chapter, I investigate the subjective motivations of migrants in La Quebrada.  
The idealist "American Dream" theory (a la Scowcroft) and the materialist "unmet 
needs" theory (a la Bush) reflect two common explanations of migrant motivations:  In 
the former, migrants are motivated by individual ambition; in the latter, altruism and 
social responsibility.  Both of these theories have merit, but no single form of 
reasoning explains the complex motivations that drive migrants.  There is no denying 
that the chance to earn U.S. wages motivates undocumented migration from Latin 
America; nor is there any question that electronic media have planted the seed of a 
mythologized America Dream in the minds of many aspiring migrants. My goal is to 
show how economic and cultural factors interact in everyday contexts.  
Through a series of ethnographic profiles, I will present detailed examples of the 
motivations of a group of male migrants. I focus on the sources of information that 
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they consider while making decisions about migration, and I emphasize the variation 
in their life experiences.  Even within a single community, there are many types of 
migrants--some leave in search of the American Dream, others want to make a quick 
buck and return to Honduras, and others simply migrate because it is "the thing to do" 
for young men.  Sometimes migrants have difficulty explaining their rationales.  
While virtually all migrants speak of being "forced" to come to the United States by 
economic pressures, they also recognize that they make a choice that other people in 
similar situations do not make.  All instances of migration contain elements of 
compulsion and volition, and the tension between "needs" and "wants" is a common 
idiom that migrants employ to describe their situations.     
Part I. Ethnographic Profiles 
Wilmer Ulloa: A "Needy" Migrant 
 
Near the beginning of my fieldwork, a young man named Wilmer told me that he had 
something to show me.  It was a small paper flyer (Figure 1) that someone handed to 
him as he got off the bus in a nearby provincial city.   The flyer was printed in a 
money-green hue, with words printed over a picture of a bald eagle, hundred dollar 
bills, and an American flag.  The text read, "Gane como en Estados Unidos!!" Earn 
Like In The United States. Someone had handed the flyers to all the passengers on the 
bus arriving from the countryside.  Below the headline it said, "American Company 
needs people willing to improve their income to $500 to $1000 a month.  The flyer 
had a woman’s name and telephone number (deleted), and the name of a meeting 
place where interviews would be held.  The flyer stated that candidates should be 
"dynamic," "responsible," and have a "desire to succeed."  Wilmer suspected that the 
flyer was intended to recruit workers for a new maquila (sweatshop), but he wasn’t 
   
 72
sure, and he didn’t have time to go investigate.  His pregnant wife was sick and he was 
taking her to the hospital at the moment he was handed the flyer. 
 
I asked Wilmer if he believed what the flyer said: Could a company in need of 
workers pay between $500 and $1000 a month?  "Well," he responded, "I have a 
cousin that works in a maquila making hospital scrubs for an American company.  He 
makes about $500 a month, so it’s possible, but it’s very hard to get a job there.  
There’s no way they would need to hand out flyers to people like me.31  This thing 
can’t be true.  It’s probably a Korean maquila.  They pay badly and treat people even 
worse.  If it really paid that much, people would be lining up to work there."32  The 
flyer appeared to be a scam.  Wilmer asked me if I believed the flyer’s offer, and I 
said, more or less, that it appeared too good to be true.  We both concluded that a 
company that paid such high wages (by Honduran standards) would not need to go 
hunting for employees at the bus terminal. 
 
I recounted stories of failures and successes that I had heard from others, hoping that 
at the very least, a potential migrant would be making an informed decision and not an 
impulsive choice based on unrealistic dreams.  Unfortunately, potential migrants were 
usually displeased with this suggestion, and claimed that returned migrants lied about 
                                                 
31 "People like me" is a self-deprecating comment, drawing attention to Wilmer’s lack of education and 
"country" way of life.  
32  In this context, a "Korean" maquila means a manufacturing facility that is owned and operated by 
Koreans.  It could still advertise as an "American" company if it was contracted to produce goods by an 
American brand.  Jobs in American maquilas (owned and operated by Americans) are generally 
considered preferable to work in Korean or Chinese maquilas because workers are treated better and the 
pay is higher.  In Honduras, there are American companies that recruit workers for legal temporary 
visas (H1-B), but employers usually work through for-profit middlemen and would never resort to 
passing leaflets at a bus station.     
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Figure 1 "Earn Like in The United States" Flyer 
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their experiences or dissuaded other people from migrating due to envidia  or a desire 
to prevent others from attaining economic success by "holding them back."33 
 
Wilmer and his wife had just had their first child, and they wanted to live in a home of 
their own.  As it was, they lived in a tiny dirt-floored waddle and daub shack with 
Wilmer’s father, younger brother, older sister, and niece.34  Their home was crowded 
and had no electricity or running water, not because they were unavailable in the 
neighborhood, but because the family could not afford these services and did not 
consider them to be necessities.  The family owned about five acres of land, on which 
they grew maize, beans, squash, cucumbers, onions, tomatoes, and various herbs.  
They had a plot of coffee, but they could not fertilize it, and the plants were old and 
unproductive.  The coffee plot provided a tiny income, as Wilmer said, "hardly more 
than the cost of the sacks for the harvest."   
 
Wilmer’s only assets were a mule, a saddle, and a wristwatch that had been sent to 
him by a cousin who lived in New York City.  He dropped out of school at fifteen, and 
could not read or write.  Even by the standards of La Quebrada, he and his family 
lived a simple, self-sufficient lifestyle, yet they required cash for medicine, school 
supplies, shoes, clothes, cooking oil, and other necessities.  To earn cash, Wilmer 
would slaughter hogs owned by others, and would walk around town taking orders for 
the fresh pork in exchange for a percentage of the sales.  He was an exuberant, warm, 
                                                 
33 Sarah Mahler (1995) describes "envidia" as a pervasive trope in Salvadoran’s discussions of 
migration.  The concept of envy is a major subtopic in the ethnography of village life in Mesoamerica 
and rural communities in Spain.    
34 Neo-local postmarital residence is preferred, but people in La Quebrada do not follow strict 
preferences about whether the couple should reside near the bride or groom's family.  The new couple 
resides near whichever family has a more comfortable, convenient space or needs  domestic labor 
power.  There is no clear rule about postmarital residence.   
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and funny person--a charming salesman--and I used to enjoy going door to door with 
him to sell the portions of pierna (leg) and costilla (ribs).  He thought that the presence 
of a gringo would make people more willing to buy, and I would make up humorous 
little jingles or rhymes in Spanish to make people laugh. He paid me in fresh 
chicharrones (pork cracklings) to go with him, and I gladly accepted, not only because 
I liked the chicharrones, but because this task enabled me to meet many people in 
town in an informal and light-hearted way.  I had heard of many unique strategies that 
anthropologists used to establish rapport in the field, but door-to-door pork salesman 
was not on the list.  
 
Wilmer felt that farming his family’s plot and working as a butcher-for-hire could not 
provide enough money for him to establish a home of his own.  He had taken on small 
amounts of debt from kin in order to pay for his wife’s medical care during her 
pregnancy.  In the past, he would have been able to earn some money by picking 
coffee during the harvest and by selling his own coffee crop, but due to the coffee 
crisis, this type of work would not provide him with enough cash for basic expenses, 
let alone the repayment of debt.  In 2002 and 2003, a hundred pounds of coffee 
cherries sold for about five dollars, and his plot provided about five-hundred pounds.  
Twenty-five dollars does not last long, so Wilmer and the rest of the family picked 
coffee on other people’s farms.  Coffee pickers were paid about two-dollars per 
hundred pounds, which worked out to between four and eight dollars a day for a 
skilled picker.  The harvest only lasted a few months, though, and not every day had a 
plentiful pickings.  The family earned most of the year’s income this way, but it was 
not nearly enough for Wilmer to move into his own home with his wife and child. 
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Wilmer told me that he was considering several options to improve his situation.  The 
first would be to sell his mule and use the money to move to the city of San Pedro 
Sula to seek work in a meat-packing plant or maquila, using his cousin as a 
connection.  The other option would be to go to the U.S. mojado and try to work 
there.35   He had heard that some people had found work in slaughterhouses or 
poultry-processing plants (Striffler 2002a), and reasoned that if he was going to do 
that sort of work, which he enjoyed,  he might as well do it in the US, where he could 
get paid far more than he would in Honduras.   
 
He considered the danger and expense of making the trip to the U.S. (about $100 
dollars, by his optimistic estimate), and was going back and forth about whether he 
should risk his life and separate from his family in order to seek work in the US.  He 
knew that he could not afford to pay a coyote, so the chances of successful migration 
were slim.  Most people who travel with a good coyote arrive in the U.S. on their first 
attempt, but it often takes solo migrants several attempts to cross the border.  More 
importantly, his father was getting old and was increasingly unable to perform 
household chores.  Wilmer’s teenage brother could pick up some of the slack if he was 
gone, but maintaining the milpa, which was five miles out of town, was too hard a task 
for one person.   
 
He also openly worried that someone would try and seduce his young wife while he 
was gone, and he launched into an unusual violent tirade about what he would do to 
the man that did so, telling me how he would come back from the States and bash the 
                                                 
35 Mojado (lit. wet) has become an acceptable slang term for "undocumented."  Although the English 
version of the term "wet" or "wet-back" is derogatory, Hondurans use it to describe themselves in an 
ironic way.  See the cartoon in Figure 2 for an example from one of the country’s mainstream 
newspapers.  
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man’s head open with a brick.  The mere thought of adultery sent him into a rage that 
was completely out of character, offering a glimpse into some of the deeper fears and 
drives that influenced his decision.  
 
One evening, Wilmer and were talking about his plans to migrate.  I had just read in 
the news that a tractor trailer filled with undocumented migrants from Honduras, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala had been abandoned in the Texas desert by a human 
smuggler.  The whole smuggling operation was directed by a young Honduran woman 
named Karla Chavez.  Seventeen people died of heat or suffocation, including one 
Honduran.  Two children from nearby communities were among the 54 people who 
survived the tragedy.36  One migrant had made a cell phone call to authorities from 
inside the trailer, but none of the operators could speak Spanish and the desperate plea 
for help was ignored.  I expected Wilmer to be outraged, but he was blasé: 
 
Wilmer:  It’s sad, but everyone knows it’s a risk to go to the U.S. mojado (illegally, lit. 
‘wet’).  They just had a bad coyota (fem. coyote). 
 
Dan:  Does this make you think twice about migrating?  Are you worried? 
 
Wilmer:  Look.  Life here is risky.  When bad people get desperate, there is violence 
here.  Do you know how many shootings there were here after Hurricane Mitch?  
Every night you could here pa pa pa, coming from the countryside.  I’ve been in 
machete fights.[Shows me a scar on his arm]   Of course it’s worth the risk.  Is it any 
more dangerous than staying here? 
 
He continued to describe the risks involved in moving to a Honduran city: 
 
                                                 
36 This was the infamous "Victoria 19" tragedy, which occurred on May 14, 2003 and was well-
publicized by the U.S. media. Journalist Jorge Ramos has written a book on this event, Dying to Cross: 
The Worst Immigrant Tragedy in American History (2005). 
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Daniel:  Why don’t you look for work in the city? 
 
Wilmer:  Have you been to Choloma? [The rapidly-growing northern city where many 
migrants from the country go to find work in maquilas]  It’s filled with gangs.  There’s 
a lot of violence…delinquency… and it’s expensive to live there.  You have to buy 
your food and pay someone to wash your clothes.  Life is hard there.  A lot of bad 
people and violence. It’s hard to make it to the US, but at least life there is tranquilo, 
and in a couple of years you can come back here and live well (snapping his wrist for 
emphasis). 
 
Wilmer weighed the risks of illegal immigration against his prospects in Honduras, 
and felt that it was worth the risk to set out for the US.  He had modest goals 
compared to many other potential migrants in La Quebrada.  He wasn’t looking to buy 
a car or a mansion; he desired a humble home and a set of pots, pans, and dishes to 
outfit it.  He didn’t think that he could achieve this goal by working in Honduras, so he 
thought about going to the U.S. for a year or two.  This wasn’t an easy decision.  He 
would have to leave his family and risk being placed in a Mexican prison or U.S. 
detention center if he was apprehended en route. 
 
Theoretically, Wilmer could either migrate to the U.S. or to a Honduran city to 
achieve his goals.  Both options require one to pull up roots and move to a potentially 
dangerous new environment.  Staying within Honduras has the benefit of cultural 
familiarity and proximity to kin, but with the ever-growing number of Hondurans in 
the US, migrants do not feel like they will be totally isolated in the US.  The higher 
wages in the U.S. outweigh the advantages of staying in Honduras.  The newspaper 
cartoon reproduced in Figure 2 nicely summarizes the rationale of many would-be 
migrants.  Here, a man thinks to himself, "I know that if I migrate to the U.S. illegally 
there is a good possibility that I will lose my life."  Then, he looks at the menacing 
faces of crime and misery, depicted wearing the shaved hairstyles and undershirts 
favored by gang-members, and the "paquetazo"  (a series of consumer tax increases 
   
 79
passed in 2003 under the guidance of the IMF), depicted wearing a dark-suit and 
sunglasses.  He wonders what would happen if he stays in Honduras, implying that the 
risks may be worse than those encountered as a mojado.   
 
Wilmer did not see any way to improve his situation without leaving La Quebrada.  
He thought that organic coffee farming could possibly help, but with coffee prices so 
low, this was a risky proposition, and it would take several years to yield any benefits, 
if it did at all.  No one in La Quebrada had succeeded with organic production, while 
the new homes built with migrant wealth were testament to the success of the migrant 
alternative.  In general, he saw no future in coffee farming, given the low prices and 
the poor condition of his plot. 
 
My conversations with Wilmer continued over several months, because I eventually 
moved across the road from him.  As I got to know him further, I realized that a 
rational consideration of material risk and reward was only a part of his decision-
making process.  In fact, the thought of leaving Honduras for the U.S. inspired a sense 
of guilt that manifested itself in several ways. 
 
One night, while Wilmer was in the middle of his deliberations about migration, he 
knocked on my door.  I was typing notes and drinking whiskey from a plastic cup.  
Wilmer sheepishly asked me for a drink, and I offered him a small cupful of scotch.  
"Don’t tell my sister or my wife," he said.  He and his relatives were devout 
Evangelical Christians, who were vehemently opposed to vices like tobacco and 
alcohol.   
 
   
 80
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Cartoon from El Tiempo, May 2003, drawn by Luis Chavez 
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 If they found out that he was drinking, they would admonish him, and he would have 
to publicly ask for forgiveness in church.  Wilmer then revealed some personal 
information that was not prompted by my own questions: 
 
Wilmer:  Is it true that a lot of Hondurans get addicted to drugs or alcohol in the US? 
 
Daniel:  I don’t know.  What have you heard? 
 
Wilmer:  The son of Doña Sandra went to jail.  He was drunk and stabbed the owner 
of his apartment in New Jersey.  There was a group of guys there from here, and they 
were all drunk, making lots of noise at night.  The landlord came in and told them to 
stop and Doña Sandra’s son stabbed him…I heard that the solitude there and the hard 
work makes you drink…Plus, you have money in your pocket to buy drinks.  Some 
people can’t resist, and they drink away all the money they make.  They can’t send 
anything here or bring anything back because of vices.37        
 
Wilmer did not drink often because he fought off the urge and could not afford to buy 
alcohol.  His question about alcoholism among migrants was a reflection of his own 
fears and an acknowledgment of his own weaknesses.  He wondered whether he could 
resist the temptation to drink if he went to the US, had some money in his pocket, and 
was apart from his family and the church, whose strict regulations and emphasis on 
guilt kept him in line.  He was not an alcoholic, but wondered what might happen if he 
could afford to drink.  How could he resist?   
 
For three days after our conversation, I barely saw Wilmer.  He started going to church 
again and stayed away from my house.  I asked his cousin what was going on, and 
found out that Wilmer’s sister had suspected that he was drinking at my house.  When 
Wilmer indulged, he became guilt-ridden, and he attended church the next day with 
the rest of his family.  He considered his own weaknesses and how he would react to 
                                                 
37 One of the most disparaging things a person could say about a male returnee was "No trajo nada." (He 
didn't bring anything back.)   A migrant needed to return with material commodities that provided proof 
of his hard work, or he was considered a failure. 
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life, as he imagined it, in the US, and this fear of social isolation played into his own 
decision-making process.  Certainly, he was afraid of the dangers of traveling to the 
U.S. mojado, but he was equally worried about what would happen once he arrived.  
Wilmer saw his family as a source or restraint, support, and order that would not be 
able to help him in the US.  He would be on his own. 
 
About a week after the drinking discussion, Wilmer told me that he had changed his 
mind.  He decided to look for work in a Honduran city instead of migrating to the US.  
He could sell his mule and pawn his watch, and use the money to move to San Pedro 
Sula to look for work in a meat-packing plant.  His cousin, who was employed, would 
help him find work.  The money from the sale of his things would pay for travel to the 
city for him, his wife, and infant daughter, as well as food and rent until they got on 
their feet.  This way, he would not have to risk his life by going to the US, and with 
some good fortune he could earn the money he needed.  He would try to make due in 
Honduras before he set out for the US. 
 
Wilmer’s story exemplifies the common interpretation of migration as a product of 
unmet needs.  Wilmer desires to move into a new residence with his family, but does 
not have the means to do so because of the coffee crisis and the lack of competitive 
employment options in Honduras.  He also considered the lack of security in newly-
urbanized areas.  The move from country to city would be difficult, so he reasoned 
that a move to the United States would be preferable.  After a few years of sacrifice, 
he believed that he could return to La Quebrada and begin a more stable, happy life 
with his family. His decision was not motivated by the desire for upward mobility that 
is taken to be part of the "American Dream."  He merely wanted to maintain his status 
position in Honduras, and saw migration as a way to make necessary income quickly.    
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However, Wilmer ultimately chose not to migrate to the US.  The specter of "greed" 
and the feelings of guilt that it inspired lurked behind all his decisions.  His association 
of migration with vice and egoistic action reflect the common belief that migration is a 
sign of excessive self-interest and ambition, something that he tries hard to avoid. His 
eventual decision not to migrate to the U.S. was not based on his fear of the journey 
north, or a purely rational consideration of means and ends.  Rather, he was worried 
about his own self-discipline (or lack thereof) and how he would respond from life 
away from family and church. 
 
Moncho: A "Greedy" Migrant 
 
Moncho’s situation is vastly different from Wilmer’s. He is the only son of one of the 
wealthiest families in town.  His father is the town’s former mayor, the owner of a 
large coffee farm, a hotel, and the manager of a gas station.  He is twenty-five, married 
with two children, and lives in his father’s hotel, which his wife manages.  He cannot 
read or write, and is known amonrg the townsfolk as the quintessential haragán, a lazy 
person who feels he is above manual labor.  His disgusted father--an "up by your 
bootstraps" individualist--refuses to support him financially, much to the delight of 
members of the town’s gossip ring, who seem to get inordinate pleasure watching the 
family fall to Earth.  I recall an occasion when the rotund Moncho tried to hide from 
his dad by lying on his back in the bed of a pickup truck so that he would not be seen 
as we cruised through town on our way to a lazy afternoon of leisure.  Moncho’s belly 
poked up above the rails of the pickup bed, so that the people on the sides of the street 
pointed and laughed, his big ponch giving away the fact that he was whiling away the 
day, drinking with friends. 
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He was a jolly, self-deprecating person, and led an outwardly care-free life in La 
Quebrada.  Nevertheless, he faced the burden of high expectations from his family, 
and failed to live up to his father’s hopes.  He rarely worked, and was not skilled 
enough to be trusted with the family businesses.  The fact that he relied on his wife 
economically was especially humiliating.  Arriving in the United States provided a 
chance for him to start over again and make money quickly.  He dreamed of returning 
home triumphantly, disproving his father and all of the other people in town who 
thought of him as a humorous, benign,  and somewhat pathetic figure.  He was willing 
to perform any task available to him in the US, and had many friends there who would 
help him find work.  He thought that he could work for two or three years in the U.S. 
and return to La Quebrada as a "success"--with a new home and car for his family.   
 
One evening in June, in the middle of the "dead season" between coffee harvests, I 
was standing on a street-corner with Moncho and a group of friends, drinking, and he 
declared his desire to migrate once again.  "Puchale. Me voy pa’ los yunai, compa," he 
said with feigned exasperation, kicking a rock against the concrete wall of the 
municipalidad , penalty-kick style. "La situación aqui está tremenda." [Damn man, 
I’m heading for the States.  The situation is  bad  here.]  "Que voy a hacer, acá? Cortar 
café?  Mejor que limpie baños en los Estados." [What am I gonna do here? (Wait 
several months to) Pick coffee? I’d be better off cleaning bathrooms in the States] he 
asked to no one in particular.  Moncho’s friends gave him a hard time about not being 
able to successfully migrate to the US, but they all sympathized with him. They all had 
attempted to emigrate illegally or were considering doing so.   
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Moncho tried to migrate illegally five times without success, only twice making it as 
far as Mexico City without being apprehended by immigration authorities.  A month 
after making his declaration to me, he embarked on his sixth try, and scrounged up the 
cash to pay a coyote to help him pass through southern Mexico by boat, instead of 
going by bus or on foot.  This required him to borrow substantial amounts of money 
from friends and sell of some inherited coffee land to pay for the trip.  He had taken on 
tremendous financial risk this time, in addition to the physical risk that always 
accompanies the journey from Honduras to the US.  His wife was vehemently opposed 
to the idea.  She felt that Moncho should remain with the family and be satisfied with 
his life in La Quebrada.  She worried about being alone with the children in the hotel, 
wondering what Moncho was up to.  She realized that Moncho was determined to go 
saying to me, "At this point, after such a great effort, he is going to leave.  He won’t 
listen to anyone." 
 
Moncho left with a group of about twenty men, traveling with a female smuggler who 
was known for having a high rate of success.  Moncho called home en route, once 
from Chiapas, and then from Reynosa, on the Texas border, the night before he was to 
cross to the US.  The next couple of days were tense, as Moncho’s wife waited to hear 
whether he had crossed successfully.  I was sitting in the town’s internet center when 
she wife arrived in tears.  She had gotten word from the coyote that Moncho had 
indeed crossed the Rio Grande, but had been apprehended by U.S. immigration and 
sent back across the border.  He attempted to cross again, but was apprehended and 
placed in the corralón, a migrant detention center near Brownsville, Texas. She tried 
to call some relatives in Texas for help using an internet phone, and she spoke with the 
coyote to find out what was going on. 
 
   
 86
Moncho had used a false identity the second time he was caught by migration 
authorities.  He later told me that he claimed to be Mexican so that he would not be 
deported all the way back to Honduras.  He was transferred from the corralón to the 
Rolling Plains Jail and Detention Center near Dallas, a newly constructed facility that 
receives overflow from the border zones.38  He spent four months in prison, eventually 
being sent back to Honduras by plane.  
 
He returned to La Quebrada a different person.  His time in prison hardened his body 
and darkened his skin.  He tried to sustain the jolly, self-deprecating, care-free 
personality for which he was known, but he did not have the same spirit as before.  His 
friends mocked him about being sexually abused in prison and said that he looked like 
a campesino, due to his muscles and sun-darkened skin.  He never told me the details 
of his time in prison, and what he did reveal was always tempered with sarcasm and 
humor.  He clearly was distancing himself from the ordeal. 
 
In addition to facing shame, physical hardship, and psychological trauma, he had spent 
his life savings on an unsuccessful journey.  He no longer had hopes to one day make 
it to the States, and began to work full-time in a coffee beneficio (mill), performing the 
taxing manual labor that he despised.  He was happy to be safely reunited with his 
family after such a traumatic ordeal, but he had the air of a defeated, broken person.  
He told me that he would never try to migrate again. 
 
Surprisingly, Moncho’s story was not taken as a cautionary tale by would-be migrants. 
It was perceived as one of Moncho’s characteristic failures, something that would not 
                                                 
38 According to an AP news story, employees of this jail alleged that prisoners were inhumanly treated 
and were denied basic prisoners’ rights ("Federal Officials Investigating Inmate Complaints" April 15, 
2004, AP State and Local Wire)  
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have happened to a more quick-witted person. One of Moncho’s best friends, Jorge, 
was not at all phased by what had happened.  He decided to migrate only a few weeks 
after learning that Moncho had been apprehended. 
   
Jorge Orellana: The Itch to Go 
Like Wilmer, Jorge comes from a landless family.  His father is mute, and both his 
parents sell produce at a roadside stand, which is among the lowest-status jobs in 
Honduras.  He is a twenty-three year old high school dropout with great intelligence 
and creativity, but he suffers from a lack of self-control that alienated his teachers and 
eventually led to his departure from school.     
 
I once asked him why he wanted to go to the US, and he gave me the standard 
response:  He was only earning forty lempira a day (about $2.50 US)and that just 
wasn’t enough.  He heard about the money his cousin Santos had made in Long Island, 
and saw the beautiful new home that Santos had constructed using earnings he sent 
home to Honduras.  He wanted a shot at success, and it didn’t matter what type of 
work he would have to do.  I asked him if, hypothetically, he was paid a hundred 
lempira a day in Honduras, instead of forty.  Would he still want to leave?  If low 
income really was the cause, how much income was necessary to suppress the desire 
to migrate?  He said, "A hundred would help, but it won’t let you buy a house or a car.  
I would still try and go."   
 
As it turned out, he was able to prove his hypothesis.   I helped him get a steady job in 
the town’s brand-new internet center that paid about a hundred lempira a day.  He 
seemed happy in his job.  Although the days were tedious, it was year-round, full-
time, employment, almost unheard of in La Quebrada, especially for an undereducated 
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person from an unremarkable family.  He got to work in the most flashy, outwardly 
modern business in town, and was earning much more money than he ever had before.  
However, he had to follow a strict schedule, work late into the night, and obey the 
rules set by his bosses--demands that challenged his undisciplined and erratic 
personality. 
 
After only a few months of work at the internet center, Jorge informed me that he was 
going to use the money he had saved to go to the US.  I was surprised, because I 
assumed that his stable employment would keep him from leaving.  Defending his 
decision, he summed up his desire to migrate by saying: "I can’t explain it to you. 
Once the itch to go [to the US] hits you, there’s just no way that you can be happy 
here."  He was defending himself by admitting that he could not explain his desire to 
leave in rational terms--he just wanted to go.   
 
Jorge is the clearest example of a poor migrant whose decision was influenced by 
exposure to Western media.  Even before he began to work at the internet center, he 
was lured by the bright lights of American pop culture, and sitting on the internet all 
day made "the itch" even stronger.  He knew all the words to rap songs by Eminem.  
He and I talked about the contestants on the reality TV show "Lucha Para Sobrevivir" 
(Survivor), and he watched action movies on Cinemax nightly on a friend’s television.  
Once he started working at the internet center, he spent most of the day in online chat 
rooms with people from all over Latin America.  Incredibly, he mastered reading and 
writing by spending hours in online chat-sessions.  He developed friendships and 
inconsequential romances with people from around the world, and pop culture was the 
common denominator in their initial social interactions.  They would talk about music, 
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TV, film, and sports to break the ice, and eventually these topics would give way to 
more personal ones, like family, love, and friendship.   
 
The internet provided a way for Jorge to live out fantasies of upward mobility.  The 
ability to use the internet makes clear statement about status in rural Honduras (less so 
in urban areas).  First, in order to be online, one must be able to read and write; 
Second, one must live in a community with electricity; Third, one must have the 
money and skill to use the internet.  Therefore, the simple act of being online suggests 
that a person is not an illiterate peasant, and has some education and access to 
resources.39  This is part of the reason why internet romances are so popular in rural 
Honduras--"undesirables" are weeded out by the requirements of the medium of 
interaction.  In a country where about 40% of adults in rural communities are non-
literate, and only about 50% of households have electricity,40 the ability to access the 
internet is a sign of worldliness and refinement.  In a limited way (albeit one that was 
very meaningful to him) Jorge was able to transcend his status position in Honduras 
by interacting online.  
 
Jorge started an online relationship with a young woman from the small city of El 
Progreso in the northern part of the country.  They chatted for hours each day for 
about a month. Finally, they decided that they would meet in person on Valentine’s 
Day. Jorge shined his shoes, borrowed a slick suitcase, put on his best clothes, and 
took the bus to El Progreso to meet his novia de pantalla (on-screen girlfriend) and her 
family.  The family met him at the bus-stop, and the girl’s sister accompanied them on 
their date.  They saw The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring in a movie 
                                                 
39 An hour online in an internet café cost between 10 and 15 lempira (70-80 cents) in 2003-2004. 
40 The rural literacy figure (63% literacy) comes from USAID’s 2000 Congressional Report.  The 
electricity figure comes from the World Bank’s "Honduras Country Assistance Strategy" 2003. 
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theater (Jorge’s second time ever in a theater) and ate lunch at Pizza Hut (Her father 
gave her money for the date).  He spent the evening with her family, and came back to 
La Quebrada happier than I had ever seen him.  He told me he was in love, but it was 
hard to tell whether he was in love with the woman or the fantasies of Western 
modernity she helped him live out.  All of this became moot about a month later, 
however, when she broke off the relationship. 
 
Jorge was dejected, and decided it was time to try to migrate to the U.S. once again.  
He had tried to immigrate a year before, and he knew the risks involved.  This time,  
he viewed migration as a personal challenge.  In his previous attempt, he had made it 
just over the Guatemalan/Mexican border before he was caught in a freight train and 
deported after spending the night in a Mexican jail.  He experienced a violent, frightful 
trip in the train, during which a group of Salvadoran women were raped in a boxcar 
nearby.  When he was caught by the Mexican police, Jorge claims the officer 
mockingly told him he was paid three-hundred dollars by the U.S. government for 
every migrant he apprehended.  Jorge laughed and told the officer, "You’ll be making 
a lot of money off me then, because I’ll be back until I make it." 
 
Jorge obviously knew the risks that migrants faced.  He had stable, relatively lucrative 
employment in Honduras, but he was a dreamer, and the internet and television fueled 
his dreams of instant gratification.  It would be far too simplistic, however,  to only 
focus on the media as the source of his impressions of life in the US.  His cousin 
Santos played an important role as well.   
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Santos Orellana: The Model of Migrant Success 
 
Jorge’s idea of life in the U.S. was strongly influenced by the experience of his cousin 
Santos.  In 1996, at the age of eighteen, Santos left La Quebrada for the US.  He was 
from the same socioeconomic position as Jorge, and worked as a jornalero (day-
laborer) before he left.  He traveled without a coyote, and nearly died of exhaustion in 
the deserts of Northern Mexico while trying to reach the US.  In a conversation with 
me, he claimed to have survived by drinking horse urine and stealing mangos from 
street vendors.  In public, he bragged about the speed and ease with which he reached 
the States, and the fact that, unlike the wealthy, he didn’t need a coyote to cross the 
border. 
 
Santos quickly found work in the in the US.  He worked in a chain of upscale delis in 
Long Island, starting off making less than three dollars an hour.  Six years later, after 
working seventy hours a week for the same business, he was making almost twelve 
dollars an hour and had saved enough to construct a small, well-furnished home in La 
Quebrada.  He timed his return so that his new home was ready when he arrived, and 
he brought with him a gas range, television, stereo system, and barbeque grill.  His 
home seemed to mimic the style of the Long Island suburbs where he had lived.  
Unlike the large homes owned by the coffee elite, his was not surrounded by a large 
gate.  It had a neat yard that abutted the street and a small fence to keep out animals, 
but Santos did not construct the imposing barricades that most of the large homes 
have, in the style of the Spanish hacienda.  Santos told me that his house didn’t need a 
gate because, "[He doesn’t] have to worry about being robbed. [He] was once a 
jornalero."     
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Santos epitomized the triumphant return that many migrants dream about. Only three 
months after returning, he married a beautiful nineteen year-old girl.  His wedding was 
the dramatic climax of his American success story.  Almost everyone in town attended 
the service, whether they were invited or not.  Truck after truck arrived at the church, 
their beds crammed with standing passengers.  Townspeople milled about outside and 
crowded the interior. Gawking teens peered through the church’s glassless window to 
get a glimpse of the service.  Santos was dressed in a handsome black tuxedo that he 
brought back from the United States, and the bride wore a sleek, modern, white gown.  
At the reception, members of the groom’s extended family passed around little 
cocktail franks on toothpicks.  They poured Pepsi from two-liter bottles into plastic 
cups and distributed them to the guests.  Instead of tortillas, they served sliced white 
bread to accompany carne asada and refried red beans.  The couple danced to 
American pop songs--not a single song with Spanish lyrics was played.  After the 
wedding, Santos was accused of being "addicted" to everything American and some 
felt that his wedding was an over-the-top expression of his new American identity.  It 
was the type of event that a jornalero could hardly imagine before the days of U.S. 
migration, and it was a very public display of Santos’ new status as a successful 
returnee.  For the dozens of young men who watched the wedding through the 
windows of the church, the message was clear:  Undocumented migration can help 
you live your dreams.     
 
On another occasion, I was sitting with young Jorge in Santos’ plush new home, 
watching a videotape of the Dominican film¸ Nueba Yol (Muñiz 1995), a tragicomedy 
about life as an undocumented migrant in New York.  In one of the film’s scenes, 
Fellito, a smooth-talking Puerto Rican friend of the protagonist, Balbuena, tells him 
that, "In New York, the dollars fly around the street like lettuce…Arriving in New 
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York is like arriving in heaven."  Santos laughed and said, "Así piensa todo el mundo 
acá" [That’s what everyone thinks here.] Then looking at his young cousin, who lay 
prone on the couch watching TV, and was planning to leave for the States within a 
month, he said, "No es cierto.  Allá, la vida es muy dura." [It’s not true.  Life is hard 
there.] 
 
Santos had been discouraging Jorge from migrating for some time. Later, I asked 
Jorge if he would heed the advice.  "Look," he told me, "He (Santos) says it’s so hard 
there, but he has a furnished home, a car, cows (counting off the assets on his fingers).  
He has no reason to complain." [Mire. Él me dice que es tan dura la vida allá.  Pues, él 
tiene casa amueblada, carro, vacas.  No tiene por que quejarse.]  For Jorge, the 
economic ends justified the means, no matter what his cousin said.   
 
Two months later, I received an instant message from Jorge, saying that he was stuck 
in a small town in Chiapas, working for food in the safe-house of a coyote.  Mexican 
migration authorities were patrolling the town looking for migrants, and he wanted to 
return to Honduras.  He promised me that he would go back to work at the internet 
center and admitted that he had made a mistake.  He claimed to have contracted 
dengue fever (a lie) to play on my sympathies. I wired him fifty dollars to use as bus 
fare to get back to Honduras.  He returned to La Quebrada a week later, and soon went 
back to his old job at the internet center. 
 
The fitting coda to this story is that Santos Orellana, the epitome of the migrant dream, 
decided to return to Long Island after only six months in La Quebrada.  He was bored, 
running low on money, and not as happy in his dream home as he thought he would 
be.  He paid a coyote to go back to the US, and began working at the deli again.  His 
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wife felt scared and lonely in the big new home, and moved back in with her mother.  
The home that Santos had spent six years saving--the clearest symbol of the fact that 
he had "made it"--was left unoccupied.  
These profiles provide a sense of the complex set of factors that affect migrant 
behavior, and the difficulty of making generalizations about migrants’ motives, even 
within one town.  It is important to remember that all of these cases are from a 
backwater town, in the midst of economic crisis, in one of the poorest countries in the 
Western Hemisphere.  Economic opportunity is, of course, the single most important 
factor that attracts migrants to the US, and the relative poverty of Honduras viz a viz 
the United States lurks in the background of all of these descriptions.  However, these 
profiles show that different people have dramatically different goals and aspirations 
when they decide to migrate.  In some cases, men choose to migrate (or not, in 
Wilmer’s case) for emotional reasons.  Religious values affected Wilmer’s decision to 
stay in Honduras.  Masculine honor and pride played into Wilmer, Moncho, Jorge, and 
Santos’ decisions.  Yes, migrants decide to set out for America in search of economic 
opportunity, but the decision to pull up roots is grounded in the relatively mundane 
processes of social life. 
The subjects of these profiles are all men.  As I mentioned earlier, far fewer women 
migrate and only a handful of females have returned to La Quebrada.  The female 
returnees with whom I spoke speculated that women chose to remain in the U.S. 
because they have greater opportunity for economic independence there.  They said 
that women from La Quebrada often found work as nannies, baby-sitters, or 
housecleaners in suburban locations.  As one woman put it, "They are doing many of 
the same things that they do here.  But there (in the US) they can get paid well for it, 
and they have more freedom, because men act differently there."  In the "ideal" 
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division of labor in La Quebrada, men are responsible for providing food, either 
through subsistence agriculture or wage labor, while women are responsible for 
managing the household, childcare, cooking, and caring for the elderly.  In reality, 
women play a much larger role in income-generation than men are willing to admit.  
In addition to harvesting coffee, women often work in small general stores (pulperias), 
or informally work as maids, cooks, or clothes-washers.  There are a significant 
number of women that work in urban maquilas and come back to La Quebrada on 
weekends.  These relatively mobile women tend to be unmarried.  If they do have 
children, they leave them in the care of their mother (the child’s grandmother) while 
they earn money in the city.  I did not know of a single case in La Quebrada where a 
man assumed childcare duties or managed the household.  Three of the female 
maquila workers I spoke with eventually used their incomes to pay for passage to the 
United States. 
One of the interesting aspects of the relationship between gender and migration is the 
fact that male migrants often have to perform feminine-gendered labor while in the 
US.  They often work as cooks, dishwashers, or janitors. And when they are at home 
in the US, they are surrounded by men, and have to prepare their own meals and wash 
their own clothes.  This may partly account for the somewhat exaggerated 
performances of masculinity that are common among returned migrants like Santos.  
The time spent by male migrants in the U.S. is marked by a temporary inversion of 
gender norms that is somewhat humiliating (Boehm 2003).  This temporary 
embarrassment fuels the males’ desire to return and live the life of a successful señor 
in La Quebrada.     
With some over-simplification, migrants in La Quebrada can be placed into the 
following three categories: altruistic migrants, anomic migrants, and ambitious 
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migrants41.  Altruistic migrants (like Wilmer) are motivated by a desire to support kin.  
Individual self-advancement, beyond the immediate needs of the family, is not 
important.  They do not seek the "American Dream" of unlimited upward mobility.  
Anomic migrants, like Moncho and Jorge, are frustrated with their lives and feel 
disconnected from family and community.  They migrate because they seek to prove 
their worth to others (as in Moncho’s case) or simply because they are bored and 
dissatisfied with their future prospects (as in Jorge’s case).  Ambitious migrants are 
more likely to pursue upward mobility and material wealth.  In La Quebrada, they tend 
not to seek long-term success in the US.  Rather, they seek to earn as much money as 
quickly as possible, and to return to Honduras to live a high-status lifestyle, following 
the model of "labor migrants" developed by Portes and Rumbaut (1996).  The 
"American Dream" for them, is a triumphant return to a new home La Quebrada after 
years of toil in the US.  Santos is the best example of this type.  
These categories are abstractions that I have created for analytical purposes.  
However, they are similar to categories that people in La Quebrada use to describe 
migrants.  The decision to leave one’s community in search of money can either be 
seen as a profoundly individualistic act or an altruistic one, and in La Quebrada, 
people separate migrants into two categories--the "needy" and "greedy."  For "needy" 
people, migration is considered a socially acceptable action, but for "greedy" people, it 
is an egoistic act that threatens the survival of the community.   As I will argue in the 
following chapter, these native generalizations about migrant "types" reveal basic 
principles of individuality and sociality in La Quebrada.  
                                                 
41 The first two categories are, of course, references to Durkheim’s typology of suicide.  I am not trying 
to draw an analogy between migration and suicide. The terms are similar only on the most superficial 
level.  
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Chapter 3 
The Needy, the Greedy, and the Lazy 
In the previous chapter, I used individual ethnographic profiles to demonstrate that 
migrants from La Quebrada come from all social classes and migrate for a variety of 
complex reasons.  All of the people I described believed that migration would improve 
their life situations. However, they had to balance the potential benefits of migration 
with physical risks and the negative consequences of emigration for their families and 
communities. Migrants had to leave their families behind in search of income, and this 
produced strong feelings of guilt.  Male migrants often faced an intractable dilemma:  
They couldn’t provide economically for their families without leaving Honduras, yet 
by leaving Honduras they would be abandoning their families, crops, churches and 
neighborhoods.  Economic survival threatened social reproduction.42 
There is great confusion and ambivalence over whether migration should be seen as a 
positive or negative change for La Quebrada.  Everyone in La Quebrada recognized 
that some individuals and families had indeed prospered from migrant earnings and 
remittances, but most agreed that a migrant economy was not a viable substitute for 
coffee farming, or some other local economic base.  Migrant wealth was concentrated 
in new homes or vehicles.  It may have helped a few local businesses (e.g. home 
construction and retail shops), but migrants did not invest in productive industries, and 
therefore did not employ many people, keeping the remitted income within a small 
group.  Remittances did not produce a long-term economic base for the town’s 
majority.  Without an economic base, the children of migrants would have to migrate 
                                                 
42 Coffee production was secondary to the lumber industry in La Quebrada until the early seventies, so 
by using the term "social reproduction," I am not implying that people are resistant to change per se.  
They would welcome any new productive activity, as long as it allowed basic social processes to 
continue: e.g. marriage, child-rearing, care for the elderly.    
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in order to maintain their standard of living, threatening the community’s survival as 
parents separated from their children, elderly parents, and other extended kin.  On 
balance, I found that people tended to see migration as a negative phenomenon.  
Migration was an understandable way for people to cope with the coffee crisis, it had 
been beneficial for a fortunate few, but it was a short-term source of income that 
threatened the long term survival of the community. 
People expressed their ambivalence about migrant dependency in the idioms they used 
to describe migrants.  Male migrants were often described as "haragán" (lazy person, 
loafer) and "ambicioso" (greedy, selfish, overly ambitious).  Some people migrated 
out of necessity (migrantes de necesidad), but they were exceptions to the general 
pattern.  The specific ways that people distinguished between negatively-valued "lazy" 
and "greedy" migrants, and neutral or positively-valued "needy" migrants demonstrate 
the ways that people perceive migration as a conflict between the needs of the 
individual and the needs of the group.     
Before I can continue this argument, it is necessary to place the previous chapter’s 
micro-level descriptions of migration in regional and historical context.  Without a 
wider perspective, it would be impossible to understand the meaning of migration to 
local people.  Local criticisms of migrant "greed" are directly tied to the rapidly rising 
economic power of young migrants throughout Honduras.  Unfortunately, 
Honduras/US migration is a topic that has been virtually ignored by scholars until 
recently, so I will shift to a wider focus to put the experience of La Quebrada into 
regional context. 
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Honduran Migration to the U.S. in Comparative Perspective 
The Honduran community in the U.S. is one of the fastest-growing immigrant groups 
in the country.  From the 1990 Census to the 2000 U.S. Census, the official population 
of Hondurans in the U.S. rose from 130,000 to 217,000, an increase of 67%.  Since 
1998, undocumented Honduran migrants have been arriving to the U.S. at a rapid rate.  
In 2002, there were more migrants from Honduras (11,033) apprehended at the U.S. 
border than from any other country besides Mexico (INS Statistical Yearbook 2002).  
The INS estimated the unauthorized Honduran population in the U.S. to be 138,000 in 
2000, which represented a threefold increase since 1990 (INS Statistical Yearbook 
2001), and made it the fifth largest--and the fastest growing--population of 
undocumented recent immigrants in the country. 
 
Honduran migration patterns differ from the more well-known cases of El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua for many reasons, the most important being the political 
situation of Honduras in the 1980s. Honduras did not directly experience widespread 
civil war and massive peasant displacement in the eighties.  Although the country was 
deeply affected by the wars in neighboring countries (as described in Chapter IV),  
warfare was not an immediate cause of emigration, as it was in other countries during 
that time.  Migration from Honduras did not really take off until the 1990s.  Using 
EWI data from the INS (see Figure 3), it is clear that undocumented Honduran 
immigration has risen steadily since 1987, peaked after Hurricane Mitch in FY 1999, 
and has remained at a high level since then. 
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Figure 3 Entries Without Inspection, 1987-2002 
Source: Statistical Handbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
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For the sake of analytical clarity, I separate the history of US/Honduran migration into 
three phases, 1950-1990, 1992-1999, and Post-Hurricane Mitch (1999 to the present).  
Although there were small amounts of immigration from Honduras to the U.S. before 
1951, INS statistics show a significant jump in migration from all of Central America 
during the fifties.  Unfortunately, Central American countries other than El Salvador 
were pooled together in INS reports at that time, so it is difficult to determine exact 
numbers of migrants.  Nancie Gonzalez reports that the international linkages formed 
during the heyday of the Honduran banana economy (pre-1960) were key to the pre-
1990s patterns of migration (Gonzalez 1988).  According to Gonzalez, many migrants 
were members of the Garífuna ethnic group who worked on the banana boats or in 
other parts of the fruit industry, and made connections with U.S. citizens through 
business interactions. Also, the local mercantile class tied to the banana trade 
developed bonds with Americans, and some ended up migrating. This led to the 
creation of a significant Honduran community in New Orleans, the most important 
port for banana shipments from Honduras.  As Hamilton and Stoltz Chinchilla argue 
for the case of El Salvador, it is likely that the pre-1990s migrants were mainly 
middle-class Hondurans who had attained some professional skills working in US-run 
industries, including the banana trade (Hamilton and Stoltz Chinchilla 2001:29, Puerta 
2003).  These people most likely worked in the domestic-service or industrial sectors, 
or facilitated the fruit import/export business in the US.   
 
For most of the past century, the Honduran economy was dominated by the production 
of bananas for export, an industry that was centered in the northern part of the country, 
along the Caribbean coast.  The banana industry was in a state of prolonged decline 
from the 1960s on, and during that time, the Honduran coffee industry rose in 
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importance.  As LaFeber (1983) and Euraque (1996a) note, the export-oriented cattle 
and cotton industries also boomed during the 1960s and 1970s, causing large-scale 
peasant displacement, mainly in the southern part of the country.  However, unlike in 
El Salvador, where this process led the displaced peasantry to emigrate to Honduras or 
the U.S. (Hamilton and Stoltz Chinchilla 1991; Mahler 1995), it mainly led to internal 
migration in Honduras, where industrial development in the northern part of the 
country attracted rural workers.   
 
Because the social pressures caused by large-scale export agriculture (especially 
cotton production) were more severe in El Salvador than in Honduras, many 
Salvadoran peasants immigrated to the Honduran countryside during the sixties.  
According to LaFeber (1983:175), 300,000 Salvadorans had entered Honduras by 
1969.  The influx of Salvadorans into Honduras, and the consequent expulsion of 
15,000-20,000 Salvadoran migrants (Euraque 1996a:141), led El Salvador to invade 
Honduras in July of 1969, the beginning of the so-called Soccer War.43  El Salvador 
occupied 1,600 square kilometers of land in southern Honduras, but it was quickly 
forced to withdraw its troops by the Organization of American States (Euraque 
1996a:140).   
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the rise of the maquila sector led to some movement back to 
urban areas such as San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa, especially the former, where 
most light-manufacturing was based.  Because Honduras is less densely populated 
than El Salvador and Guatemala, land-tenure issues and urban overcrowding have 
been a less severe problem in Honduras than in these countries.  Although many 
                                                 
43 See Euraque (1996a) and LaFeber (1983) on the origins of the Soccer War.  LaFeber writes that 
"about 130,000" Salvadorans returned to El Salvador after the war (176). 
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Hondurans have been forced onto marginal mountainous land by agro-industrial 
expansion, Honduras does not have the population pressures that led to widespread 
migration to the U.S. from El Salvador or Guatemala.  Honduran immigration rates 
were far lower than those of neighboring countries during this period.  Internal 
migration, from country to city and back again, was far more common in Honduras 
than migration to the US. 
 
The second phase of Honduran migration occurred from the late 1980s to the mid 
1990s, and was chiefly related to a major drop in coffee prices caused by the demise of 
the International Coffee Agreement in 1989, and the passage of the three U.S. laws, 
IRCA in 1986, the Immigration Act of 1990, and the Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. The 1986 law allowed for the legalization of 
people who had resided in the U.S. since 1982, and the 1990 law expanded the 
preference quotas to allow for greater numbers of people to enter the US.  Although 
there is no direct study of the effect of these laws on immigration from Central 
America, the dramatic increase in the number of immigrants in the late eighties and 
early nineties suggests a correlation.  Besides the direct influence of the expanded 
quotas, the rise could be due to the increased incomes that family members in the U.S. 
could earn after becoming permanent residents, which could provide funds for family 
members to immigrate.  By the early nineties, many of the immigrants that came in the 
eighties would have become U.S. citizens, allowing their children, spouses or, in some 
cases, parents, to qualify for visas.  According to Michael Jones-Correa (1998), more 
than half of the Hondurans who migrated to New York between 1982 and 1989 and 
became citizens were naturalized between five and nine years of residence (Jones-
Correa 1998:98), and their change in legal status could partly account for the large 
numbers of people that immigrated in the early nineties.  Between 1992 and 1996, 
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more than 16,000 Hondurans were naturalized as U.S. citizens, a fact that could 
account for a rise in "second wave" migrants, given that family preferences were 
greatly expanded in the 1990 Immigration Act.  The 1996 law made it significantly 
harder for undocumented immigrants to naturalize, so naturalization rates dropped in 
1997 and 1998 (INS 2001). 
 
 I did not personally encounter or hear about any migrants from La Quebrada that 
acquired visas through the expanded quotas, but, as legal residents, these people would 
be relatively unlikely to return to Honduras.  The most significant cause of the wave of 
emigration from La Quebrada in the early nineties was the cessation of the 
International Coffee Agreement, and the subsequent crisis in coffee prices that 
occurred from 1990-1992.  The coffee crisis certainly was another cause of emigration 
from Honduras to the U.S. in the early-nineties.  Because most Honduran coffee 
farmers are smallholders, they would also tend to migrate illegally, which likely 
contributed to the spike in EWIs in the early-nineties.  
 
Hurricane Mitch struck in October of 1998, left nearly 10,000 Hondurans dead, and 
led to the displacement of over a million people.  In its aftermath, there was a dramatic 
rise in illegal immigration from Honduras, with the number of Hondurans 
apprehended at the southern U.S. border (Entry Without Inspection or EWI) reported 
by the INS rising from 10,600 to 18,800 between Fiscal Year 1998 and 1999.  Legal 
immigration remained steady, due to the fact that the number of available visas was 
not expanded.  After Hurricane Mitch, another severe coffee crisis (1999-2003) caused 
many farmers to migrate north.  In 1998, Hondurans already in the U.S. were granted 
Temporary Protected Status that allowed them to remain legally in the U.S. until 2002.  
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TPS was extended in 2001 and again in 2004, so that Hondurans who arrived before 
January of 1998 could remain in the U.S. without fear of deportation until 2006.  
 
Mitch damaged lowland areas, especially the tobacco and banana crops, far more 
seriously than it did the coffee-growing regions.  Close to 90% of the banana crop was 
affected, leaving 17,000 workers jobless.44  In the aftermath of the storm, Honduran 
President Carlos Flores Facussé used the fear of migration to plead for aid from the 
US, "warning that a new wave of migrants will go ‘walking, swimming and running 
up north’ unless the United States helps Central America get back on its feet."45  The 
present high rates of undocumented migration show no signs of letting up.  In fact, 
although EWI apprehensions have fallen from the Post-Mitch spike, they rose between 
2000 and 2002, showing that undocumented migration from Honduras remains 
widespread.  At present, more Hondurans are stopped at the southern border than 
citizens of any other country besides Mexico.   
 
La Quebrada is now in transition from a coffee economy to one based on migrant 
circuits.  Prior to the mid-nineties, few people in La Quebrada migrated to the United 
States, but since 1998, the economy has increasingly come to depend on migration.  
By 2003, close to five hundred townspeople were living in the United States, dispersed 
throughout the country, with suburban Long Island and Morristown, New Jersey being 
the most popular destinations.  The first migrant "pioneers" used connections with the 
well-established Salvadoran community in Nassau County, Long Island (the same 
community described in Mahler 1995) in order to immigrate between 1990 and 1992.  
Two members of the first wave of migrants were men whose families had immigrated 
                                                 
44 Migration News, 6:01 (January 1999) 
45 Migration News, 5:12 (December 1998) 
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to Honduras from El Salvador in the sixties in order to work in the lumber mills.  They 
used family connections with Salvadorans in Long Island who had emigrated during 
the eighties to facilitate the move and find work in a Long Island pizza parlor.  
Another man was a traveling salesman who befriended a Salvadoran who was in the 
process of migrating while selling shoes near the Salvadoran border.  He migrated in 
order to escape from a bad debt, and lived with a Salvadoran family in Glen Cove, 
New York upon arriving in the US.  A woman, also from a Salvadoran family, went to 
live with relatives in Fort Collins, Colorado, in order to escape marital problems.  Her 
husband moved there a year later, and there continues to be a migrant circuit between 
La Quebrada and Fort Collins.  
 
The early stages of emigration from La Quebrada depended upon social connections 
formed between Hondurans and Salvadorans in the sixties, when large numbers of 
Salvadoran peasants migrated to Honduras in search of work.  Despite the post-Soccer 
War expulsion of some Salvadorans (mainly from southern Honduras), a great number 
remained in places like La Quebrada.  These people maintained social ties with 
Salvadoran kin that facilitated the early stages of migration in the nineties.  By that 
time, the Salvadoran community in the U.S. was well-established.   
 
To summarize, La Quebrada received large numbers of internal Honduran migrants 
and Salvadoran labor immigrants in the fifties, sixties, and seventies.  The first wave 
of migration to the U.S. did not begin until the early-nineties, when people used 
connections with the Salvadoran community to facilitate their journey to the US, 
mainly as a result of the coffee crash that followed the collapse of the International 
Coffee Agreement in 1989.  There was periodic migration throughout the nineties, 
mainly secondary waves of people linked by kinship or friendship to the original 
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"pioneers."  The boom did not occur until after the Hurricane Mitch and the second 
coffee crash of 1999.  Emigration has intensified since then, and migration is now 
facilitated by two human smuggling operations.  
 
Emigration to the U.S. is a relatively new strategy to cope with economic hardship.  In 
previous periods of low coffee prices, farmers would scale back on coffee production 
and plant staple crops for home consumption (Wolf 1967).  Some migrated to the 
cities or banana regions in search of work.  The damage caused by Hurricane Mitch 
clearly led many people to migrate, but the storm is a necessary but insufficient 
explanation of the rise in Honduran emigration since 1998.  Hurricane Fifi, a similar 
storm that struck Honduras in 1974, did not lead to widespread emigration to the US, 
because internal migration was still the most common strategy for people to escape 
hardship.  A combination of historical, technological, and cultural factors have made 
migration into a commonplace strategy to escape economic problems.  
 
  
The Realities of Migrant Dependency in La Quebrada 
 
Regardless of the historical genesis of the phenomenon, migration to the U.S. is now 
an unavoidable aspect of life in La Quebrada, and throughout rural Honduras.  There 
are some material reasons why this change has occurred--improved communications 
with urban areas in Honduras and the United States has made travel cheaper, easier, 
and faster.  People are connected to urban centers both materially and culturally, and 
they measure their own life experiences against those in the wider world, as described 
in the previous chapter.   
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The new social realities of migrant dependency  are visible on the front porch of 
Internet Los Catrachos, a small cinder-block building off the main square that has 
become the telecommunications hub of this community.  The town only received 
electricity in 2001, and has no telephone service, but it does have two satellite internet 
providers, founded in 2003 by three young entrepreneurs, two of whom are returned 
migrants.46  These businesses house a handful of computers that are used to make 
VOIP (internet) telephone calls to the United States.47  There, on a dusty corner, 
sandwiched between the town hall and the dilapidated cathedral, the postmodern 
division of labor is made manifest in the clientele of the internet café.48 
 
In the morning, men in their teens and twenties begin to stream in, some hopping off 
the backs of pickups or coffee trucks, others coming by mule or on horseback.  
Clutching phone numbers scrawled on balled-up scraps of paper, they ask the 
employee at the internet shop to call the U.S. phone number they hold in their hands.  
Some cannot read the numbers written on the paper, and diffidently hand the paper to 
the operator with a knowing glance.  Others come in bunches, all pooling their money 
together to call a certain friend or relative in the United States--pidiendo ayuda--
asking for help in financing their own trip to the United States.  Some come from the 
town itself, others make the trip from the outlying villages or caseríos, tiny rural 
hamlets that are little more than exogamous kin settlements.   
 
                                                 
46 One of the owners worked for ten years on luxury cruise ships, including the Italian ship Achille 
Lauro, which was hijacked in 1985.    
47 The story of these computers is interesting in itself.  They are late-nineties Pentium II models that 
were purchased at a used-equipment auction in the US, shipped to Honduras and sold for about $200 
each.  The machines in Internet Los Catrachos have stickers on them which show that they were once 
the property of the Pillsbury Corporation in the US, which is part of the General Mills Co. 
48 I use the term internet café, although this business does not serve refreshments.  The terms "ciber 
café," "ciber," or "café internet" are common in Honduras. 
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Although people come to the internet shop year round, the numbers swell between the 
months of April and September, when the coffee harvest has ended and there is little 
available work besides occasional odd jobs that might yield a couple of dollars per day 
or less.  During this time, the desire to migrate intensifies, and crowds gather on the 
porch, gossiping and weighing their chances at successful migration, partly because 
there is nothing better to do.  Sometimes the young men call a friend’s work telephone 
number in the US, and they are reprimanded for calling while the person is on the job.  
Other times, the same phone number appears time and time again, distributed to all the 
men in a certain barrio or village.  The calls become so tiresome that the person in the 
States often changes his number, turns of his phone, or just hangs up.  The pleas are 
repetitive: ¿Primo, me puede ayudar? [Cousin, can you help me?]  Aquí la situación 
es una cosa seria. [The situation is really serious here.]  Está tremenda aquí compa. 
[It’s awful here, compadre.] No tengo nada. [I’m broke.]  ¿Me manda un dinero para 
irme?  [Can you send me money to go?] 
 
This part of the clientele--the regulars--was a source of comedy for the workers at the 
internet center.  They memorized the numbers and would try to predict how many 
times the aspiring migrant would call before giving up.  The callers could not--or 
would not--take a hint, and would sometimes call every day to see if someone could 
help them.  The excuses given by people in the U.S. were another source of comedy.  
One of the most common excuses was to say that it was raining or snowing, and there 
was no work, which created the impression that people did not work in bad weather in 
the US.  This excuse was based on the fact that many men worked in house painting, 
construction, or landscaping.  They did not work when the weather was bad, but this 
excuse was used by people who clearly did not work in those occupations and merely 
wanted an excuse so that they would not have to send money.  One day, I checked the 
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U.S. weather report and told the owner, returned migrant, that it was raining on the 
East Coast.  He said: 
 
La gente va a decir que no hay trabajo.  Para no enviar.  Es lo más seguro. [People 
will say that there’s no work. So they don’t have to send (money). That’s for sure.]  
 
Sometimes current events were used as excuses, such as the Iraq War, the East Coast 
blackout in August 2003, etc.  The employees would guess which excuse would be 
popular on a given day.  If a person in the U.S. used the same excuse over and over, 
rumors would circulate that he or she was lazy, alcoholic, or spending all of his money 
on a woman or man.  This is a sign of the intense pressure put on migrants to produce 
a surplus, as described by Mahler (1995), and the ways that that migrants cope with 
this pressure by taking advantage of people’s lack of knowledge about life in the US.   
 
Not all calls were so futile.  The more serious migrants would already have made a 
deal with a coyote and would call to arrange the logistics of payment and travel.  
These people tended to be relatively wealthy, and had the resources necessary to make 
long phone calls and pay part of the coyote’s fee.  Sometimes, returned migrants 
looking to go back to the States would call their old bosses and inquire about work.  It 
was surreal experience to see a young Honduran man call a Long Island deli from an 
internet phone, nonchalantly ask how business was going, and inquire about whether 
or not he could get any shifts next month, but it was a normal part of life in La 
Quebrada after the arrival of the internet phone in 2002.    
 
Virtually all the migrants from La Quebrada are undocumented.  Those with some 
resources hire a coyote for anywhere from $2000 to $6000, depending on whether or 
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not a customer pays in advance or finances the trip with money earned after they 
arrive in the United States.  Groups of friends often set out alone with little more than 
a few dollars in their pockets, hoping to ride the trenes de la muerte, freight trains that 
travel across Mexico.  Members of this group will call relatives asking for fifty 
dollars, or other small forms of assistance from friends or relatives.  The latter group 
rarely makes it to the U.S. successfully.  Although some have made it, most are 
apprehended by Mexican police and deported.  Some are injured or killed en route. I 
met two men who had attempted the trip ten times.  Certain returnees told me that they 
couldn’t be happy in Honduras for long.  They would build up some capital by 
working in the States, return to Honduras to live until their money ran out, and then 
would return to the U.S. to repeat the process of cyclical migration.  As with Santos 
(described in the previous chapter), locals sometimes described cyclical migrants as 
"addicted" to life in the United States.      
     
By nightfall, the women start to arrive.  Most are past their forties and wish to speak 
with sons and daughters in the States, often to arrange money transfers.  A small 
segment consists of young mothers who bring their children in to speak with their 
fathers in the States.  These people have pre-arranged calling times, and they know 
their kin’s day off, what time they are at work, and when they go to sleep.  They 
request money for diapers, baby formula, fertilizer, visits to the dentist, school 
supplies, and other mundane necessities.  Sometimes the calls are tearful, others have 
the calculating feel of business transactions. Some people have never spoken over a 
telephone before.  Elderly gentlemen come in, removing their straw hats upon entry.  
Crowds try to peak through the barred windows to eavesdrop, but they are shooed 
away.  On Sundays, the wait to make a call can be an hour or more, especially after 
church gets out and entire families have hour-long conversations with loved ones, 
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telling the operator to cut them off at a certain time because they only can afford a 
certain number of minutes.  Migrant families find fellowship in chatting with the 
dozens of people waiting to call loved ones on Sunday afternoon.  Often, a particularly 
loud talker unknowingly airs her business in front of the waiting crowd.  When she 
leaves, the gossip begins.   
 
 
Here, a new social order is emerging, in which many of the markers of status that 
defined La Quebrada before the migration boom, such as land ownership and 
advanced age, are being replaced by the valued knowledge of the migrant economy, 
principally held by young returned migrants.  The wisdom of experience is now held 
by young migrants who challenge the social order of the coffee economy.  At the same 
time, new forms of social differentiation emerge within the migrant economy itself.  
Values such as education, lawful citizenship, and family responsibility have been 
redefined in the context of the migration phenomenon.   
    
Until recently, ownership of coffee land, a store, and/or a high level of education were 
signs of high status in La Quebrada.  Family connections to local politicians were also 
important.  In the past decade, all of these factors have been either devalued or 
redefined by the decline of coffee and the rise of migration.  The declining importance 
of education is the most surprising.  Teachers complain that young people--especially 
young men--do not see the value of staying in school, since they plan on emigrating 
illegally when they are finished.  Education level does not substantially impact one’s 
ability to find work in the States, and college-educated people labor in the same jobs 
as non-literate peasants.  Three of the town’s most accomplished students, all with law 
degrees from the national university, recently emigrated illegally and live and work in 
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New Jersey alongside uneducated peers with no formal education.  One of the town’s 
largest coffee landholders washes dishes in an Atlanta restaurant.  Predictably, the 
study of English has replaced agronomy as the most popular topic of study for the 
wealthy.  There is no English taught in La Quebrada, so many parents, including the 
town’s mayor, send their children to city schools in order to learn English.   
 
In an economy that depends on wages earned in the United States, the ability to cross 
the border becomes the most valuable asset one can have.  There are several ways to 
enter the US, each requiring some combination of money, knowledge, and 
connections.  The simplest way, a legal visa, is the least common.  No one from La 
Quebrada has obtained an immigrant visa in the past ten years. Obtaining a tourist visa 
is an option open only to the wealthy, who can demonstrate proof of assets to the U.S. 
Embassy in order to be granted permission to travel.  An embassy interview costs 
$100 and the would-be traveler must demonstrate significant wealth in order to 
convince the embassy that he or she will not overstay their visa.  Nevertheless, several 
coffee growers and their children have obtained tourist visas and overstayed in order 
to work in the States.  A tourist visa is, for all intents and purposes, treated like an 
immigrant visa by the general public in La Quebrada, and the ability to acquire a 
tourist visa is a sign of great wealth. 
 
If a person cannot obtain a visa, the next option is to hire a smuggler to help cross the 
border.  This also requires capital, and there are two ways to pay for the trip, which 
begins in Honduras, crosses into Guatemala, and then crosses into southern Mexico by 
boat. Once in Mexico, the migrants are smuggled through the country in trailers or 
buses, staying in designated safe houses along the way.  According to a local coyote, 
the costs change depending on the "going rate" for bribing Mexican immigration 
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officials.  The cost of transportation, lodging, and food is insignificant compared to the 
cost of bribes.  And, of course, the coyotes keep some profit for themselves. One way 
that people pay for the trip by selling assets like coffee land, homes, or vehicles.  This, 
however, is an unattractive option in a depressed economy, where people are forced to 
sell at low rates because they are desperate.  I once saw a man, desperate for cash, try 
and sell fifty acres of coffee land for the equivalent of U.S. $2000, less than a fifth of 
its market value.  Another option is to use material assets as collateral for the 
smuggler, and then pay the smuggler in installments with wages earned in the US.   
 
Either way, traveling with a coyote is only an option for people with some capital or 
assets.  It is not available to the poorest segments of society, unless they have personal 
ties to the coyote and he or she trusts them enough to make the trip without putting any 
money down.  This is common for the close kin of people who have previously 
traveled with the coyote.  The relatives are like co-signers in the coyote’s loan, and 
personal ties are necessary to obtain credit with the coyote, as long as the coyote 
knows that a relative is working in the States and can help make the payments. 
 
The fact that coffee land is now being used as an asset to provide passage to the 
United States symbolizes the decline of coffee’s importance, but also shows how past 
success is translated into capital in the migrant economy.  Land, whether it is used for 
the production of coffee or to finance passage to the United States, is still used as 
capital to produce wealth.  However, the coffee production employs a network of local 
people, including harvesters, millers, and merchants, while the use of land as collateral 
for migrant passage only enriches the coyotes, their lieutenants, and the Mexican and 
Guatemalan police and border patrol who receive their bribes to facilitate passage.  
The two main coyotes in town have not continued to grow coffee on their newly 
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acquired land.  They have tended to convert it to pasture for cattle, when possible, or 
they have left it fallow, waiting for coffee prices to rise.  However, the coyote has been 
so successful in his smuggling operation that he doesn’t plan on investing the time or 
effort in coffee production.      
 
Coffee Production and Social Structure  
 
The decline of coffee and the rise of migration has weakened the social bonds that 
people formed through participation in domestic economic production. It is important 
to recognize that coffee communities are marked by a volatile economy.  Although the 
price regulations institutionalized by the International Coffee Agreement managed this 
volatility to a certain degree from 1962 until 1989, there were still constant rises and 
falls in world coffee prices that affected the fortunes of small farmers. 
In his classic studies of San Jose, Puerto Rico, Eric Wolf (1956, 1967) saw coffee 
communities as being subject to great economic and social volatility, as opposed to the 
"closed corporate communities" that were well known in Latin American 
anthropology of that era.  Unlike "closed" communities, "open" coffee communities 
do not have stable patron-client bonds, and have relatively weak systems of 
institutionalized reciprocity.  Compared with peasant communities with strong 
leveling mechanisms and an ethic of institutionalized poverty, coffee communities 
tend to celebrate the accumulation of wealth as a marker of prestige and honor.  
According to Wolf, ascendant growers in Puerto Rico tried to legitimate their position 
through conspicuous consumption, proving that they had "hit the jackpot" in the coffee 
casino.  In a volatile economic climate with constantly shifting fortunes, public 
displays of wealth signified who was on top at a given moment.  At the same time, the 
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declining classes tried to hold on to lost glory through the same means.  Public 
displays of status translated economic success into social prestige. Wolf called 
attempts for ascendant elites to prove their new status "redefining behavior," as 
opposed to the "retaining" behavior of the old elites (Wolf 1967:519).  Wolf saw such 
behavior as a rational adaptation to the volatile coffee economy.  Reinvestment of 
profits in new homes or vehicles was safer than investing in productive capital, since 
the bottom could fall out of coffee prices at virtually any moment, while fixed assets 
like cars and homes retained value.49  Although status plays were driven by particular 
cultural values, such as ideals of masculinity,  Wolf recognized a certain form of 
economic rationality in the coffee farmers’ seemingly irrational form of conspicuous 
consumption. In this case, "conspicuous consumption" was economically preferable to 
reinvestment of capital in coffee land.  This behavior caused social problems, 
however.  The desire for conspicuous consumption caused ascendant farmers to 
reduce the amount of wealth they distributed to kin in favor of personal "redefining 
behaviors"--displays of rising status--and this caused jealousy and envy throughout the 
community (Wolf 1967:521). 
 
Given the inherent instability of coffee economies, and La Quebrada’s particular 
history as a community founded by internal migrants who arrived to work in the 
lumber industry, it is clear that the social order is highly unstable, even when 
compared to other coffee communities.  Because La Quebrada is a newly-formed 
community, differences in wealth or status do not have deep familial roots.  Virtually 
all the inhabitants of La Quebrada arrived as lumber-cutters or coffee entrepreneurs, 
and this has fostered a strong tradition of socioeconomic mobility.   
                                                 
49 Wolf’s study was conducted before the initiation of the International Coffee Agreement in 1962, 
which stabilized prices until 1989. 
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Prior to the rise of migration and the arrival of returnees, success and high status were 
associated with a person’s ability to hire others to work, rather than work for hire.  
Those with even a small amount of capital hire jornaleros (male day laborers) to 
perform menial tasks in their milpas (maize and bean plots) and fincas (coffee farms).  
Household chores such as washing, cooking, and cleaning are commonly performed 
by hired women.  This status hierarchy is directly tied to the division of labor in the 
coffee industry, with landowners hiring the landless as day-laborers.  Although the 
strong patron-client bonds found in other peasant societies did not exist between 
particular landowning families and "their" workers, there was a necessary structural 
relation between landholders and the landless. 
 
Locals see the present as a time of severe crisis and social disintegration precisely 
because migration has not filled the economic or social void left by coffee’s demise.  
The concepts of status that were formed within the coffee system seem to have no 
meaning in the migrant economy.  Landless people and small farmers relied on wage 
labor on larger farms to provide the means of subsistence and reproduction.  The 
coffee crisis has created a situation where neither landholders or landless can survive 
off coffee production, and migration has created an unsustainable economic base that 
breaks social groups apart, threatens lives, and allows organized crime to thrive. 
 
Negative Portrayals of Migrant Character   
  
As Mahler (1995) noted among Salvadorans in Long Island, people in La Quebrada 
tend to explain systemic economic conditions as the results of individual behavior.  
Accusations of jealousy, envy, greed, and laziness are common idioms that people use 
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to explain the economic crisis in which they find themselves.  They blame the crisis on 
individual character flaws more often than structural forces--such as the decline in 
coffee prices, restrictive immigration policy, or a corrupt government.  These local 
narratives highlight the failings of individuals as the source of crisis.   
 
The moral criticism of migrants as egotistical, selfish, or greedy parallels the ways that 
Salvadoran migrants in the U.S. criticize each other, according to Mahler (1995).  She 
argues that Salvadoran peasants who have migrated to the U.S. face intense pressure to 
produce a surplus to send home, which creates an individualistic, dog-eat-dog culture 
that clashes with the more egalitarian values of pre-war Salvadoran rural society.  
Because the migrants are marginalized from the U.S. mainstream, they exploit one 
another to extract a surplus.  She focuses on the existence of peasant networks of 
mutual assistance and social reciprocity in rural El Salvador that can no longer be 
sustained in the United States, where migrants attempt to profit off one another rather 
than assist each other (216). 
 
This interpretation of migrant competition downplays the social divisions inherent in 
"open" peasant communities, especially coffee towns.  People in La Quebrada indeed 
exert great amounts of pressure on migrants to send money home.  They depend on 
migrant earnings.  Yet the demands are quite different for different classes of people, 
and do not reflect an expectation of generalized reciprocity, but rather an expectation 
that the structure of the coffee-era class hierarchy be maintained.   
 
Here, I will focus on two common narratives that reveal a great deal about the way 
that local class structure determines the social pressures placed upon migrants.  The 
first describes the belief that certain migrants are "greedy" and the second that they are 
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"lazy."  These narratives are surprising, because both are strong critiques, showing that 
certain migrants’ economic success has not translated into social prestige.  Although 
most migrants are hard-working and self-sacrificing, they are often accused of laziness 
and greed by people close to them, even members of their own families.  Their 
behavior is judged according to cultural standards that cannot adequately explain the 
new economic realities in which the community finds itself.  Surprisingly, the 
economic importance of migrants has not led the contestation of existing standards of 
value, but a process by  which existing values are reasserted in the face of dramatic 
change. For various reasons, returned migrants have not challenged the belief that they 
are lazy and/or greedy.   
 
In ethnographic interviews and casual conversations, people from all social classes in 
La Quebrada criticize migrants from landholding families by using the word ambición.  
Locals commonly distinguish between migrantes de necesidad  and migrantes de 
ambición, which I translate as "migrants of need" and "migrants of greed." Ambición 
is a term of opprobrium, and is thought to be a sin by both the Protestant and Catholic 
churches in La Quebrada.  The word suggests  "greed for power and wealth" as 
opposed to American English, where it means something more like "earnest desire for 
success."  Although ambición can have neutral or positive connotations in Spanish, In 
this case, ambición is the excessive--and socially disruptive--desire for honor or 
wealth, and is therefore more akin to the English "greed" than it is to "ambition."  
Although this was not a consensus opinion, it was one of the most common 
descriptions of migrants that I heard over the course of my research. 
 
The capacity to differentiate between the necessary and the superfluous, i.e. to 
distinguish need from greed, is an example of how moral concepts can serve to 
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legitimate class differences.  One class’ necessity is another’s luxury.  All societies 
draw the line between legitimate desire and greed, and such judgments reflect opinions 
about socially legitimate action. In English, the word "ambition" is used to describe a 
positive assessment of individual desire, while greed is a negative assessment of the 
same drive when it crosses the bounds of acceptability.  As Bourdieu (1977:77-78) 
argues, the classification of certain forms of desire as virtue and others as vice (such as 
need vs. greed) is an example of how social hierarchies delimit the conscious 
possibilities of action for certain groups.  He writes: 
 
…the dispositions durably inculcated by objective conditions…engender aspirations 
and practices objectively compatible with those objective requirements, the most 
improbable practices are excluded…which inclines agents to make a virtue of 
necessity, that is, to refuse what is already refused and love the inevitable. (77) 
 
The French working class has the tendency to "turn necessity into virtue," believing 
that certain practices--characteristic of the upper classes--are "not for the likes of 
them" (379-380)  Bourdieu sees this as a form of ideological boundary-maintenance. 
He refers to moral criticisms of "inappropriate" behavior as "calls to [class] order," 
emphasizing the fact that they legitimate existing class boundaries.  He writes: 
 
The calls to order (‘Who does she think she is?’ ‘That’s not for the likes of us’) which 
reaffirm the principle of conformity--the only explicit norm of popular taste--and aim 
to encourage the ‘reasonable’ choices that are…imposed by the objective conditions 
also contain a warning against the ambition to distinguish oneself by identifying with 
other groups, that is, they are a reminder of class solidarity (1984:381).  
 
One could easily dispute Bourdieu’s assertion that  conformity is "the only explicit 
norm of popular taste" (my emphasis), but the key point here is that attempts to 
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transcend the boundaries of class are often considered "unreasonable" or "in bad 
taste."  In ethnographic interviews, virtually everybody I spoke with claimed that they 
wished to migrate out of pure necessity, whether it be the need to feed one’s family or 
the need to purchase a new truck or build a new home.  However, local gossip 
suggested that there were certain types of people for whom migration was considered 
to be a morally acceptable action, and others for whom it was not, and that these moral 
judgments were based on social estimations of "necessity."  In La Quebrada, the 
standard of "necessity" approached the minimal limits of human survival.  The only 
migrants who were consistently characterized as "needy" were those who owned no 
land and faced truly dire economic circumstances, and did not have enough income to 
house, clothe, or feed their families. 
 
"Migrants of need" are generally the landless poor; migrants of greed own coffee land 
or some other valued asset.  Migrants of need make the trip to the U.S. on their own; 
migrants of greed pay a coyote.  The following quote from a landless person, 
criticizing a coffee farmer for migrating, is representative of the idea that certain 
migrants are greedy:  
 
Si yo tuviera tanto dinero, por que me tiraría para los Estados?  Puedo hacer la vida 
aquí…poner un negocio…no hay necesidad de dejar la familia. Los que van con 
coyote tienen sus cosas. ¿Por que se van?  Y los que van con visa, ni quiera Dios. [If I 
had that much money, why would I head out for the States?  I could make my life 
here...start a business…there’s no need to leave your family.  People that go with a 
coyote have their things.  Why do they go? And those that go with a visa, God 
forbid…] 
 
The idea expressed here is that people who can afford a coyote have enough capital to 
lead a decent life in La Quebrada, and therefore do not migrate out of need.  The 
    
 122
significant point is that those who can afford to pay a coyote to smuggle them across 
the border are considered to be free from "necessity" and act out of greed.   
 
Another major marker of "need" vs. "greed" is ownership of a home.  Many migrants 
say they desire to hacer mi casa and comprar mi carro when asked why they want to 
migrate.  Young married men wish to move into their own homes when married, 
rather than live with parents.  I once heard a group of young men making fun of a 
particularly-flashy returned migrant, who owned a new pickup, a shiny revolver, and 
numerous gold medallions, but rented--rather than owned--a shabby, pine-board 
shack.  They said, partly in jest,  
 
¿Es que él es tonto? La casa y después el carro." [Is he stupid? It’s the house first and 
then the car.]  
 
This returnee was criticized for spending his money the wrong way.  Because the cost 
of a coyote is enough to construct a modest cinder block house, those who spend 
money on coyotes are seen as desiring more than the "necessary" and are accused of 
"greed."  
 
The term conformista (conformist) is sometimes used as a term of honor, indicating 
humility and a sense that one is happy with one’s position in life.  It is the opposite of 
ambition, and means that one only desires that which is socially appropriate to people 
of his or her class.  Consider the following exchange between me and a landless 
jornalero who was considering illegal immigration: 
 
Cree usted que se va por necesidad? 
[Would you say that you are migrating out of economic necessity?] 
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Mire. Soy conformista.  No soy ambicioso.  No ocupo muchas cosas…pero ahorita el 
trabajo no da ni para la comida.  Algunos se van para comprar su carro…para hacer 
su casa.  Yo no.  Soy conformista de verdad. 
[Look, I’m a conformist. I’m not ambitious.  I don’t need many things, but right now 
my work doesn’t even provide enough for food.  Some people go [to the US] to get a 
car or a house.  Not me.  I’m a real conformist.] 
 
This respondent is defending himself against charges of selfishness by saying proudly 
that he is a conformist, in opposition to an "ambitious" person, who would presumably 
migrate to gain material wealth while shirking his responsibility to his family.  He, on 
the other hand, is truly desperate, and is looking for money to provide food for his 
family.  Conforming to social expectations is respected because it displays an 
acceptance of a given order.  This respondent defends himself by saying, in effect, "I 
know my place.  I’m not greedy.  I just want to provide for my family."  As Bourdieu 
argued, the landless people turned necessity into virtue, celebrating a "conformity" 
that was near the minimal limits of human survival.   
 
The social characteristics that distinguish these two categories express a particular 
concept of virtuous conduct, in which the ceiling of legitimate aspiration almost 
exactly parallels the lifestyle of La Quebrada’s prosperous coffee growers. 
Surprisingly, coffee-owning parents often accused their own children of greed, 
because they felt that they sought a lifestyle that was materially "better" (or at least 
different) than that of their parents.  However, the economic realities of the coffee 
crisis made it impossible to maintain this standard of living, let alone surpass it.  
Upward mobility in itself was not criticized.  Poor migrants were not deemed "too big 
for their britches" or derided for challenging an existing class order.  In fact, returnees 
who purchased coffee land or opened typical stores were celebrated as success stories.  
However, migrants who owned land were criticized for desiring more than what been 
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considered "prosperous" by a previous generation.  People are defending the structure 
of the coffee society and not the particular people within that structure.  Upward 
mobility itself was celebrated as long as the definition of "success"--the terms that 
defined social value--remained intact.   
 
The Idle Immigrant 
 
Another common anti-migrant narrative accused them of being lazy or idle. People 
commonly referred to male emigrants as haragán (pl. haraganes), a Spanish word 
meaning "idle person,"  "loafer," or, more specific to this case, "a man who feels he is 
above work." 50  The etymology of the word haragán is disputed, but it has been in 
use in the hispanophone world since at least the eighteenth century, when it was used 
in Spain to describe peasant workers who preferred to relax in the shade, sing, or sleep 
while the hacienda owner was not present, according to the Real Academia Española’s 
definition from 1758.51  Despite being worlds away from imperial Spain both 
temporally and geographically, the word’s meaning in La Quebrada was quite similar 
to the Spanish definition.  An haragán is a man with a sub-par work ethic who shirks 
his social responsibility in favor of self-indulgent leisure.  Both in interviews and in 
neighborly conversation, people would criticize migrants as haraganes.  This 
definition surprised me, because I tended to think of undocumented workers in the 
                                                 
50 Zillberg (qtd. in Andrade-Eekhoff and Silva-Avalos 2003) finds that this term is also used to describe 
young people who receive migrant remittances in El Salvador. 
 
51The complete definition reads, in Spanish: El holgazán, floxo, perezoso y tardo en lo que mandan 
hacer.  El P. Guadix citado por Covarr. dice que es voz Arábiga, y que vale tanto como él que canta 
quando hace calor: lo que ordinariamente executan los gañanes y peones, en que no estando el dueño de 
la hacienda presente, se echan a la sombra, y se están cantando u durmiendo sin trabajar.  Lat. Defes, 
dis, Iners, tis.  SANTIAG. Quar. Serm. 2. Salutac. El delinquente, el fullero, el blasfemo, y aun el hijo 
de vecino haragán, aprendiz destas virtúdes.  Herr. Hist. Ind. Decad. 4 lib. 9. cap. 7. Ni quieren hacer 
heredades ni sembrar, porque son grandes haraganes. 
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U.S. as hardworking and self-sacrificing people who performed difficult labor to 
support their families back home.  The fact that the view that migrants are lazy was 
largely uncontested by returned migrants was even more surprising.  Returnees 
seemed to reinforce, rather than challenge, this misperception.  I expected concepts of 
wealth and status to change in accordance with the new social realities of migration, 
but such concepts die hard, and the presence of returnees had done little to challenge 
the idea that migrants were selfish.     
 
Moncho, profiled in the previous chapter, is perhaps the most extreme haragán in La 
Quebrada, yet he symbolizes the current generation of young males for many people.  
Though this perception is not universal, I heard people of all classes--including 
relatives of migrants and returnees--depict migrants as haraganes.  This belief existed 
for several reasons.  First, the recent crop of migrants inherited coffee land from their 
parents and have abandoned it for the US.  Their decision is seen as a desire "not to 
work" because they are not working in coffee farming.  In addition, there is a severe 
lack of information about the hardships of life in the US, which allows the paradisiacal 
impression to survive.  Telephone service is new, and impressions of the U.S. are 
strongly influenced by U.S. satellite cable television programming, which has been 
available in La Quebrada since electricity arrived in 2000.  Returned migrants rarely 
admit to struggling in the US.  When they do, they are dismissed or simply ignored 
(Mahler 1995:85-86).  People believe they are "making excuses" for not having 
returned with more money or for having sent too little money home while they were 
away. The successful returnees make those still in the States seem lazy, and people 
wonder why so-and-so was able to return with money while another person was not.   
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One would expect the growing number of returnees to challenge such depictions of 
migrants.  There are signs that this may occur in the future, but, on the whole, 
migrants have done little to challenge these criticisms by presenting their own view of 
the world.  As Mahler (1995) notes, returnees and migrants do not counter the utopian 
perception of life in the U.S. held by their countrymen.  In many cases, they reaffirm 
this view, and when they do speak of hardship, people refuse to believe them 
(1995:85-88).  
 
Returnees’ tendency to maintain the utopian image of the U.S. creates an unrealistic 
impression of migrant life.  The presence of "successful" migrant makes some families 
feel that they are receiving too little money from kin in the U.S. and that perhaps their 
relatives are wasting money on "vices" in the States.  This is especially true among the 
wives of married men in the States, who resent being left alone and are often 
suspicious of their husbands.  They believe that they should be receiving far more than 
they actually do, largely because of the myth of easy money in the US.  It is common 
for people to suspect that migrant relatives are secretly hording some of their income 
or spending it frivolously, especially on alcohol or extramarital affairs.  If the migrants 
are earning so much in the US, why are people in La Quebrada not receiving more?  
The behavior of returnees ends up placing more pressure on migrants by creating 
unrealistic expectations.  This impression is so deeply rooted that people refuse to 
accept evidence to the contrary, which perpetuates the migratory cycle. 
 
Consider the following joke that I heard countless times while in the field:   
 
 ¿Oíste del muchacho de La Quebrada que fue pa’los Estados?  Pues, en su primer 
día allá, unos pocos minutos después de haber  llegado, encuentra un billete de diez 
dólares votado en el suelo.  Está allí con un amigo que dice, "¿Compa, lo vas a 
sacar?" Él sonríe y dice "Pues déjalo. Hoy no tengo ganas de trabajar. 
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[Did you hear about the guy from La Quebrada who went to the States?  Well, on his 
first day there, a couple of minutes after arriving, he sees a ten-dollar bill on the 
ground.  He’s there with a friend who says, "Hey man, are you going to pick that up?"  
The guy smiles and says, "No, leave it there.  I don’t feel like working today."] 
 
This joke is significant for two reasons.  First, it suggests that people do not have to 
work hard to satisfy their needs in the US. Money is everywhere. At the same time, the 
migrants will not work in order to obtain the money.  When I asked a woman in her 
sixties to explain why the joke was so funny, she pointed to the fact that the migrants 
do not want to work.  
 
 Es que ellos no quieren trabajar.  Ni para sacar diez dólares… Son unos haraganes.   
 
[It’s that they don’t want to work.  Not even to get  ten dollars…They are some real 
loafers.] 
 
This woman’s son works as a salad chef in a motel near Mt. Rushmore in South 
Dakota.  Her late-husband was one of La Quebrada’s largest landholders.  She called 
her own son, who sent money home at regular intervals, an haragán, largely because 
her once-prosperous family had fallen on hard times and she placed the blame on him.  
The joke seemed to reflect her experience with migrant dependency, and she found it 
quite funny. 
     
The joke emphasizes the laziness of the migrant pair, as if to say, "Even in a place 
where there’s money everywhere, they still won’t even bend to pick it up." Taking the 
joke into account, it is possible to see why Moncho is the epitome of the migrant 
haragán.  He was given every opportunity to succeed, and now must migrate to find 
work.  He is even unsuccessful at migration, having been deported or detained during 
all of his attempts.  The relative ease of Moncho’s upbringing, and his inability to take 
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advantage of it, is analogous to the dollars on the ground that the migrants choose not 
to pick up.  The key is that neither Moncho nor the other migrants have--in the 
public’s opinion--taken full advantage of what their parents have provided.   
 
Moncho and his peers are members of the first generation to have been raised entirely 
in La Quebrada.  Their parents were migrants from other parts of Honduras that had 
some success in coffee-growing.  Although Moncho has not been able to migrate 
successfully, many of his peers, the sons of the coffee elite, have done so.  These 
people face the pressure of rising expectations of success while living in a declining 
economy.  Their parents were able to make a living as coffee farmers after the 
departure of the lumber industry.  However, the coffee crisis has made it almost 
impossible for young people to achieve the prosperity of their parents, making 
emigration a popular alternative.  The general economic decline that La Quebrada has 
experienced in the past decade is often blamed on their perceived lack of work-ethic.  
People perceive the economic crisis to be the result of the younger generation’s 
laziness.  The haraganes  bear the responsibility for the hard times in which they live, 
and are accused not only of abandoning the coffee industry, but also of not being able 
to earn enough in the US.  Whereas Moncho’s parents’ generation worked from the 
bottom up, the current generation is seen as lazy, unwilling to do the work that their 
parents did to achieve their relatively high status.  They bear the responsibility for the 
general economic decline in La Quebrada, and their decision to migrate is seen as an 
abandonment of their social obligation.  The fact that Moncho has even failed at 
migration turns tragedy into farce.   
 
The narrative is an expression of generational decline that places the blame for a 
structural problem (the coffee crisis), on the shoulders of individual young people.  
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The hard times in La Quebrada are seen as the outcome of decisions made by 
individual actors, and migration is perceived as an escape from the burden of local 
expectations and responsibility--a cop out by the spoiled youth who then waste their 
opportunity to earn money in the United States.  This inter-generational element of 
remittance economies is  crucial, and it explains why migrants are so often seen in a 
negative light, especially when parents depend on their wages for survival.  
 
Gossip, Confusion, and Control 
It will likely come as no surprise that some migrants from La Quebrada were accused 
of being "greedy."  In anthropological studies of rural Latin America, time-worn 
concepts such as the "limited-good" (Foster 1965) and other versions of the "moral 
economy" emphasize group-solidarity, generalized reciprocity, and social 
reproduction over individual initiative.  Prominent development scholars have seen 
these group-oriented values as maladaptive obstacles to economic development, 
contrasting Latin American "groupism" with a reified Protestant Ethic of individual 
ambition (e.g. McClelland 1985; Harrison 1985). These "cultural theories of 
enterprise" are intellectually dubious (Billig 1994), and the myth of the relative 
absence of enterprise in rural Latin American has been strongly challenged by 
Hernando De Soto (1989, 2000) and others who focus on historical and institutional 
factors that inhibit entrepreneurialism, rather than attributing underdevelopment to 
essentialized cultural traits. 
On the surface, the criticism of migrants as "greedy" could appear to be an example of 
"groupism" in rural Latin America.  Such characterizations could be seen as the result 
of a collectively-held opposition to individual advancement at the expense of the 
group.  However, this is not the case.  In La Quebrada, individual upward mobility is 
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greatly valued, but only up to a certain point where it becomes "greed."  All societies 
contain normative concepts of right and wrong that limit extreme individualism.  
Indeed, they could not be considered "societies" if they did not.  The difference 
between these two categories reveals basic principles of individuality and sociality in 
La Quebrada. The determination of this boundary is not a reflection of a distinctive 
group-orientation.  These concepts are not timeless ethical principles--they are 
contested within the political and religious spheres.  In La Quebrada, the standards of 
"need vs. greed" are the product of the class structure of the coffee economy, and the 
rise of a migrant has challenged these concepts, albeit to a surprisingly limited degree.    
Individual ambition is only seen as a negative when it threatens the survival 
(reproduction) of local social structure.  La Quebrada is based on a structural 
relationship between landowners and landless workers; when people who own large 
amounts of land and a home decide to migrate, their personal ambitions are deemed 
"greedy" because they are destroying the economic base of the community without 
developing new alternatives. People value economic upward mobility, as long as 
individual economic success provides some form of employment for others, 
maintaining the viability of the local economy.   
In this case, the markers of "greed" tend to reflect a pursuit of individual gain at the 
expense of processes of social reproduction.  This does not mean that any ambition 
beyond the minimal needs of reproduction are seen as anti-social.  Migration is only 
seen as negative when it threatens the community’s economic base, which is based on 
exploitation and production for profit.  Coffee production is seen as far less 
exploitative and dangerous than the migrant economy, because it at least allows 
families to remain together, with adults caring for children and the elderly.  Migrants 
are greedy because they must leave their families in search of a decent wage, eroding 
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social relationships in search of the economic means of survival.  The drive for self-
advancement only becomes "greed" when it threatens social reproduction.   
This does not explain why the contemporary crisis is so often framed as the product of 
individual character flaws.  I believe that the local criticism of migrants arises from a 
profound sense of confusion about how and if La Quebrada can continue to survive as 
a community if it depends on a remittance economy.  A great deal of the meaning of 
local gossip lies in the act of telling it. People explain the crisis in whatever terms they 
have available, and the ability to formulate an explanation of how and why migrants 
are able to prosper or fail--however humorous, simplistic, or mean-spirited--provides 
the speaker with a sense of control and comprehension. Gossip, especially critical 
gossip about migrants’ failings, allows people to reassert principles of sociality at a 
time where the world seems to be turned upside down.  Some migrants, like Santos 
Orellana, leave town with nothing, and magically return to live the lifestyle of the 
coffee elite, while the children of the coffee elite struggle to survive.  The journey to 
the U.S. is often a magically transformative event that a great number of people--
especially the older generation--cannot comprehend.  The act of giving one's opinion--
no matter what that opinion may be--demonstrates some ability to explain the world. 
The popular view of migration is ambivalent, and the negative gossip about migrants 
always is accompanied by a tacit acknowledgment of their economic importance.  
Locals know that many families depend on remittances, and that some individuals 
have achieved economic success.  At the same time, they recognize the dramatic 
negative consequences for the future viability of their community.  They tend to 
express this negative sentiment in incoherent ways, targeting individual migrants 
while knowing that they rely on them economically.  They do not know a way out of 
this cycle.   
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The popular ambivalence over migration that I have described here has not been 
reflected in mainstream political or intellectual debates.  Migrant remittances now 
generate more domestic income than any other sector of the Honduran economy, 
including agriculture and the maquila, so the government sees migration as an 
economic resource. Unfortunately, politicians and intellectuals tend to downplay the 
fact that communities that depend on migrant remittances face an unsustainable future.  
Families are broken apart and education is devalued.  Organized criminal networks led 
by coyotes and drug smugglers attain tremendous social and political clout.  Migrants 
die in the desert.  Women disproportionately bare the responsibility for raising 
children and caring for the aged.  
Throughout Latin America, development leaders have argued that migrant money can 
be put to positive use. The only way to end the need to migrate is to create economic 
opportunity at home, and, they argue that migrant dollars can be used to this end.  By 
embracing migration as "development," governments are trying to be pragmatic and 
resourceful, but what message are they sending?  From the perspective of a would-be 
migrant, why rely on the largesse of your countrymen in the States when you can join 
them?  Why depend on the "trickle down" from migrant remittances when you can go 
to the source?  Is the government giving up on domestic reform?  The desirability of 
migration demonstrates a lack of domestic economic opportunity, and therefore 
demonstrates the failure of previous development paradigms to create that opportunity.  
By embracing migration, politicians are clearly looking for a way to end the cycle of 
migration by creating something at home, but they are tacitly acknowledging 
migration’s effectiveness.  The "big questions" of global inequality have faded to the 
background, in favor of a resigned acceptance of migration as a fact of life in a 
globalized world.  It seems fruitless to ask why these countries must depend on 
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remittances in the first place or to investigate the structural factors that make the worst 
job in the U.S. is better than the best job in the Honduran countryside.  In this political 
climate, the migrant development platform takes the resigned position that countries 
like Honduras must "make due with what they have," viewing migrant remittances as 
an economic resource.  
In the chapter that follows, I trace the history of Honduran social policy in order to 
understand how it has arrived at this point.  The history of Honduran social 
movements is an illustrative example of what Andre Gunder Frank has called "the 
shift from development to crisis management."  Since the initiation of structural 
adjustment in 1990, the basic issues of social equity that guided development policy 
since the fifties have been replaced by a narrow focus on short term income-generation 
and absolute growth, with hardly any attention paid to the distribution of resources or 
the long-term social costs of economic activity.  The contemporary view of migrant 
remittances as "development" is the end result of a long and painful process of 
depoliticization.     
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Chapter 4  
 
The Ashes Of Progress: The Cold War And Its Aftermath In Honduras 
 
The 1980s are often called Latin America’s "lost decade," and they were especially 
painful in Honduras, which became the "main girder in the bridge" (LaFeber 1983) for 
a U.S. foreign policy obsessed with stopping the spread of the Soviet sphere of 
influence in the Western Hemisphere.  Surrounded by countries mired in brutal civil 
wars, Honduras became the base of operations for many important parts of the Cold 
War hemispheric struggle, most famously, the training of the Nicaraguan Contras.  
   
By decade’s end, the Cold War was waning, and new forms of politics had emerged, 
not only in Honduras, but throughout Central America.  These "new" social 
movements, (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Escobar and Alvarez 1992) rose from the ashes 
of defeated guerilla armies, and set their political sights on the cultural rights of 
particular ethnic groups and environmental preservation, rather than the more systemic 
issues of economic inequality or dependency that informed politics in previous 
decades.  
 
After the return to democracy in 1990, non-governmental organizations took on 
important roles as protectors of social welfare, while national agrarian boards, peasant 
organizations, and labor unions lost political clout.  The political system became 
decentralized, and individual municipalities were given greater legal autonomy.   As 
the immediate horror of the violence subsided, social reformers turned to more 
pragmatic forms of politics that yielded many important benefits.  However, new 
social movements pushed basic questions of social equality to the background, as the 
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language of rights replaced the language of equality (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), at a 
time in history when the gap between the world’s rich and poor increased at 
historically unprecedented rates.  These movements shifted the grounds of social 
policy away from state-level institutions and turned international non-governmental 
organizations into the most visible protectors of social welfare in Honduras.52   
 
As non-governmental institutions became increasingly important politically, the 
Honduran economy became more and more dependent on migrant remittances.  
Between 1990 and the present, migrant remittances went from an insignificant part of 
the Honduran economy to the single biggest source of foreign exchange.  The rise of 
migration to the United States in the past two decades serves as a clear symbol of the 
inability of Cold War development policies to bring about meaningful hemispheric 
reform and regional economic stability.  After decades of agrarian reform, state-led 
development programs, and international development schemes, remitted wages from 
people working in  the U.S. have become the most important source of income for 
many rural communities.  
Remittances have diffused some of the political economic tensions that were left 
unresolved after the "lost decade."  Without migrant dollars, there would likely be 
greater competition for low-paying jobs, increased rural to urban migration, general 
economic unrest, political calls for economic reform throughout the region, and a rise 
in guerilla movements.  Because the short-term economic benefits of migration--such 
                                                 
52 Hugo Noé Pino, former director of the Central Bank of Honduras and embassador to the United 
States writes: "A principios de los años setenta la transformación agraria llegó a considerarse como el 
‘quehacer fundamental’ del gobierno.  Hoy, a lo sumo, se habla de una ‘modernización’ que, para 
muchos analistas, no es más que la muerte de la reforma agraria" (1995:9). 
[At the beginning of the seventies, the agrarian transformation came to be considered the fundamental 
project of the government.  Today, in sum, people talk of a "modernization" that, for many analysts, is 
nothing more than the death of the agrarian reform.]  
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as increased incomes and stimulated domestic consumption--have diffused domestic 
political conflict, migration is often described as a political "escape valve" by Central 
American intellectuals. Some politicians, notably Mexico’s President Vicente Fox, 
have publicly celebrated migrants as "heroes."  
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how historical events have shaped political 
life in contemporary Honduras and to illustrate the relationship between the rise of 
migration and the decline of rural politics.  The belief that migration is a solution to 
rural problems--held not only by migrants but also by politicians and intellectuals-is 
one consequence of the depoliticized climate that has existed since the eighties, when  
the military leadership effectively destroyed both radical and reformist politics in the 
country.  To see undocumented migration as an economic resource is a uniquely 
postmodern understanding of progress, in that it values the inflow of foreign exchange 
provided by migrants while disregarding the damaging long-term social consequences 
of migrant dependency.  
 
The contemporary vision of migration as "development" must be placed in historical 
context.  Since the end of the World War II, the Honduran government has tried to 
improve the condition of rural society through various sorts of modernization 
programs.  The fact that migrant remittances are perceived as an acceptable substitute 
to social or economic policy measures demonstrates the rejection of modern ideas of 
progress based on a class compromise and redistribution of wealth, and the 
valorization of any practice that provides income in the short term.  
 
To tell the story of this political transformation, I will focus on the life of Prudencio 
Flores--one of La Quebrada’s most influential and controversial political leaders.  His 
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story is, in one sense, uniquely Honduran, but it also reflects more systematic trends in 
the history of Latin American progressive thought.  Prudencio’s political life began 
with an interest in progressive democracy in the fifties, then turned to radicalism in the 
seventies, and eventually came to embrace participatory democracy, "local" 
empowerment, and sustainable entrepreneurialism by the early nineties.  His life 
serves as a model of the general ideological trends that Honduran rural activists have 
followed since the fifties.   
 
  
Prudencio is the first person that I met in La Quebrada.   He was active in all manners 
of community politics, and was one of the leaders of a participatory rural development 
project that was being carried out by USDA and Cornell University in 2000 and 2001.  
He owned about fifty acres of coffee land, and was helping to establish an organic 
coffee cooperative, supported by the USAID/USDA project, that was preparing for its 
first harvest when I first arrived in the field for exploratory research.  In fact, the first 
time I met Prudencio, he was covered in a foul coating of organic fertilizer made from 
rotting coffee husks and chicken manure.   Because I was introduced as a Cornell 
student by a member of the project, Prudencio was outwardly cooperative and kind 
from our first meeting, showing me and my wife around the co-op and patiently 
answering our questions.  Our initial relationship was relatively formal, but when I 
returned to La Quebrada for an extended stay after the initial research, I spoke with 
Prudencio several times per week, worked on his coffee farm, and frequently went to 
him with questions about local politics and history.   
 
Prudencio lives in a large, nondescript, concrete home on the top of a hill a few miles 
from town. He also owns an adjacent pulperia which turns his home into a 
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neighborhood community center, where passersby sit on outdoor benches to wait out 
rainstorms, buy cold drinks or household staples, or just sit and chat.  He has a lush 
garden where he experiments with different crops and organic techniques. In addition 
to staple crops like corn, beans, and squash, I noticed a patch of raspberry bushes, a 
plant I had never before seen in Honduras and have not seen since, as well as carrots, 
radishes, cabbage, and other vegetables which are uncommon in the area and 
demonstrate his curiosity and desire for innovation.   
 
Inside his home, one immediately notices a bookshelf in the center of the living room, 
which stands out against the drab cinder-block walls and bare concrete floor.  The 
bookshelf contains titles on psychology, the history of philosophy, Marxism (Lenin’s 
What is to be Done?), pedagogy, and organic farming techniques. The walls of the 
home are bare. Religious icons, family photographs, and framed school diplomas--
common in even the most sparse Honduran homes--are notably absent.  Besides the 
book shelf, the living room contains a floral print living room set, and not much more, 
except for a shelf that holds bottles of natural medicines purchased from a vendor in 
the city.  An open kitchen, with a typical wood-burning stove and new electric 
refrigerator, abuts the living room.  A hired cook offers visitors a glass of fresh 
tamarind juice, a homemade pastry, or perhaps a cup of coffee.  
 
A self-described "actvista, revolucionario, y cafetalero."  Prudencio is a socially-
minded, highly-educated farmer, who is as comfortable talking about Marx’s critique 
of the Hegelian dialectic as he is discussing coffee varietals. His sons, both born in the 
seventies, are named Lenin and Karl.  He is an idealistic, sometimes intimidating man, 
whose tendency to turn any conversation into a political debate has earned him a 
reputation for demagoguery and political grandstanding.  Trained as a teacher, he is 
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wont to spontaneously lecture on political theory--especially Marx--and his outspoken 
atheism has made him an extremely controversial figure in the community.   
 
Despite his small stature, he always seems ready to burst from his own skin in 
argument.  His eyes focus intensely, and his veins bulge from his forearms, which 
ripple with muscle from years of work on his coffee farm.  He sports a pointy Lenin-
esque beard that gives his face a diabolical cast.  There are no casual conversations 
with him. Everything is an intellectual battle, and he seems to get great pleasure from 
putting his opponents off-guard with bluntness or hyperbole intended to shock (e.g 
referring to prominent politicians as "corrupt, Mafioso, assassin, son-of-a-bitch, 
criminals," referring to anthropologists as antropáfagos (man-eaters), or arguing to 
me, with an impish grin, that President Bush intentionally destroyed the World Trade 
Center on September 11, 2001). Once accustomed to his style of argumentation, one 
realizes that such pronouncements are made in the spirit of intellectual combativeness 
rather than reasoned belief.  Prudencio’s rhetorical style is designed to provoke, and he 
only moderates his views after much debate.  What he lacks in nuance, he usually 
makes up for with passion. 
 
One day, after several months in the field,  I asked Prudencio what his dream for La 
Quebrada’s future would be.  He answered with uncustomary restraint and 
seriousness, showing none of his typical bombast: 
 
I would like to create a center for sustainable living…a community-owned building 
with land and fields to produce all types of food…tilapia ponds, organic orchards, all 
types of fruits and vegetables, and of course organic coffee for export.  We could even 
have a small hotel for tourists.  We would have a recreation center where the youth 
could play sports, a soccer field, table tennis.  I would like to have acupuncture, 
herbal medicines, and other types of alternative health programs. 
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Prudencio envisions a sustainable land of plenty that is self-sufficient, equitable, 
environmentally friendly, and fun.  His vision closely parallels the model of eco-
development that has become popular throughout Central America in the last two 
decades, as the "red" politics of class have largely been replaced by the "green" 
politics of sustainability and participatory development since the 1980s (cf. Babb 
2004).  Since the end of the Cold War, Costa Rica, with its strong democratic tradition 
and eco-centered development approach, has become the model of success in the 
region for progressives.  Eco-tourism, non-traditional export agriculture, and 
community-development are all combined in Prudencio’s vision.   
 
The story of how Prudencio--a self-described radical--came to embrace this relatively 
moderate political agenda speaks to the general intellectual history of Central America 
since the Cold War.  Prudencio’s changing political philosophy illustrates the 
differences between modernity and postmodernity, understood as ideal types.  His 
youthful belief in large-scale sociopolitical theories of progress--first social 
democracy, then Marxism--transformed into a belief in strong local democracy and 
eco-projects like orchards and tilapia ponds.  This transformation was not entirely 
voluntary.  In fact, it was a painful and frustrating process that ended in Prudencio’s 
disgusted resignation from politics in 2004. 
     
Prudencio came of age at a pivotal moment in the history of Honduran politics.  
During the forties, fifties, and sixties, the Honduran government began to play an 
important role in the promotion of public welfare in rural areas, and the state became 
increasingly representative of a national community rather than a small cadre of elites.  
Swept up by the tides of post-World War II modernization, the Honduran government 
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attempted to improve social conditions through public education, public heath, labor 
policy, and agrarian reform.  Taken together, these policies instilled a new modern 
political philosophy that was initially promulgated by elites but became a part of 
mainstream culture by the sixties.  
 
This philosophy was based on a diachronic notion of progress, founded on the 
possibility of a compromise between labor and capital and a close link between state 
and nation.  This new conception of the role and responsibility of government led to 
rising expectations of socioeconomic progress, following the democratic model of 
capitalist modernization. Unfortunately, the growth of democracy and the inchoate 
class compromise would be stunted by the political realities of the Cold War in the 
sixties. 
Prudencio was born in 1949 in a provincial coffee town about thirty kilometers from 
La Quebrada.  His hometown was a conservative community devoted to coffee 
production (for landholders) and subsistence agriculture (for smallholders and landless 
people).  At that time, the town was dominated by the Catholic church, and his mother 
was, in his words, "a Catholic fanatic" who constantly prayed to the saints and forced 
him to say the rosary several time daily.  He spent a great amount of time with his 
paternal grandfather, who, in his words was a "cacique" who owned cattle land outside 
of town and was a local political leader. 53   According to Prudencio, his grandfather 
had eighty-five children with ten different women.  He speaks of his grandfather with 
great nostalgia, as a relic of a bygone pre-modern era where people gained wealth and 
status by sponsoring rituals and redistributing wealth: 
                                                 
53 See Paul Friedrich (1965) for a description of Mexican cacicazgo during this time period. "An 
Agrarian "Fighter"" in Context and Meaning in Cultural Anthropology, Melford Spiro, ed. Free Press, 
New York. 
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My grandfather was todo un señor…un hombre de verdad.  He had eighty --five 
children with ten women…Can you imagine?  And here was a man who lived with 
honor.  He was rich and had land, but he never had to worry because people respected 
him.  He buried all his money in the ground.  He never went to a bank….No one 
would even think about robbing him.  When someone in the family, or maybe a 
campesino,  had a wedding, the entire village was invited and everyone could eat the 
cake…which, back then, was really just bread.  And he would sponsor Catholic 
masses in [the closest parish]…Everyone respected this man. He was a man of the 
people." 
At that time, Honduras was ruled by military dictator Juan Manuel Galvéz, a member 
of the Nationalist party, which had long been the ally of the Catholic Church. For most 
the twentieth century, the Honduran army brutally repressed labor movements among 
urban artisans and workers on the banana plantations.  This began to change in the 
late-forties.  In 1949, Galvez signed an OAS charter guaranteeing the rights of labor 
organizations (Euraque 1996a:92).  Five years later, the country was shaken by the 
largest strike in Central American history, when 35,000 banana plantation workers 
allied with factory workers in what has been called the Honduran "Paris Commune." 
This strike led to a wave of labor reforms, assisted by the CIA and U.S. labor-relations 
specialists, and the country’s first national elections in several decades in 1957, which 
were also the first elections with universal suffrage.  Dr. Ramon Villeda Morales, a 
progressive Liberal, was elected in 1957 and preceded to institute a wave of state-
reforms with the backing of the United States, first through the Good Neighbor 
Program under Eisenhower and then through the Alliance for Progress under 
Kennedy.    
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Prudencio was directly affected by the election of President Villeda Morales.  His 
early education was in a parochial school; Honduras had no truly national public 
school system until the fifties, and it expanded greatly under the modernization 
programs led by Villeda Morales.54 Prudencio switched to a public school at age 
eleven.  His move to a public school coincided with the questioning of his mother’s 
faith.  In his words: 
 
At the age of twelve, I began to doubt the Catholic religion, and I was fighting with 
my mother.  I began to hear about Castro, Che, and the Cuban Revolution on the radio 
broadcasts and I expressed my support for the revolutionaries.  This outraged my 
mother, since she thought I was disavowing the Catholic church…She kicked me out 
of the house when I was sixteen. 
 
Prudencio took the Christian value of iconoclasm too much to heart for the taste of his 
mother and his religious teachers.  He acknowledges that his political development 
was closely linked to adolescent rebellion.  At that time, progressive politics were 
completely absent from the Honduran Catholic church, which had not yet been 
reformed by the Second Vatican Council and the rise of liberation theology, which 
would significantly change the church in later years (White 1977).  The church 
symbolized a staid traditionalism for a young idealist like Prudencio.  He remembers 
being a favorite of the local clergy, who recognized his intelligence at a young age, 
and knowing that he came from a pious family, tried to steer him towards a religious 
life with frequent praise and gifts of sports equipment.  He rejected the church, and 
this led to conflict with his mother.  To this day, he associates religion with his 
mother, bringing her up in almost every conversation on the matter.   
 
                                                 
54 There were some public schools, funded by municipalities, as early as the nineteenth century, but it 
wasn't until the postwar modernization of Galvez and Villeda Morales that the national education 
system reached most rural areas. 
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Prudencio names Jesus Christ as one of his heroes, but he despises the Catholic 
church.  Like many secular intellectuals, he understands the story of Christ as one of 
courageous iconoclasm in the face of oppression.  He is familiar with Hegelian and 
Marxist theories of religion, and believes that organized religion perpetuates the status 
quo through an ideology of obedience that contradicts the fundamentally revolutionary 
message of Jesus Christ.  He says: 
 
I saw the Church as teaching people obedience, not liberation.  I was a dynamic 
person, who felt that power needed to be in the hands of the people, and not the nuns 
and priests.  Jesus himself rebelled against the power of the priests, who were corrupt, 
and had turned the temple into a marketplace. 
 
He sees Christ as a person who fought against corruption and hypocrisy in the Church 
in hopes that it would realign with the spirit of universal benevolence out of which it 
was ostensibly created.  In this regard, his own interpretation echoes Weber’s theory 
of charismatic renewal, in which the routinization of power structures leads to periodic 
bursts of charismatic energy and self-critique. Prudencio sees Christ as a historical 
reformer, not a religious messiah, and he has carried a strong belief in criticizing 
authority throughout his life.   
 
Prudencio’s rejection of Catholicism was linked to a belief in progressive, secular 
government, and his mention of the Cuban Revolution as a key event in his life is 
important for several reasons.  First, it provides an example of how the arrival of radio 
in rural areas changed Honduran culture.  The first Honduran radio channel opened in 
Tegucigalpa 1948, led by Cuban expatriates.  Radios spread from the cities outward 
during the fifties, and the development of the battery-powered transistor radio enabled 
people in un-electrified rural areas to hear about national and international political 
events.  Prudencio relied on the radio for information, and his rejection of the 
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legitimacy of religious knowledge was partly based on the new information he was 
receiving over the airways. 
 
The Catholic Church had been the most important social institution in rural Honduras 
prior to the fifties, but the arrival of radio, followed by public school, signaled an 
important change not unlike that observed by Geertz (1957) in Indonesia at the same 
time, as ideological or political affiliations replaced local territorial communities as 
the primary modes of social integration in rural areas.  This transformation from a 
community based on religious institutions and personal relationships to a small 
component of a national political community was an important part of the transition to 
modernity in rural Honduras.   
 
As historian Tulio Halperin Donghi notes, "The Cuban Revolution set the tone of 
Latin American history in the 1960s" (1993:301), and the aftershocks of Castro’s turn 
to socialism in 1960 had a significant impact on Honduran history.  From the sixties 
until the early-nineties, U.S. foreign policy focused on preventing another hemispheric 
neighbor from becoming "the next Cuba."  In Honduras, the U.S. State Department 
was pre-eminently concerned with nipping communism in the bud through a 
combination of military training and economic aid (Euraque 1996a:108-109, 112). 
    
This policy had a direct impact on Prudencio’s life.  Early in his administration, John 
F. Kennedy initiated the Alliance for Progress as a combination of developmentalism 
and counter-revolution, which "recommended vigorous land-reform, rapid and broad-
based industrialization, and expansion of the functions and resources of the state" 
(LaFeber 1984:294).  Guided by modernization theorists, the Alliance for Progress 
intended to use a strong state and applied technology to promote economic 
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development, thereby diminishing the threat of social revolution by initiating broad 
reform.55  The Alliance for Progress was intended to alleviate the social tensions that 
may have otherwise led to a socialist revolution, and it also expanded the "great 
society" philosophy of activist government beyond the borders of the United States.  
 
In Honduras, the Alliance for Progress found an ally in President Villeda Morales, 
who held the presidency from 1957 to 1963 (LaFeber  1984:178).  Villeda Morales 
expanded universal public education into rural areas, promoted labor rights, and 
passed a series of sweeping legislation which would redistribute vast tracts of 
unproductive land to peasants.  He also cut off diplomatic relations with Cuba and 
denounced communism in order to separate his brand of reformism from Castro’s 
(Euraque 1996a:114).  During this period, organizations like the Peace Corps and the 
International Rural Development Bank became active in rural Honduras.  Labor 
unions were given large loans by the U.S. International Cooperation Administration to 
provide improved housing for fruit company workers (Euraque 1996a:101), and 
progressive politics were transforming Honduran society in novel and important ways.  
A local progressive bourgeoisie had developed around the city of San Pedro Sula, and 
they allied with labor and peasant groups in the emergent Liberal Party. 
 
While a student in the new public school is his hometown, Prudencio befriended a 
member of the first Peace Corps class in Honduras, Gary Fordham, who came to his 
village in 1963.  At that time, Prudencio was constantly fighting with his mother, and 
considered running away from home.  Gary became a mentor and big-brother to him, 
often buying him books, speaking with him about world events, and providing food 
                                                 
55 Escobar (1995) argues that the Alliance for Progress, and modernization theory in general, turned 
"poverty" into a social disease that could be eradicated by applied technology.       
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and shelter when he ran away from home. He recalls that his early intellectual 
development was influenced by the heady democratic idealism of the early-1960s, and 
that his relationship with the Fordham gave him a sense of political optimism and a 
firm belief in people’s ability to change society through secular education.  He would 
listen to current events on the radio with Gary, and discuss national and international 
politics. 
 
In 1965, after years of fighting and periodic flights from home, Prudencio’s mother 
expelled him from the family home for good.  He had finished the mandatory basic 
education course, and planned to search of work in the US-owned banana plantations 
of the North Coast, an area that he had never before visited before but was, according 
to him, where "all the action in the country was going on, both politically and 
industrially."  Indeed, there could hardly have been a better place for a young worker 
imbued with Kennedy-era idealism.  The North Coast of Honduras had been 
economically and politically dominated by US-owned fruit companies since the late-
nineteenth century, and had long been a symbol of U.S. economic imperialism in the 
region for left wing Latin American intellectuals, who saw Honduras as the 
paradigmatic "banana republic."  Pablo Neruda best expressed this idea in his poem 
"La United Fruit Co," published in 1950 in Canto General: 
 
Cuando sonó la trompeta, estuvo 
todo preparado en la tierra, 
y Jehova repartió el mundo 
a Coca-Cola Inc., Anaconda, 
Ford Motors, y otras entidades: 
la Compañía Frutera Inc. 
se reservó lo más jugoso, 
la costa central de mi tierra, 
la dulce cintura de América. 
 
Bautizó de nuevo sus tierras 
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como "Repúblicas Bananas" 
 
When the trumpet sounded  
everything was prepared on earth,  
and Jehovah gave the world  
to Coca-Cola Inc., Anaconda,  
Ford Motors, and other corporations.  
The United Fruit Company  
reserved for itself the most juicy  
piece, the central coast of my world,  
the delicate waist of America.  
 
It rebaptized these countries  
Banana Republics.   
 
Despite the neo-colonialist legacy of the fruit companies,  an unprecedented alliance 
between an urban bourgeoisie and banana-workers in the late-fifties  led to social 
democratic reforms that were rare by Central American standards.  By the early-
sixties, the North Coast was the locus of much of Villeda Morales’ reform efforts.  It 
seemed that Honduras was heading towards a labor-capital compromise that was rare 
in the region, with the North Coast leading the way.  Prudencio, then a teenager, 
wanted to be a part of it.  The North Coast was the most modern and progressive 
region in the country. 
This progress was halted in 1963, when Villeda Morales was deposed in a military 
coup and replaced by Army Colonel Oswaldo Lopez Arellano, a leader of the 
conservative National party.  In 1965, the year that Prudencio set out for the Coast, the 
new dictator had scheduled an election under pressure from the U.S. to re-establish 
democracy. General Lopez was elected through a process that was clearly a sham, and 
took power in 1965.  According to Euraque, "The 1963 coup had left mainstream 
liberalism in disarray " (1996a:123).  The coup deeply affected Prudencio, and he 
decided not to continue with his plans to relocate to the coast. He was involved in a 
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nascent romance with the woman who would become his wife, and ended up moving 
in with his paternal grandparents, who lived in the country near La Quebrada. 
He was happy living with his grandparents, and enjoyed the rural lifestyle. In the 
following years, he traveled around Central America, worked odd jobs, and got 
married.  He also became increasingly active in agrarian politics, and saw the damage 
that export lumber corporations were inflicting on the environment around La 
Quebrada.  In 1970, Prudencio decided to become a teacher and enrolled in the 
national teacher’s college in Tegucigalpa.  There, he became increasingly attracted to 
the political left, which had become more radical throughout the sixties, following the 
general political currents of the day. The emergence of the Lopez government 
temporarily thwarted the efforts of Honduran progressives. Kennedy’s death led to the 
Johnson administration’s support of General Lopez.  The government turned to more 
hard-line anti-communist politics, and this turned many people against the liberal-
democratic version of progress. Lopez Arellano attacked labor leaders as 
"subversives" throughout the late-sixties, and effectively alienated the Honduran left 
from mainstream liberalism for several years.  
 
LaFeber details the demise of reformist policies following the Lopez coup, who he 
sees as a martinet controlled by a power block of U.S. businessmen, the military, and 
wealthy landowners.  He writes, "The post-1963 Alliance assumed a different form in 
Honduras.  Resembling the larger change in Latin American policy when Johnson 
replaced Kennedy, increased amounts of U.S. private capital appeared in Honduras as 
the López regime rolled back the Villeda Morales labor reforms and provided inviting 
opportunities for foreign investors" (LaFeber 1983:181).  LaFeber focuses on the 
military’s role in protecting the interests of the U.S. fruit companies and an emerging 
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cotton and cattle oligarchy at the expense of the peasantry.  He sees López as 
representative of the Vietnam-era shift away from liberal reform in Latin America 
which would continue through the Nixon years and re-emerge under Reagan. 
 
Prudencio’s early admiration for the United States, formed during his friendship with 
Fordham and the days of Kennedy and Villeda Morales, turned to hostility as he 
entered the university.  He organized his first political protest in opposition to a IBRD-
funded plan for American education specialists to develop a curriculum for Honduran 
schools. The U.S.’ support of the military dictatorship had eroded popular support for 
the American government through the sixties, and Honduran students were well aware 
of the 1968 student massacres in Mexico City and believed that the CIA was at least 
partly responsible.56  Prudencio began to read Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse Tung and 
was active in left-wing political groups.  
 
Anti-imperialism, and particularly anti-Americanism, has long been a part of the 
culture of the Latin American left, and Honduras was certainly no exception.  But 
domestic events turned students’ critical energy away from the U.S. in 1969, when the 
invasion of Honduras by El Salvador in 1969 unified Honduran society against a 
foreign enemy, bringing domestic political rivals together in the cause.  Student 
activism was directed at El Salvador rather than the US, and the new domestic unity 
led to a compromise between General Lopez Arellano and his former critics.  Lopez 
Arellano began to institute his own social reforms beginning in the 1970s.  Honduran 
rural society had become increasingly impoverished due to the impact of large-scale 
export production, and Arellano saw the potential for the sort of rural crisis that had 
                                                 
56 On October 2,  1968 the Mexican Army opened fire on a student demonstration in Tlatelolco in 
Mexico City, killing hundreds of demonstrators. See Zolov (1999) for an analysis of the origins of the 
massacre and its impact on Mexican politics and culture. 
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befallen El Salvador and precipitated that country’s invasion of Honduras.  Working 
with leaders of labor unions and peasant groups, he revived the sweeping agrarian 
reform that he had denounced years before, and he established ties to the industrial 
bourgeoisie that had opposed his coup.   
 
Despite his radicalism, Prudencio began working for the Instituto Nacional Agrario, 
the institution responsible for carrying out the agrarian reform, in the early seventies. 
The INA was responsible for redistributing unproductive latifundios to landless 
peasant groups, and the fact that a progressive like Prudencio could become an 
employee of the military government speaks to the uniqueness of Honduran military 
reformism in the seventies.  In 1975, Prudencio was involved in Honduras’ most 
famous and ambitious land redistribution project in the Bajo Aguán valley, a fertile 
region where thousands of hectares of land had been abandoned by the banana 
companies.  With the financial backing of the state, the INA attempted to develop 
peasant cooperatives for the production of African palm oil (Macias 2001).  The 
cooperatives were organized and managed by government bureaucrats, who were 
involved in fraud and embezzlement.  Prudencio was head of the INA worker’s union, 
and consistently spoke out against the corruption which eventually led to the 
cooperative’s demise.  
 
The internal problems of the INA became moot, however, in late 1975, when a 
military coup deposed General Lopez Arellano and replaced him with the more 
conservative Colonel Melgar Castro, who would then be replaced by General 
Policarpo Paz García.  By 1977, the agrarian reform was essentially halted by the 
newly conservative government, which was allied with the interests of large 
landholders who had long opposed the reform (Weaver 1990:69).  After the coup, the 
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agrarian reform process relied on land seizures conducted by peasant groups without 
support from government agencies.  Prudencio joined the national communist party 
(PCH) and became active in radical peasant organizations, frustrated with the 
ineffectiveness of the INA.   
 
He developed a severe stomach ulcer in 1977, caused, he believes, by the stress of 
activism. A leader of the PCH arranged for him to travel to the Soviet Union for 
medical treatments.  He spent almost a year in the USSR, and was disillusioned with 
the bleak totalitarian society that he encountered there.  He was warned of the dangers 
of speaking critically of the Breshnev government, and was convinced that Soviet 
communism was on the decline.  He returned to Honduras in 1979.   
 
The events of 1979 were crucial to the history of Central America, and set in motion a 
series of forces which would quash whatever elements of mainstream progressive 
politics remained in Honduras.  The Sandinistas successfully toppled the Somoza 
regime in Nicaragua, and the left wing FLNM began its civil war in El Salvador.  
Honduras became the focus of U.S. foreign policy, led by a hard-line anti-communist 
Army general named Gustavo Alvarez Martinez.  The Honduran military was not 
under civilian control, and they had been trained and equipped by the United States 
since the sixties.  Under the new government, General Alvarez was unquestionably the 
country’s political strongman.  A fanatical anti-communist, he had trained in 
Argentina and was the first to impose "dirty war" counterinsurgency  tactics, such as 
death squads, kidnappings, and torture, in Honduras.  The Nicaraguan revolutionaries 
had conducted operations in the Honduran mountains, and developed links with 
nascent Honduran revolutionary groups.  People like Prudencio, who had been active 
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in peasant movements and left-wing politics, were labeled as "subversives" and faced 
unprecedented danger.    
 
By this time, Prudencio was married with three young children, and decades of work 
as a political activist were wearing him down.  The threat posed by the military 
leadership led Prudencio to back off from his public activism.  He decided to move to 
La Quebrada in 1982 and start a coffee farm on land that was owned by his 
grandparents and in-laws.  He became active in local politics, helping to organize a 
local committee that pressured the national government to grant La Quebrada 
autonomous status as a municipality.   At the time, Honduran coffee was beginning to 
grow in importance on the world market.  Global demand increased for the mild 
Arabica varieties that Honduras produced, and Prudencio’s farm had a run of 
profitable harvests.  The community as a whole was growing and prospering.  
However, Prudencio's personal history as an activist and member of the Honduran 
Communist Party (PCH) put him in danger of accusations of subversive activity by the 
paranoid militares.  In 1985, he was roused from his bed and kidnapped by military 
police while his children watched.  He was held for three weeks under suspicion of 
subversive activity, but does not voluntarily speak about the incident.  When I asked 
what happened, he brusquely responded by saying, "Me jodieron," which is best 
translated as They fucked with me.   
 
Although he was unwilling to speak in detail about the 1985 kidnapping, he admits 
that he was fortunate to survive.  By that year, General Alvarez had been deposed by 
General Walter López, and the dirty war tactics persisted in a less brutal and maniacal 
form.  Prudencio says that if Alvarez had still been in power, he would have certainly 
been murdered.  Nevertheless, the events of 1985 left his family traumatized, 
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especially his children.  He decided to focus on local political concerns, and in 1986, 
his efforts to win political autonomy for La Quebrada were rewarded when the 
community became an official municipality.  Prudencio was named interim town 
secretary by governmental decree, pending elections the following year. 
  
At first, the community had almost no infrastructure, such as public schools, road 
maintenance, or water.  The leadership had to learn how to work within the political 
system in order to achieve funding from the national government for municipal 
projects.  Prudencio’s initial solicitations show a certain naïve optimism and a belief in 
the state as a care-giving patron.  A letter to President Jose Simon Azcona, written 
months after the formation of the municipality is revealing.  It reads: 
 
Excelentísimo Señor Presidente de la Republica de Honduras 
Ingeniero José Simón Azcona 
 
Por medio de la presente nos dirigimos a usted con el cariño que un pueblo le prodiga, 
dado a la connotación que tiene para nosotros, la trascendental obra que realizó al 
elevarnos de la categoría de aldea a la de Municipio; este gesto pasara a la Historia 
como una acción sublime hacia un pueblo que se le concedió el objectivo de su lucha, 
gracias a esa actuación justa, usted se convirtió en el Hijo Predilecto de este bello 
lugar y a quien deseamos tener en nuestro seno, ya sea como Presidente de nuestro 
país o como simple ciudadano, porque la esperanza que abrigamos cuando llego es su 
campana política, ya fue materializada por ella queremos rendirle un justo y merecido 
reconocimiento publico pues el pueblo debe rendir tributo al hombre que merece los 
Honores; esperamos considere nuestro deseo y nos de cualquier día la sorpresa que 
llegara hasta este rincón productivo. 
 
Señor presidente: Así como un niño necesita de un tratamiento especial para su 
Desarrollo, también nuestro Municipio espera de su creador un tratamiento especial 
para alcanzar a corto plazo las metas que nos hemos puesto, que en líneas gruesas 
son…   
 
Your Excellency  Señor President of the Republic of Honduras, Engineer Jose Simon 
Azcona: 
 
Through this letter, we address you with the love that a community bestows upon you, 
given the meaning that the transcendental task you accomplished by raising U.S. from 
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the category of village to municipality has for us.  This gesture will pass into History 
as a sublime action that provided a community with the object of its struggle;  thanks 
to this just action, you have become the Favorite Son of this beautiful place, who we 
wish to keep in our bosom, whether as President of our country or as a simple citizen, 
because the hope that you gave U.S. when you came here during your campaign has 
materialized, and for that we want to pay you just and deserved public recognition, as 
a community should pay tribute to a man that deserves the Honors; we hope that you 
consider our wishes and one of these days surprise U.S. by stopping by this productive 
little corner. 
 
Señor President: Just as a child needs special treatment for its development, so our 
Municipality hopes that its creator provides special treatment so that it can reach the 
short term goals that we have proposed, which, in broad strokes are…] 
 
 
Despite the flowery language, the local government’s requests were for basic public 
goods--a road connecting them to a nearby town, funds for urban improvements, 
connections to the national electrical grid, a catastral survey, legal designation of 
boundaries, and assistance in a potable water project in partnership with CARE.  In 
another letter, Prudencio requested a diagnostic study of community needs and asked 
that the Minister of Planning put them in touch with an international organization who 
could spearhead the development process.  These seemed like reasonable requests, and 
they occurred as the country was transitioning to democratic rule.   However,  
Prudencio was unprepared for the realities of Honduran party politics.   
  
Honduran democracy remains quite corrupt, but before 1993, it was much worse.  
Prior to electoral reforms passed in 1993, voters could only vote for party tickets, 
rather than individual candidates.  A voter could not choose the presidential candidate 
from one party and a mayor from another.  The mayor was elected based on the 
percentage of votes his or her party’s presidential candidate received in a given 
municipality.  Mayoral candidates had vote-getting clout in the national elections, so 
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there was a great amount of corrupt dealing in order to get certain candidates to 
support a certain party.  
 
The newly-formed government was open to the influence of Honduran party politics, 
where favor-swapping, patronage, and bribes are common. National politicians forged 
links with the new town leadership in a power grab, and a political rift quickly 
developed in the local government between allies of the Liberal and National parties.  
Prudencio, in typical iconoclastic fashion, refused to ally himself with either party, and 
regretted that local politics had quickly deteriorated into partisan sniping.  As he puts 
it, "The local politicians were only concerned with their own interests and had no 
concern for the needs of the pueblo."  He had become disillusioned with national 
bureaucracy while working at the INA, and now he saw that local politics were subject 
to the same patterns of corruption. The Nationalist party, longtime allies of the 
military government,  took control of local politics and Prudencio was cut out of the 
local government.  He began to feud with one of the town’s largest coffee growers and 
most powerful Nationalist politicos.  In the meantime, the town remained without 
potable water, roads, or electricity.  
 
The late-eighties and early-nineties brought sweeping changes to Honduras, due in 
part to Honduras’ strategic position in the Cold War power struggle but also to the 
wave of democratization that spread throughout the world after 1989.  In 1990, the 
peace plan initiated by Costa Rican president Oscar Sanchez Arias led to the 
establishment of democratic elections in Nicaragua, ending the threat of guerilla 
warfare in Honduras or the need for large-scale military aid.  The demise of Marxist 
leadership in Nicaragua, coupled with the breakup of the USSR, ended Honduras’ 
position as "main girder in the bridge" (LaFeber 1983) of the US’ hemispheric security 
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strategy.   The amount of U.S. aid to Honduras declined dramatically, and much of the 
remaining funds were intended to strengthen local democratic institutions and 
decentralize politics.  Honduras held democratic elections in 1990, electing the 
Nationalist Rafael Callejas.  Corruption and human rights violations could no longer 
be excused as necessary evils that ensured "stability." Financial transparency and 
support of the rule of law became important priorities, as "efficiency" replaced 
stability as the guiding principle of national progress.  
 
With the end of the "red" threat came new interest in strong democracy and human 
rights, as well as economic policies geared towards market liberalization and global 
competitiveness.57  USAID, the World Bank, and other lending agencies began to 
focus on fiscal discipline as a requirement for development assistance.  The IMF 
created a fiscal austerity program for Honduras in 1989, and USAID withheld funds as 
punishment for non-compliance.  The structural adjustment programs instituted in 
Honduras followed the neoliberal model that the IMF and World Bank instituted 
around the world (Noé Pino 1995).  As a response to the debt crisis of the eighties, 
highly-indebted countries like Honduras aimed to cut spending in order to stabilize 
national currencies and attract private capital.  Honduras wooed light manufacturing 
companies--mainly garment sweatshops--with tax-free zones and low labor costs.  
Investment in non-traditional agricultural products like berries, cucumbers, mangoes, 
flowers, and broccoli was encouraged by USAID, and shrimp-farming for export 
became one of the country’s most profitable industries.   
 
                                                 
57 Honduras has made great strides in fighting corruption and enforcing human rights since the return of 
democracy, but they remain two of the most pressing issues for the country.  Not one military or 
political leader has been convicted of human rights abuses, despite the efforts of a national human rights 
commission.    
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Centralized social programs were expensive and inefficiently run, and in this new 
environment, public expenditures needed to be cut significantly for Honduras to 
maintain its standing with creditors.  This new tight-fisted approach did not bode well 
for rural areas, and especially La Quebrada, which had virtually no public services and 
was desperately in need of state support. NGOs became increasingly important actors 
in the social services sector, filling the void left by the cessation of military aid.  
 
In 1989, the breakdown of the International Coffee Agreement caused coffee prices to 
plummet, intensifying the need for assistance in La Quebrada.  During this period, 
Prudencio forged alliances with NGOs that would become important throughout the 
nineties.  In 1989, the national forestries service (COHDEFOR) conducted a feasibility 
study for a municipal water system, and determined that pollution from certain coffee 
farms was contaminating the town’s water sources.  Prudencio began a campaign to 
stop one of the farmers, his main political rival, from polluting the water from his 
heavily-fertilized field.  The influence of his history as an activist was clear in 
pamphlets posted around town, where he used language like, "People of La Quebrada, 
divided we are many but weak; united we are few but strong" and "Until the final 
victory," but his goals were far from radical.  He sought to develop a community-wide 
committee for the protection of local watersheds.  His request was denied by the 
town’s mayor, so he organized public rallies.  Nevertheless, a judge ruled in favor of 
the polluting landowner under questionable circumstances.  Despite affidavits from the 
national environmental ministry supporting Prudencio’s claim, the judge ruled that the 
landowner could continue to pollute.  Although his campaign ended in 
disappointment,  Prudencio made professional contacts with agronomists funded by 
USAID, which was working with CARE to improve hillside agricultural practices in 
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Honduras.  He saw his new NGO allies as a way out of the frustrating corruption of 
mainstream politics.   
 
In the early nineties, Prudencio began to organize an association of elected 
neighborhood representatives.  He focused his energies on local democratic 
participation, organizing La Quebrada’s first open town meeting in 1996, with the 
assistance of three NGOs.  He had come full-circle in his political opinions.  His early 
belief in strong centralized government and technical assistance had been challenged 
by his experiences with bureaucratic corruption and state hypocrisy.  His new 
approach saw the town meeting model of "pure democracy" as the foundation of 
effective popular rule, and he bemoaned the political flaws and inefficiencies of 
centralization. 
 
In 1998, the catastrophe caused by Hurricane Mitch led to a tremendous infusion in 
development aid in Honduras. Prudencio had been active in promoting strong systems 
of local governance in La Quebrada, and development agencies were eager to work in 
places where, ideally, a broad coalition of political factions developed a community’s 
agenda.  Therefore, La Quebrada was a natural fit for community-driven development 
work.  In early 1999, Prudencio became the local leader of two related development 
projects funded by USDA and USAID and managed by Cornell University.  The first 
was an attempt to develop a community-driven diagnostic study in which elected 
neighborhood-leaders developed a hierarchy of the community’s needs (something 
Prudencio had been working towards for a decade).  The second project was an 
organic coffee cooperative and processing facility, of which Prudencio was the co-
president. 
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The coffee cooperative was the victim of bad timing.  During its first crop year, world 
coffee prices hit a fifty-year low, and the co-op sold its crop for below the cost of 
production.  It managed to hang on, with a few members, for another season, but it had 
disappeared by 2003.  Prudencio’s sons migrated to the U.S. and were working as 
house-painters in suburban New Jersey.  He had retired from local politics in 
frustration, and spent much of the year in Tegucigalpa, returning to La Quebrada for 
the coffee harvest.  One afternoon, we were speaking about the fortunes of migrants, 
and whether returnees could help the economic prospects of the community.  "Look," 
he told me, "A few people might come back with a truck or a gold chain from work in 
the States, but they will never create any long term future for the people here.  That is 
something that can’t be done without politics.  And here, politics are not possible 
unless you are a criminal." 
 
Prudencio’s life story encapsulates the transition from modernity to postmodernity in 
Honduras. His political life began as rural Honduras was beginning to develop as a  
modern nation-state.  He feuded with his mother over the relative value of secular 
education versus religion, and he eventually became a teacher in the public schools, 
demonstrating his belief in modern, secular concepts of progress.  During the early 
days of the Alliance for Progress, his exposure to the Peace Corps cemented his faith 
in progressive democracy.  He participated in the agrarian reform movement and state-
directed development, but was frustrated by the corruption, inefficiency, and 
hypocrisy he encountered in the bureaucracy.  He turned to Soviet communism as a 
model of progress, but his belief in Communism was shattered by his trip to the USSR 
in the late-seventies.  His persecution by the military government in the eighties forced 
him to take on a more moderate agenda as a matter of survival.  He turned to local 
democracy and environmentalism in the eighties, and forged alliances with non-
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governmental institutions.  By the nineties, he had completely lost faith in mainstream 
government and turned to non-governmental solutions to local problems.  By the time 
I met him, he had embraced sustainable entrepreneurialism--organic coffee 
production--which was exactly the sort of market-driven social program that the 
NGOs were promoting at that time.  The failure of the coffee project and his sons’ 
migration had left him disillusioned and cynical about Honduran politics.   
 
In present-day La Quebrada, NGOs play a vital role in local politics, which could be 
seen as a new form of political engagement, rather than depoliticization.  One 
organization, Proyecto Aldea Global (Global Village Project) has become almost a 
state within a state.  The town's mayor appeals to Aldea Global's leadership for 
funding for social programs, and the project has even provided basic infrastructure, 
like roads and water, that the Honduran government has not been able to provide.  
Aldea Global is nominally a Christian organization, but it does not actively 
proselytize, and it works in partnership with American Jewish World Service as well 
as secular charities like the Kellogg Foundation.   As an NGO, Aldea Global is outside 
of the political system, and is therefore unaccountable for its successes and failures.  
Of course, it must follow the laws of the country, but the project prides itself on its 
ability to cut through bureaucratic red tape and deliver results without involving the 
political establishment. The success or failure of its projects does not translate into 
political power.  Although its leaders stress community involvement, Aldea Global is 
a non-democratic organization that relies on external funding from private donors or 
government grants.  NGOs like Aldea Global provide important social services that 
cash-strapped states cannot.  However, their newfound power symbolizes the process 
of depoliticization that has occurred in rural Honduras.  Even "the government" has 
given up on government, viewing NGO activity as a pragmatic way to provide 
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services with limited resources.   The state plays a relatively minor role in rural 
development while the political leadership focuses on export growth in urban 
manufacturing.  The contracting of rural social services to NGOs removes the state 
from accountability and marginalizes rural politics from the mainstream. 
  
The rising power of groups like Aldea Global demonstrates the severance of the pact 
between Honduran state and nation, especially in the countryside.  One of the ironies 
of the Honduran transition to democracy, post-1989, is the fact that mainstream 
political institutions have played a decreasing role in local politics, while NGOs, 
which are outside the boundaries of democratic governance, have risen in power.  It is 
no wonder that people feel marginalized from domestic politics, when NGOs like 
Aldea Global perform even the most basic functions of government, such as road 
construction.  Taking Prudencio's story into account, we can see how dramatically he 
role and responsibility of government has changed since the days of the Alliance for 
Progress.  His story fittingly explains the origins of the current depoliticized climate in 
La Quebrada.   
 
In the following chapters, I describe two movements that provide strategies for social 
improvement within this depoliticized climate.  In Chapter 5, I describe two religious 
movements that provide worshipers with  philosophies of self-empowerment, and, I 
argue, have filled the gap left by the demise of secular politics.  Chapter 6 describes 
the fair trade coffee movement, one of the few popular strategies that have been 
devised to improve social conditions in La Quebrada and places like it.  Fair trade 
shifts the responsibility for regulation of the coffee market away from states and 
international organizations, and towards individual consumers.   Although both of 
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these movements contain political elements, they are ultimately products of the 
process of depoliticization described here.   
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Chapter 5 
Broken Idols: Religious Belief, Mediation, and Action   
 
Jesús es más que un templo de lujo con tendencia barroca. 
Él sabe que total a la larga esto no es más que roca. 
La iglesia se lleva en el alma y en los actos no se te olvide 
que Jesús, hermanos míos, es verbo no sustantivo 
 
Jesus is more than a luxurious Baroque style temple.  He knows that in the end, this is 
nothing more than rock. You carry the church in your soul and in your acts. Don’t 
forget, my brothers, that Jesus is a verb and not a noun.   
 
Pop song by Guatemalan singer Ricardo Arjona, "Jesús verbo no sustantivo" (Jesus: 
verb, not noun)58   
 
In the previous chapter, I documented the transition from  progressive, state-centric 
modernization to depoliticized postmodernity in rural Honduran politics.  In this 
chapter, I will describe how this transition has affected contemporary religious thought 
and practice.   
 
The ideological similarities between religious and political movements in each 
respective historical era are striking:  During the era of agrarian reform and state-
centric modernization, Honduran Catholics came to embrace politicized religious 
movements that synthesized Catholicism with campesino politics. These movements 
generally followed the two major modernist ideologies of the Cold War--social 
democracy and Marxism.  In the early sixties, Catholic Social Movements (CSMs) 
opposed Communism (mainly Castroism) and followed a reformist democratic model, 
often funded by USAID, assisted by the CIA and other institutional branches of the 
Alliance for Progress (White 1977:276).   
                                                 
58 This song was a huge hit throughout Latin America in the eighties.  I noticed that it appealed equally 
to active and passive Christians in La Quebrada.  I twice saw people break into tears while singing 
along with this song on the radio.    
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By the late-sixties, segments of these movements began to embrace Marxism, and 
were influenced by the liberation theology developed by Paulo Freire in Brazil.59  The 
Marxist CSMs, especially the "Celebration of the Word of God" directed peasant land 
seizures and encouraged violent opposition to the dominant capitalist classes.  They 
drew philosophical inspiration from dependency theory and other forms of anti-
imperialist thought.  The democratic CSMs still survived alongside the Marxists, but 
they distanced themselves from their more aggressive tactics of the latter group. The 
relationship between the democratic CSMs, USAID, and the CIA was not a secret, and 
their increasingly close relationship led Honduran populist leaders to turn to more 
radical philosophies.60  By the seventies, the radical CSMs had great popular appeal, 
and the "Celebration of the Word of God" was a force in rural politics.  The 
reformist/radical split that marked secular politics mapped almost perfectly onto 
Catholic institutions, with social democratic movements forming in the early-sixties 
and generally being usurped by more radical movements by the late-sixties and 
seventies.  
 
Protestant evangelicals were active in Honduras beginning in the nineteenth century, 
but their impact was limited.  The country had an insignificant (<10%) Protestant 
population until the eighties.  Evangelical missionaries were funded and assisted by 
fanatical anti-communists in the U.S. (such as Lt. Col. Oliver North) who saw their 
                                                 
59 These movements may have received financial/institutional support from the Soviet Union, but the 
nature of their relationship has not been studied.   
60 For example, one of the most important democratic CSMs, Acción Cultural Popular Hondureña 
(ACPH), was funded by USAID from 1968-1972. The increased interference of USAID’s leadership 
alienated ACPH’s leaders, who moved towards more radical models of peasant action by the late sixties 
(White 1977:276-286). The democratic CSMs based their philosophy on a model developed by Roger 
Vekemans, a Belgian Jesuit in Chile who "became a conduit for millions of dollars from the CIA" (Stoll 
1990:14). 
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religious proselytizing as part of the fight against the spread of Marxism, which was 
embodied in Catholic liberation theology, a part of the Sandinista revolutionary 
platform in Nicaragua that threatened to spread through Central America (Stoll 
1990:135-179).  
 
In his book Is Latin America Turning Protestant? (1990) Stoll argued that evangelical 
Protestantism provided pragmatic solutions to problems of rural society that were far 
more convincing then those offered by liberation theology.  Although he spends much 
of the book arguing that the rise of evangelical Protestantism was not part of some 
nefarious anti-Marxist plot, revelations about the spread of Protestantism in Honduras 
forced him to reconsider. Oliver North had indeed used U.S. strategic resources to 
support Protestant evangelicalism in Honduras, confirming the conspiracy theory that 
he had tried so hard to refute.  Stoll writes:   
 
This, then, is what stood behind the buzzing activity of North American evangelists in 
Honduras.  Behind all the coming and going--into restricted areas, through 
connections with the U.S. embassy, on military aircraft, bringing relief supplies to 
refugees and ministering to contras--was a lieutenant colonel in the White House, 
orchestrating evangelists into sensitive areas to hand out gifts and ideology (Stoll 
1990:325-326) 
 
He continues: 
 
To those who distrust and fear evangelical growth, Oliver North and his friends have 
confirmed the view that this is the result of strategic U.S. planning.  That evangelism 
is a spiritual con game, of attracting Latin Americans with dollars, working closely 
with the power structure, and following orders from Washington.  This is the 
conspiracy explanation for evangelical growth in Latin America, an explanation 
widely accepted in the Catholic Church, on the left, and wherever sectarianism divides 
the poor against each other.  It is not the picture of I wanted to draw when I started this 
book; it is the folk mythology I wanted to refute, not affirm.  Yet Oliver North and his 
evangelists have done this great disservice to their brethren: they have shown that it is 
true (327). 
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As Stoll recognizes, there was indeed a direct historical relationship between Cold 
War military activity and the rise of Protestantism in Honduras, but this historical 
explanation of the origins of Honduran evangelism cannot explain why so many 
people have continued to believe in evangelical religions in the fifteen years since.  
The close ties between some Protestant churches and the U.S. government were well-
known, yet these churches continue to grow by the day. Something about their 
message must resonate with popular experience, and a historical account of their 
origins doesn’t begin to address their contemporary appeal. As Stoll predicted, "The 
more important story is what is going on at the popular level" (327).  This essay seeks 
to explain the contemporary appeal of Honduran evangelical movements at "the 
popular level." 
 
At present, evangelical Protestantism is the most dynamic and fastest growing form of 
religion in rural Honduras.61  I believe that a great deal of its power comes from its 
tendency to frame social issues as the product of individual choices.  This philosophy 
is ideologically powerful at a time when the relationship between state and nation has 
been transformed, and rural people can no longer look to the state as representative of 
their interests.  Here, I will present ethnographic data from La Quebrada to analyze the 
appeal of two recent religious movements, which stems from their relatively 
unmediated message of the power of the autonomous individual.  Although the 
specific doctrines of Protestantism vary greatly, they all share one fundamental 
difference from the Christian Social Movements that were so important in the sixties 
and seventies: The new religions frame social problems as the consequences of 
individual choices, and they tend to ignore politics at an abstract level. This emphasis 
                                                 
61 According to various studies reproduced by David Stoll (1990:337), the Protestant population of 
Honduras was less than 2% of the total population in 1960, and less than 10% during the mid-eighties.   
According to contemporary estimates, the Protestant population of Honduras is over 35%.  
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on the power of the individual, abstracted from collective mediating institutions, is a 
cultural consequence of the demise of agrarian politics in Honduras.   
 
The difference between evangelical movements and the modern CSMs is clear.  The 
contemporary movements no longer explain the problems faced by rural society as the 
consequences of sociopolitical factors, as did both the Democratic and Marxist 
versions of "social Christianity." Instead, the new churches focus almost exclusively 
on individual morality and various formulations of "personal responsibility."  The 
individual has become the basic unit of social reform, and secular theories of progress 
have lost ground to a depoliticized emphasis on individual morality.  This theory of 
individual power has ideological force at a time when the relationship between nation 
and state has eroded, NGOs assume the role of many state functions, and socially-
destructive practices like undocumented migration are viewed as economic resources. 
 
In this essay, I focus on the popular appeal of two religious movements that have 
arisen in La Quebrada over the past fifteen years.  The first movement is a relatively 
ascetic Pentecostal congregation that emphasizes personal sobriety, discipline, and the 
fear of damnation.  The second movement is an avowedly libertarian Christian cult 
that has no concept of sin or damnation and attracts members with a message of 
individual responsibility and freedom from guilt.62  Both religions emphasize personal 
empowerment and self-improvement, but they do so in vastly different ways.   
 
                                                 
62 I will use the word "evangelical"  to describe the Pentecostal Baptist church.  In Latin America, 
"evangelical"  (evangelico/a) means Protestant.  Readers should note that the Spanish word for "gospel" 
is evangelio.  The term evangelico draws attention to the fact that these churches proselytize, ie "spread 
the gospel." 
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This chapter follows a discussion of Honduran politics in order to draw a connection 
between evangelical religious movements and depoliticization.  These new religious 
movements in La Quebrada are directed towards the resolution of life’s problems and 
the empowerment of individuals. As the previous chapter illustrates, for almost fifty 
years, secular conceptions of modernization seemed to have surpassed the role of 
religion as a source of moral order in rural Honduras.  The recent popularity of 
religious movements should be placed in this historical context.  They do no represent 
a return to "tradition," but a response to the failure of secular ideologies to produce 
satisfactory results.  
 
In La Quebrada, the evangelical turn began in 1989. The collapse of the International 
Coffee Agreement, the cessation of economic aid from the United States, and the 
institution of fiscal austerity measures all began in 1989, but in La Quebrada, the 
collapse of coffee had the greatest impact.  Between 1989 and 1993, coffee prices 
were cut in half, leading to increased rural poverty and violence.63  People had 
nowhere to turn for secular solutions to these problems.  After the collapse of agrarian 
politics, described in the previous chapter, there was no guiding secular theory of 
progress.  Kennedy-era progressive democracy was either seen as an anachronistic 
relic of an idealistic age or a corrupt offshoot of American imperialism.  Mainstream 
political parties were left in a corrupt shambles, shackled by external debt and a legacy 
of fiscal incompetence.  Revolutionary politics had led to a decade of fear and tumult 
                                                 
63 The impact of the end of the ICA on the Honduran coffee industry was not entirely negative.  
Honduras had little political power within the International Coffee Organization, and its annual quotas 
were relatively low due to its peripheral position within the institutional structure of the ICO.  The end 
of the ICA allowed the country to export more coffee by volume, but prices dropped too low to make 
up for this increased volume.  Additionally, price volatility (not necessarily a net decline) is especially 
difficult for small farmers, and the end of the ICA certainly made prices more volatile, even if they may 
have risen at times.   
    
 170
that no one wished to revisit.  In this atmosphere of political failure, religious 
movements have filled the political void left by the demise of secular politics. 
 
I was consistently surprised at the passionate and coherent explanations of religious 
belief that people in La Quebrada provided.  I was equally surprised by the absence of 
analogous debate over the virtues of political parties or secular philosophies.  
Strangely, membership in Honduras’ two major political parties, the Nationalists and 
Liberals, was taken as a matter of tradition rather than volition.  One was a "red" 
(Liberal) or a "blue" (Nationalist) by virtue of membership in a "red" or "blue" family, 
and the specific beliefs of each party were rarely discussed.  When politics were 
discussed, the discourse was highly personalized (e.g. "so and so is corrupt," "so and 
so is a man of the people").  There was not much ideological difference between the 
two major parties.   Religion, normally the domain of tradition, was a topic of debate 
and personal choice, while politics was the domain of tradition, uncritically accepted.  
These churches filled the role normally played by political parties in modern states--
they were domains where people developed and debated ways to improve social 
conditions. 
 
As I will emphasize in this chapter, the new churches provide a great deal of meaning 
and personal satisfaction to participants, and they have helped many people deal with 
hardship.  The evangelical churches have been quite beneficial to many communities. 
However, these churches intend to empower people through individual moral guidance 
rather than collective political action, and they provide easy individual solutions to 
complex social problems.  
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Both of the new religious movements that I focus on believe that other faiths have 
failed to adequately explain the nature of social reality.  Both faiths contain a doctrine 
of "self-help" that is especially attractive in times of crisis and change, but their 
versions of "self-help" are opposite.  In the following section, I investigate how these 
two decidedly different religious movements emerged from the same general 
sociological conditions.  Do these two religions seek to resolve similar social 
dilemmas? Does a person need to adhere to a strict code of conduct in order to feel 
"born again" or does a doctrine of absolute liberty provide a person with the same 
sense of pride and power over their lives?  Do these philosophies have some basic 
functional similarities behind their manifest philosophical differences?   
 
It is a known fact that proselytizing faiths tend to thrive in "burnt-over" societies 
(Mintz 1974:258).  Revivalist churches are often "the churches of the detribalized, the 
decultured, and the disinherited. They fill many needs for lower-class people who, one 
way or another, have lost their stake in ‘the old ways’" (Mintz 1974:258).  Pentecostal 
Baptist churches provide members with a new interpretation of reality, a sense of 
group solidarity, and a clear path to a better life.  They also provide recreation, a social 
support network, and the ability to actively participate in a valued status-group for 
marginal members of society (Martin 1996).  Throughout modern history, revivalist 
churches have located the source of social decay in the cultural sphere.  They often 
prohibit music, dance, art, clothing, or other behaviors that they associate with either a 
destructive, encroaching modernity or a diabolical, retrograde "tradition." In La 
Quebrada, Pentecostal churches contain both elements: They prohibit pop music and 
trendy clothing, two elements of a "sinful" modernity, and they prohibit Catholic 
festivals and the worship of patron saints, two practices that are common parts of 
traditional rural culture.  
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Another significant aspect of Pentecostal Baptist churches is that they tend to win 
adherents through spectacles of mass healing, speaking in tongues, and trances.  The 
functional interpretation of religious revival de-emphasizes the experiential 
importance of these phenomena (Csordas 2002).  Miraculous acts give people a sense 
of proximity to and limited control over a transcendent power.  These acts condense 
the power to heal afflictions, both physical and psychological, into moments of great 
drama that provide evidence of the efficacy of faith.  The social aspects of church 
membership are vitally important, but often follow from the initial experience of 
miraculous power that "convinces" people to follow a new faith.64 
 
The importance of healing to conversion events begs the question: If people are drawn 
to revivalist faiths that can cure physical and emotional afflictions, then why should 
these faiths emphasize personal guilt and the struggle against temptation?  Doesn’t this 
emphasis on guilt create as much suffering as it alleviates?  Logically speaking, would 
not a libertarian faith, such as the one I describe in this essay, provide people with a 
greater sense of power and control over their lives by removing the oppressive specter 
of guilt?  If the appeal of the revivalist faiths is based on the curing of all sorts of 
afflictions, can libertarianism be as empowering as asceticism?  
 
Religious Diversity in La Quebrada 
 
In La Quebrada, there are so many Christian sects to choose from that religion has 
become an individual choice rather than a ritualized social obligation. There are fifteen 
                                                 
64 This point is vividly demonstrated in Mintz' description of the conversion of Taso Zayas in  Worker 
in the Cane.  Unfortunately, Mintz’ sociohistorical interpretation of conversion de-emphasizes the 
experiential component. 
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different churches in town: five Catholic churches in different neighborhoods, eight 
Pentecostal churches, one Jehovah’s Witness hall, and a fringe Christian church, 
Creciendo en Gracia [Growing in Grace], devoted to a Puerto Rican man named Jose 
de Jesus Miranda who is called "The Apostle."  The largest of these churches, the 
Catholic church in the town center, has about five hundred congregants.  The size of 
the Pentecostal congregations varies from about one hundred to twenty-five.  I 
calculate the town’s population to be about 65% Catholic and 35% Protestant.65  
 
All of the non-Catholic churches are relatively new.  The first Protestant church was 
formed in 1989, and all of the others sprouted up in the nineties.  Catholicism remains 
the most popular religion, and it is the baseline against which all other sects define 
themselves.  All of the current adult members of the new churches were born into 
Catholic families, and most discussions of the relative merits of evangelical churches 
begin with, "I don’t believe in Catholicism because…."  One is a Catholic unless they 
choose otherwise.  Therefore, evangelical religions always contain an element of 
voluntarism that is absent from Catholicism (Martin 1990:31-42), and this makes 
adherents of the new churches more vocal and enthusiastic about their choice of faiths.  
Catholics tend to be passive participants, rarely attending church services, while the 
Protestants tend to be loyal attendees and zealous advocates of their faith. This 
enthusiasm is helpful to the researcher, because people are quite comfortable 
explaining why they believe in a certain religion versus another.  Critique and 
introspection are inherent in proselytizing faiths, because people often choose to 
believe in them, sometimes breaking with family tradition.  Although there are now 
                                                 
65 These numbers are based on a survey of clergy that I conducted in 2002.  I asked the leaders of all the 
churches in town to estimate the number of people who would they would consider "members" of their 
churches.  A survey conducted by Le Vote Harris was published in the Honduran news magazine 
"Hablemos Claro" in January 2005.  In this survey, 56% of people in the Distrito Central described 
themselves as Catholic, and 36% self-described as "Evangelicals."  
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many young second-generation Pentecostals, the adult leaders of the churches are 
recent converts. 
 
The first evangelical churches were founded in La Quebrada in 1989, just as the 
International Coffee Agreement was suspended and coffee prices plummeted to 
historic lows. There is almost certainly a connection between the coffee crash and the 
rise of the new churches.  These churches offer a "second birth" and a solution to life’s 
problem, an ideology that becomes more appealing when problems are especially 
acute.  Although the majority of Catholic-to-Protestant conversions occurred during 
the coffee crisis, no one that I spoke with said that economic conditions directly 
influenced their conversion.  Most people claimed that they converted to the new 
churches because they felt shame over personal shortcomings like alcoholism, theft, 
adultery, out-of-wedlock births, or violence.  Some of these behaviors, such as theft 
and violence, become more common in times of economic distress. Other behaviors, 
like alcoholism and out-of-wedlock births, are more destructive when income is scarce 
because they consume domestic resources. Elizabeth Brusco (1997) has argued that 
part of the appeal of Protestantism comes from its economic advantages to poor 
families.  Women are able to "domesticate" destructive male behaviors like gambling 
and drinking.  This interpretation certainly applied to families in La Quebrada, such as 
the family of Wilmer Ulloa, described in Chapter 2.  At the same time, it is too 
mechanistic to locate the appeal of these religions only in the economic sphere.  The 
economic crisis caused by the coffee collapse is certainly related to the first wave of 
Protestant conversions.  Some people turned to the new churches to solve problems 
that were made more widespread and severe by the coffee collapse of 1989, but this 
was only part of its appeal. 
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I was in La Quebrada during another major coffee crisis (2000-2003). I witnessed the 
rapid growth of the Centro Educativo Creciendo en Gracia.  I had not heard of this sect 
and at first believed it to be a local cult. However, I later discovered that the church 
has hundreds of thousands of followers, branches in twenty-four countries, an 
international television network, a record label, a flashy website with a twenty-four 
hour radio feed, and weekly sermons broadcast all over the world (including weekly 
sermons on my local public access television station in Massachusetts).  Creciendo en 
Gracia (CEG) came to La Quebrada in 1997, and the congregation was founded by a 
member of one of the town’s wealthiest families who served as its first preacher.  
Although the church is still strongly associated with this family and some its close 
allies, it has expanded to include members of all social classes and it now has about 
seventy-five adult followers.   
 
Its members saw the Pentecostal Baptism as bound by oppressive rules that were 
counter to the true message of Jesus Christ.  One of its mottos was "The devil has been 
destroyed."  It stressed the fact that people were not forced to commit sins due to the 
devil’s influence; they were responsible for their own actions.  As the pastor once told 
me, "Bad and perverse people do bad and perverse things.  Jesus eradicated sin from 
the world, and destroyed the devil with his sacrifice."  This philosophy was seen as a 
liberating call for personal responsibility by some and a license for absolute self-
interest (without regard for consequences) by others.  CEG did not use charismatic 
healing as a proselytizing technique.  Simply by believing in their philosophy of a 
guilt-free life, people could be healed of a major emotional affliction. 
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Ethnographic Profile: Yadira Ulloa 
 
Yadira Ulloa was a devoted and passionate member of the Iglesia Cristo Misionera, La 
Quebrada’s largest Pentecostal church.  She was twenty-four years old, unmarried, and 
cared for her father, five-year old daughter, and brother.  She worked as a maid year-
round and picked coffee during the harvest season.  Each day, she washed and mended 
clothes, prepared meals, chopped firewood, and carried water.  She helped her 
daughter get ready for school, and cared for her two infant nieces as well.  She worked 
tirelessly, and was known as one of the fastest female coffee harvesters in town, 
picking as much as seven hundred pounds in a single day.   
 
The church was the main focus of her life.  Every morning, other women of the church 
would stop by to chat about their plans for the evening.  They would discuss what they 
would wear to church, gossip about other people in the congregation, or discuss the 
amount of tithes collected the previous night.  They were active in collecting funds to 
start "campos blancos" or new churches in outlying communities.  They sold raffle 
tickets, donuts, and pineapple fritters door to door to help purchase materials for the 
new churches. 
 
The Cristo Misionera church is a Pentecostal Baptist congregation.  Its founder is said 
to have received the holy spirit in Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico in the early sixties, and his 
speech in tongues (glossolalia) is taken as evidence of his access to divinity.  
Congregants sometimes speak in tongues during particularly exciting points in the 
services, and people are water-baptized after they have spoken in tongues.  The most 
important part of a baptism is the confession of faith.  The confession is as follows: 
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Señor Jesús; Soy un pecador/a y vengo a ti para pedirte perdón por todos mis pecados. 
Yo se que te he ofendido y no he vivido una vida que sea de agrado para ti. Pero en tu 
misericordia te pido que me perdone. Entra en mi corazón y lávame con tu sangre 
borra mis pecados. Yo creo de corazón que moriste y resucitaste por mis pecados y 
ahora lo confieso con mi boca. Te invito para seas el Salvador y Señor de mi vida¿ 
Gracias Señor Jesús, Gracias por tu perdón. Soy una nueva criatura! Amen. 
 
Lord Jesus: I am a sinner and I come to you to ask forgiveness for all my sins.  I know 
that I have offended you and that I have not lived a life that is to your liking.  But in 
your mercy I beg that you forgive me.  Enter in my heart and bathe me with you 
blood, cleanse my sins.  I believe in my heart that you died and were reborn for my 
sins and now I confess it with my own mouth.  I invite you to be the Savior and Lord 
of my life.  Thank you Lord Jesus.  Thank you for your forgiveness.  I am a new 
creature! Amen.   
 
This prayer is a confession of sin and a plea for forgiveness.  It displays the theme of a 
"second birth" which is common in evangelical religions.  The second sentence (…I 
have not lived a life that is to your liking.) expresses sorrow over a previous manner of 
living, and the last few sentences ask the Lord to "be the Savior" of a "new creature."  
This prayer is rather similar to Catholic prayers of contrition and prayers of to the holy 
spirit, which also emphasize the spirit's ability to enter into a worshiper.  However, the 
Catholic prayers tend not to emphasize rebirth.  Also, in this case, sinners are not 
required to confess to a priest, nor do they pray to angels or saints, as do Catholics. 
Divine power manifests itself in incomprehensible speech and uncontrolled action, 
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which demonstrates its transcendent nature.66  From this prayer alone, we see two 
definitive characteristics of evangelical faith: a direct, unmediated relationship with 
divinity, and the power of that divinity to give people a "new life."  These two factors 
are key to the local appeal of evangelical religion in La Quebrada.   
 
As would be expected, most of the members of the church have experienced some 
personal crisis that led them to search for a second chance.  Yadira began to attend 
church after she became pregnant from a man who had no interest in caring for their 
child.  Her father joined after battling alcoholism.  Another man went to jail after 
being caught stealing coffee from a neighbor’s farm and turned to the church after he 
was released from jail.  Two women had committed adultery while their husbands 
resided in the United States.  The ability to be "born again" through baptism attracts 
people to the church, but it only part of the appeal.  As Mintz and Martin have 
emphasized, these churches provide recreation, a sense of belonging, and a network of 
mutual support for members. 
 
For Yadira, entertainment was an important part of the appeal of church.  She lived in 
a home with no electricity, and, in the church, she could spend a few hours each night 
singing and clapping to festive music with friends.  Before the town was put on the 
national electrical grid, the church was one of the few buildings that were illuminated 
at night, and people would congregate alongside of the church to chat, taking 
advantage of the halo of light that it cast on the street.  For Yadira, going to church 
was a fun alternative to sitting at home, working, or chatting by firelight.  It gave her 
                                                 
66 Csordas (2002:76)  has argued that glossolalia should be viewed as a non-semantic behavior that 
reveals the "grounding of language in natural life, a bodily act."  This view does not address the 
collective aspect of glossolalia as it emerges in ecstatic ritual.  Here, Csordas’ focus on individual 
experience moves too far away from social explanations. 
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an opportunity to dress up in her best clothes, and proudly walk through town as part 
of a group that mattered.  As an unmarried single-mother who did not finish high 
school, her social status was relatively low.  The church marked her as somebody, and 
she took pride in slowly walking to church with friends each evening, stopping by 
people’s homes to chat along the way.  She made sure that people saw her as a 
member of the church and she was a vocal and effective proselytizer.  On Sunday 
market-days, she would stand in the middle of the market stalls, singing and praying 
with friends, hoping to "win" souls.   
  
As Martin as argued, part of the appeal of new Pentecostal churches is that they 
provide a voluntary association where women like Yadira can be active and valued 
participants.  Her participation in fund-raising activities gave her experience and 
responsibility handling money and a chance to be part of a project that had visible 
effects in the community.  Her proselytizing gave her a public persona as well.  
Though her participation in the church, she became an important part of one of the 
town’s most powerful subgroups.  As a low-status, under-educated young women, she 
would not have this opportunity in any other group in town. The church gave her a 
feeling of individual power and pride. 
 
The church’s inclusiveness is another part of its appeal.  Services follow a weekly 
schedule that gives everyone a chance to lead the service at some point.  Mondays are 
devoted to bible study, Tuesday is the "Culto de Damas" and services are led by 
women,  Wednesday is "Culto de Niños" and children lead various songs and prayers.  
Thursday is "Culto en el Hogar," where a particular family hosts services in their 
home.  Fridays, the "Culto de Caballeros" are led by adult men.  Saturdays (Culto de 
Jóvenes) are led by teens, and Sundays are "Culto de Todos," where no group is 
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singled out.  The church provides a specific time for each social group to be the focus 
of attention.  Age, gender, and class distinctions exist within the church (in fact, 
women and men must sit on opposite sides of the church), but every social group is 
given equal standing, as long as they adhere to the tenets of the church. There is an 
informal weekly prayer meeting for the most active members of the church, and 
participation in this group of "hardcore" adherents is the most noticeable social 
division within the church.  All but two of the fifteen to twenty  "hardcore" 
participants are women. They fast for a day before the prayer meetings, which last for 
several hours inside a private home.  These meetings often culminate in the entire 
group speaking in tongues.  
 
The church also provides a network of mutual support that is especially important for 
single mothers and people who depend on remittances from relatives in the United 
States.  Church-members take care of each others’ children and run errands for friends 
when they go to the city to collect remittance checks or shop.  Membership in the 
church creates a bond of trust among people that are not related.  The church’s strict 
moral code assures people that members are disciplined and trustworthy.  It provides 
an extended family that is important for people who are disassociated from normal 
bonds of kinship and neighborhood, such as recovering alcoholics and thieves. 
   
The church also performs a therapeutic function.  Before each service begins, 
congregants place their heads on the pews and kneel on the ground, facing away from 
the altar.  They quietly pray for forgiveness, murmuring words to themselves.  The 
women usually sob quietly as they do this, while the men, who are far outnumbered by 
the women, rarely cry.  Small groups will sometimes form, where women’s heads are 
only a few inches from each other on the pews.  In this case, the other women can hear 
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what the people near them are saying. They hear their friends ask forgiveness from 
god, and the mutual experience of sorrowful prayer creates a strong bond of sympathy 
between them.  This "silent" prayer lasts for about a half hour before the service starts. 
   
All prayers begin with the same call-and-response welcome, in which the prayer 
leader says, "Dios le bendiga" (God bless you!) and the crowd responses with the 
same blessing.  Then the leader asks, "Quien vive?" (Who lives?) and the group 
responds, "Dios."  Then the leader responds with "Gloria a Dios."  The singing begins 
slowly, a drummer and electric guitar player start out playing softly but build to a false 
climax just before the pastor begins his sermon.  Following the sermon, the singing 
becomes even more intense, and this is usually the point where people catch the holy 
ghost, and shake, sway, or speak uncontrollably.  The presence of the holy ghost 
usually spreads quickly--one person begins to shout, "Hallelujah!" or "Gloria a Dios," 
then others respond.  Then someone begins to sway or shake, and another follows.  
Only a handful of people actually go into these trance-states, but it is taken as 
evidence of the presence of the holy spirit and a sign of the efficacy of the prayer.  
This is the real climax of the service, and then it slowly winds down, with the music 
becoming softer, and the pastor handing out the offering trays to the congregation.  
The appearance of the holy ghost is a cathartic moment for the group.  The service 
literally begins at a low point, with people kneeling on the ground, sobbing.  By the 
end, their arms are raised, they are clapping and shouting, and the riotous tone of the 
service lifts the spirits of the congregation.  The service takes about two and a half 
hours on a typical night. 
 
By the time the service ends, people are exhilarated, and head home to bed along 
empty streets.  They have a de facto exemption from the town’s nighttime curfew.  
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Walking home after church one night, Yadira’s mother asked me how I felt.  I said 
that I felt tired.  She looked concerned, and said, "You may be tired, but you should 
feel totally happy and at peace, because you have heard the word of God.  You will 
sleep in peace."  Her words reminded me that the church service serves a daily 
catharsis that alleviates tension and puts celebrants at ease. 
 
The therapeutic efficacy of the church service rests upon the congregants’ sense of 
guilt.  The tearful prayers for forgiveness that precede the service are motivated by 
guilt over sinful behavior.  Sin, temptation, confession, and forgiveness are the 
dominant themes of the service.  The church has a strict code of conduct, and the 
failure to abide by this code produces guilt.  In addition to the sins derived from the 
Ten Commandments that are found in all Judeo-Christian religions--greed, fornication, 
disrespect of elders, vengeful behavior, blasphemy, lying, and violence--Cristo 
Misionera prohibits drinking, wasteful spending, gambling, the wearing of jewelry, 
makeup, or provocative clothes, and dancing to pop music.   
 
These codes can be carried to extremes.  One afternoon, I saw Yadira in tears and 
asked her what was wrong.  Her cousin had sent her a new skirt from New York and 
she was planning on wearing it to church.  She showed it to some of her friends and 
they told her she could not wear it because it was chinga (sexually provocative) 
because its hemline fell above her knee.  Yadira was certain that the skirt went below 
the knee, and accused her friends of trying to make her feel guilty because they were 
jealous of her new clothes.  She was ashamed by the accusation of improper dress, and 
angry at her friends for their "witch-hunt" mentality. Fearing being labeled a sinner by 
the congregation, she sold the skirt to a neighbor who was not a church-member.  
Even though the skirt fell below her knee, Yadira’s fear of accusations of sinful 
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behavior convinced her that her eyes deceived her.  In this case, the women of the 
church were using the fear of sin as a way to enforce conformity.  Yadira's skirt was 
sent from the US, which they saw as the source of the sinful modernity they so feared.         
 
In various branches of the Protestant tradition, writes David Martin, "discipline and 
sobriety are as vigorously embraced in ordinary life as ecstasy and release are 
achieved in the sphere of worship." (1990:203).  This emphasis on sobriety in 
everyday life creates guilt--behind every prohibition lies a secret craving--and this 
craving provokes feelings of anxiety.  Temptations are signs that the devil is 
infiltrating one’s soul, and life is seen as a constant struggle to avoid diabolical 
temptation.  During services, the pastor asks people to publicly confess to sins.  Even 
young children are put on the spot.  The pastor will say, "Have you lied to your 
parents?" sticking a microphone in front of the child, who usually begins to cry. 
People publicly confess to both sinful acts and sinful thoughts, such as coveting 
another person’s property or wishing them misfortune.  These confessions lead to a 
release of tension that is built up through feelings of guilt.   
 
In this manner, the church experience rest upon the continual production and 
alleviation of guilt.  As Sidney Mintz has eloquently stated, "When the attainment of 
virtue is made possible by the foreswearing of all those things that can be turned 
against a man to make him feel guilty, the solution to many of life’s problems can 
seem very clear" (Mintz 1974:261). Unlike the Catholics, the evangelicals can directly 
atone for their sins through prayer, and the presence of the Holy Spirit in the services 
confirms the efficacy of their prayers. By demonstrating their ability to fight 
temptation, churchgoers experience a partial mastery of the self and a sense of power 
over their lives.  The ability to fight temptation, verified by the presence of the holy 
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spirit, gives one a sense of power, or, at least, access to a power that can solve life’s 
problems.  The distinction between possession of power and access to power is 
crucial.  For the Pentecostals, the holy spirit is the ultimate source of power, which 
acts upon individuals and groups that are able to access it through prayer. 
 
 
The Devil Has Been Destroyed: Religion Without Guilt 
 
If the Cristo Misionera church created a sense of individual power or mastery through 
the production and alleviation of guilt, then the Creciendo en Gracia church was its 
opposite.  It was based on the liberation of worshipers from the burdens of guilt.  I first 
learned of the church when I saw a young man wearing a t-shirt that proclaimed, "The 
devil has been destroyed!  We are all blessed!"  The shirt was screen-printed with an 
image of the vanquished devil--a Halloween-style skull, placed inside a red circle 
bisected diagonally by a red line, as on a "No Smoking" sign.  I asked him about the 
meaning of the shirt.  "There is no more devil," he told me.  "There is no more sin. 
Todos somos bendecidos."  We are all blessed.  
The central tenet of the sect was that, according to the Apostle Paul, the death of 
Christ had freed the world from sin and believers lived in a permanent state of grace.  
The teachings of a Puerto Rican apostle named Juan de Jesus Miranda were the 
foundations of their beliefs, which derived from the doctrine, "Salvo Siempre Salvo" 
or "Once Saved, Always Saved."  This doctrine states that once a person has been 
saved, he or she is bound for heaven no matter how they behave on Earth.  When a 
person "grows in grace," they need not to worry about sin and punishment, because 
the crucifixion eliminated sin from the world.   
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The biblical evidence for this belief comes from Hebrews 2:14-15, which reads, 
"Therefore, since the children share in flesh and blood, He Himself likewise also 
partook of the same, that through death He might render powerless him who had the 
power of death, that is, the devil, and might free those who through fear of death were 
subject to slavery all their lives." (New American Standard Bible).  The opposite of 
"death" in this passage is eternal life, entry into heaven.  Members of this church 
believe that Jesus’ death guaranteed all believers a place in heaven.  Variants of this 
belief are common in Protestantism.  The doctrine of "eternal security" was, for 
example, associated with the Calvinist concept of predestination, whereby a person 
had no power over entry to heaven or hell through their behavior in Earth.  Creciendo 
en Gracia also believes in predestination, but it is rather tautological and risk-free 
version thereof, almost the exact opposite of the Calvinist vision.  Membership in the 
church is taken as a sign of grace, and all members of the church, no matter their 
actions, are destined for heaven. Whereas Calvinists took the doctrine of pre-
destination as a source of salvation anxiety that led them to do good deeds on earth, 
the members of this church take predestination as a free pass to heaven. 
The local nickname for Creciendo en Gracia was "La Iglesia de los Asesinos"--church 
of the assassins--or los bendecidos (the blessed), a parodic reference to practioners’ 
custom of referring to each other as "bendecido/a."  The founder of the town’s branch 
of the church was a feared local thug, and a member of one of La Quebrada’s most 
wealthy and notoriously corrupt families. The preacher allegedly murdered the 
previous husband of his wife in order to move into the man’s home, steal his 
agricultural supply business, and run off with his wife, who was also the beneficiary of 
the victim’s life insurance policy.  He was known as a ruthless person who would do 
anything for money.  The preacher founded the church in 1997, only four years after 
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the Puerto Rican apostle that founded CEG was supposedly visited by the Angel 
Gabriel and began his ministry.  The founder of the La Quebrada church discovered 
CEG after seeing a televised sermon and visiting a branch in the city of San Pedro 
Sula.  
 
Local critics saw the church as a way for the family to justify its unlawful acts--
indeed, dozens of its members were part of the extended clan, employees of the 
family, or people linked to them through other bonds of patronage or debt.  Most 
townspeople viewed the religion as a sham, making jokes about the bendecidos as 
asesinos.  As one man said to me, "Isn’t it convenient that the worst family here 
invents a religion with no sin?  Now they have nothing to fear when they die.  They 
think they’re going to heaven.  They can do whatever they want here on Earth without 
consequences," he said, pointing downward at hell with a sly wink.  Despite this 
reputation, I met people who believed in CEG because the doctrine of individual 
liberation appealed to their own experiences.  One man, a recovering alcoholic, liked 
the fact that he could no longer blame his problems on the devil.  He didn’t take the 
libertarian message as an excuse to drink, but saw it as an empowering message of 
personal responsibility.  Three women enjoyed the fact that they could dress as they 
wished and didn’t have to worry about a male pastor castigating them for their choice 
of clothing.  The permissiveness of the church was attractive to these people because it 
gave people a sense of self-determination, despite the negative stereotype of the 
bendecidos that circulated through the town.  CEG’s doctrine of liberation was viewed 
by believers as a source of empowerment, while critics saw it as an excuse for 
immoral behavior.  A doctrine of liberation can easily slip into absolute individualism, 
but it does not have to.  
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Native Critiques of Alienation: Three Examples 
 
One salient aspect of both the Pentecostal Iglesia Cristo Misionera and Creciendo en 
Gracia is that they criticize the alienated representations of power in other religions.  
The Pentecostals ask why Catholics bestow such power on religious icons and priests, 
while members of CEG ask how the Pentecostals can preach deliverance from 
suffering while upholding oppressive rules that produce guilt, attributing great power 
to the devil.  In their own way, both religions are attempting to restore the power to act 
to individual subjects, criticizing other faiths that alienate that power.  
 
Example 1: False Idols 
The Pentecostals explicitly challenge the mediation of divine power by defining 
themselves against Catholics.  Roman Catholicism is the Honduran national religion, 
and the Pentecostals view it as an anachronistic form of idolatry.  In interviews, 
Protestants consistently constantly ridiculed the Catholic faith in icons to me.  
Interestingly, not a single informant focused on the Catholic belief in Papal authority 
(unlike in Peter Cahn’s ethnography of religious diversity in Chiapas, where Catholics 
are called romanistas [2003:ix]), nor did they criticize the consumption of the 
Eucharist.  Virtually everyone mentioned idol worship as Catholicism’s greatest flaw.    
 
The strong association of Catholicism with idolatry stems from the universal 
importance of the image of the crucifix to Catholics.  More importantly, it reflects the 
popularity of statues of the Virgin of Suyapa as an object of devotion for Hondurans.  
Suyapa, the patron saint of Honduras, is represented in tiny cedar statues, no more 
than three inches tall, which are found in every Honduran Catholic church, on vehicle 
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dashboards, and in homes and businesses.  The cult of Suyapa began in the mid-
eighteenth century (a Saturday in February 1747, according to legend) in a poor 
village outside of Tegucigalpa.  Suyapa is said to have miraculously appeared to a 
peasant, Alejandro Colindres, and his son Jorge,  when they got lost at night on their 
way home from work.  Suyapa took the form of a tiny statue that has the power to heal 
the sick.  She has been the national symbol of Honduras since the 1920s.  The national 
cathedral is located in the village of Suyapa (on the outskirts of Tegucigalpa), as is a 
smaller shrine in which the original idol is housed.  The fiesta of Nuestra Señora de 
Suyapa is celebrated each year as a national holiday, and hundreds of thousands of 
pilgrims visit the site to pray and seek healing.  Suyapa is the symbol of Honduran 
Catholicism and she is strongly associated with the narrative of the Honduran nation.  
 
The Protestants’ criticism of Catholic idolatry is a challenge to the alienation of divine 
power. As the pastor at the Cristo Misionera church put it: 
 
What does a crucifix or statue mean to God?  We do not pray to the image of god.  We 
pray to god in all his glory.  As I like to say, you can have a cross on your chest and 
the devil in your head (una cruz en el pecho y el diablo en el techo)... 
 
In contrast, the protestants emphasize their direct relationship with divinity.  The 
Pentecostal church does not venerate religious icons or images of any kind.  There is 
no cross image in the church, only a banner that says, "Gloria a Dios."  Services are 
conducted in informal vernacular speech, and the sanctuary itself is non-descript.  The 
pastor dresses neatly but informally, does not own a car, and lives a lifestyle that is 
similar to that of church-members.  The only expensive items used in the church are 
large speakers and musical instruments, which project the content of the service 
outwards to the community, and are therefore useful expenditures used to proselytize.  
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All of the church’s energies are devoted to speaking, singing, and shouting directly to 
divinity.  No resources are wasted on decoration or the maintenance of a bureaucracy.  
The pastor is an approachable layperson who does not live extravagantly and travels 
through town on a bicycle.   
 
All of this is opposite to the intimidating formality of the Catholic church, in which 
iconography, formal hierarchy, and even language itself stand between worshipers and 
divinity.  The words of Don Felipe, a peasant farmer in his sixties and member of the 
Pentecostal Iglesia Cristo Misionero, strikingly demonstrate the difference between 
the "clear" (unmediated) message of the evangelicals and the Catholics: 
 
My parents went to [Catholic] church all the time…my mother went several times a 
week when I was young, and I went too…and I didn’t understand anything the priest 
said.  It was all in a language called Latin. Daniel, here in Honduras, we, the poor, 
don’t speak Latin.  We speak Spanish or Castillian, as some people call it.  I would 
sometimes ask the nuns questions about stories from the Holy Bible, but not the priest.  
I could look up at pictures or the statues to learn. Now, the word of God is clear.  The 
Holy Bible tells the truth that God passed down to Jesus his son.  We don’t pray to 
statues. Listen up (oiga bien)!  The word of God is clear for all to hear.  Now 
everything is really clear [clarito]. 
 
Although Catholic priests no longer conduct mass in Latin, the local priests are 
foreigners who speak with accents.  They only occasionally come to La Quebrada, and 
mass is normally given by a Guatemalan nun, accompanied by young women who live 
in a local convent.  There are no lay Catholic preachers in La Quebrada.  Worshipers 
must ask forgiveness by confessing to the priest, who only visits from time to time.  In 
contrast, Don Felipe’s emphasis on the clarity of the message of Pentecostalism draws 
attention to its relatively unmediated  truth.  Whereas Catholicism is formal, 
intimidating, and external to the local community, Pentecostalism is informal, 
accessible, and local.  
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Taken together, the Pentecostal rejection of priestly authority, faith in icons, and 
linguistic conventions are all challenges to the mediation of power.  The Pentecostals 
emphasize clarity and direct communication with divinity that gives the worshiper 
direct access to divine power.  They can see the results of their faith in the appearance 
of the holy ghost, revealed through speech in tongues and trances.  The ultimate 
source of power is still transcendent, but worshipers can mediate between the 
transcendent and the mundane without the help of a priest or an icon.  Through 
personal discipline and ecstatic worship, people attain the power to mediate between 
the sacred and profane worlds.  
    
Example 2: False Doctrines 
 
Whereas the Pentecostal church relies on a relatively unmediated relationship of 
holiness, Creciendo en Gracia relies on posters, recorded music, broadcast sermons, t-
shirts, and webcasts to spread its message.  In almost every way, Creciendo en Gracia 
embraces affect, glitz, and indulgence.  During services, sultry young singers in 
provocative costumes sing to the latest hip-hop beats.  Worshipers watch recorded 
music videos and view sermons on the internet.  A modified seal of the President of 
the United States of America (Figure 4) is the congregation’s symbol.  Note the small 
"SSS" written on the upper right corner of the shield, which stands for "Salvo Siempre 
Salvo" (Once Saved, Always Saved).   
 
As mentioned above, the church emphasizes its opposition to both Catholic 
and Pentecostal Baptist concepts of guilt and self-denial, celebrating the fact 
that women can dress as they wish and wear makeup.  Dancing, stylish 
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clothing, makeup, and alcohol are permitted, and even celebrated.  Consider 
the poster reproduced in Figure 5:  Here, the woman in the center of the frame 
is carrying a bible and wearing a long skirt of the type favored by the 
Pentecostal Baptists, called "Ropa Cristiana" (Christian Clothes).  She dreams 
of wearing pants, short hair, and stylish clothes while she proclaims the 
holiness of Jehova.  She is also chained to a vicious guard-dog called 
"commandments," while lit sticks of dynamite called "law" threaten to 
explode.  To her right is a kneeling, pathetic-looking man, chained to the 
shadowy "untouchables," the world religious councils, who warn him, 
"Remember, we forgive, but we never forget," while holding a scythe and an 
axe.    
This poster depicts people imprisoned by religious doctrine, then set free by 
the more permissive faith provided by CEG.  Traditional religion is depicted as 
oppressive and dangerous.  In the upper right hand corner, there is a sandwich 
formed by "Paul" and "Jose Luis" as bread, with "Moses" as the meat in the 
middle.  Jose Luis, the apostle, considers himself to be continuing the work of 
Paul, freeing the world from the religious law of Moses, replacing the 
Pentecostal laws with a doctrine of permissive grace. 
 
CEG’s message of individual liberation is, in some ways, a message of "un-
alienated" power. However CEG’s doctrine is rooted in the absolute authority 
of the Apostle Jose.  He determines right from wrong, and individual liberation 
does not include the freedom to question the apostle.  Although the effect of 
his ministry is to give worshipers a sense of agency and free will, in direct 
opposition to the strict Pentecostals, worshipers follow his every command and 
utterance.    
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Figure 4: Official Seal of Creciendo en Gracia 
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Figure 5: Cartoon from Creciendo en Gracia's website 
(http://www.creciendoengracia.com/posterdelareforma/poster1a.jpg) 
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The Apostle José Luís carries the message of god.  God, through the Angel 
Gabriel, communicated the Gospel to him, and he carries it to the people.  This 
point is made clear in the following letter that was posted on the CEG website.  
It specifically contrasts the false doctrines of Pentecostalism with the apostolic 
message of CEG: 
 
Dear Brothers of CEG: 
 
One of the articles posted on your website got my attention.  In the final part, it reads: 
Dear Brother, the power of the Holy Spirit did not arrive in Pentecost, but rather, God 
communicates the gospel through our Apostle Jose Luis de Jesús Miranda and upon 
hearing it and believing in him, we are stamped with the Holy Spirit …I would like 
you to explain this segment to me because it really surprised me.   
 
 
The Apostle responded as follows: 
 
 
For two thousand years, religion has thought that the Holy Spirit arrived in Pentecost, 
but nevertheless, no one discovered anything there.  There were some mystical 
manifestations of trembling and unknown languages, but there wasn’t any 
discovery…. 
 
Nobody in more than twenty centuries has been able to discover these truths until the 
edification of the Apostle José Luis De Jesús Miranda arrived.  Now, through him, the 
believers are stamped with the Holy Spirit, upon hearing the authentic gospel of 
Christ resuscitated in his words. 
 
As this exchange makes clear, hearing and seeing the apostle speak the gospel 
provided a religious experience. The CEG services were not designed to access divine 
power directly.  The apostle received the truth from the Angel Gabriel, and he spread 
the word to the congregation. For this reason, viewing a sermon over the internet or a 
satellite feed was just as effective as participating in a church service.  Being a 
spectator was a religious experience in itself.  The poster reproduced below provides 
another example of the Apostle’s ability to mediate between god and humanity, and 
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the importance of new media technologies to CEG’s message.  In this image, the 
Apostle holds out a bible (presumably interpreting it), speaking into a microphone.  
Above him, a satellite orbits the earth, and the words "We are living in the days of the 
mediator, Jesus Christ, man" are printed in between outer space and the apostle, just 
under the satellite.67  The satellite, which mediates between earth and sky, is 
analogous to the apostle, who mediates the word of god for humanity.  This poster, 
coupled with CEG’s heavy reliance on satellite feeds and internet sermons, draws 
attention--indeed, celebrates--the highly mediated nature of its religious message.    
 
Pentecostals were the "target audience" for CEG.  CEG defined itself in opposition to 
the Pentecostals, and their apostle is a converted Puerto Rican Pentecostal.  The 
Apostle contrasts his own revelation to that described in the biblical story of Pentecost 
(Acts II), in which the Prophet Joel delivers the message that speech in tongues is a 
sign of salvation.  Jose de Jesus says that this story contains "mystical manifestations 
of trembling and unknown languages, but there wasn’t any discovery."  In contrast, he 
received a version of the gospel that presents the possibility of a new life of freedom 
and "grace" to Pentecostals who, like the figures in the poster above, are imprisoned 
by strict doctrines.  
 
The Pentecostals define themselves against the Catholics, and preach the unmediated 
relationship between people and the Holy Spirit.  Creciendo en Gracia defines itself 
against the Pentecostals, believing that that the rigid codes of conduct force the 
Pentecostals to live in a state of rule-bound paralysis.  The Pentecostals’ attribution of 
power to the devil limits their own autonomy, and CEG offers an alternative that gives 
                                                 
67 Also, the poster calls Honduras, "Alturas."  This is a favorite joke that the apostle often makes when 
he references Honduras.  The word "Honduras" means "depths," and the apostle calls it Alturas 
(heights), due to the rapid growth of CEG in the country. 
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Figure 6: Creciendo en Gracia Convention Poster, 2005 
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individuals control over their lives.  In this sense, Pentecostalism is to Catholicism as 
CEG is to Pentecostalism.  Each doctrine places progressively more emphasis on 
individual liberty.  
Both religions present worshipers with the possibility for a "closer" relationship to the 
true source of power.     
 
Native Materialism 
 
Logically, one would ask why Creciendo en Gracia would need to believe in the 
Apostle at all.  Why not dispense with religion altogether and take the doctrine of 
liberation to its conclusion?  Why ascribe power to anything beyond the individual?  
This line of reasoning echoes the most polemical Marxist interpretations of religion 
that divide the world into  "true" material forces and "false" (or, at least, secondary) 
symbolic representations.  Interestingly, a local theater group in La Quebrada 
produced a short play that parallels this interpretation, criticizing the ideological 
effects of religious belief and emphasizing a masculine form of materiality.68 Before I 
conclude this discussion, I will summarize the plot of the skit, called "Los Santos 
Comilónes" (The Gluttonous Saints): 
 
An old woman, dressed in traditional peasant garb, is at work cooking in a rustic 
comedor (diner), its walls lined with religious icons and statues (held by actors).  A 
                                                 
68 The theater group is comprised of local men with no formal training.  Most have the equivalent of a 
high-school diploma, but none have attended college. They perform unscripted short plays at local 
events, schools, and festivals.  I did not see this skit performed in person.  It was recounted to me by 
one of the actors, who described the plot, and showed me photos and a poor-quality video tape of the 
performance.   
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tall gringo (mildly insulting slang for American), sunburned, wearing sandals, shorts, 
and a tank-top, enters the building.  A few seconds later, a flamboyant transvestite 
enters as well, wearing a bright purple skirt, a long-haired wig and gaudy make-up.  
The gringo and the transvestite begin to talk to one another, and order their food, 
making a lot of noise and generally being rude. The old woman smiles and seems 
happy just to have customers, despite their rude behavior.  The gringo and the 
transvestite begin to read a newspaper together as they await their meals.  They laugh 
and the transvestite flirts with the gringo.  The old woman delivers their food, but they 
continue to be absorbed in the newspaper and their flirting.  As they read the 
newspaper and flirt, the saint statues descend from the walls and eat their meals off 
their plates.  The statues also eat the rest of the food the old woman is preparing in the 
kitchen.  The old woman, the transvestite, and the gringo remain oblivious.  The play 
ends as the woman and the customers react with great surprise and anger that someone 
has eaten their food.  The "gluttonous" saints have returned to the walls, and the 
audience erupts in laughter. 
 
This skit could be interpreted as a political commentary, but it was not intended as 
such. Themes of gender and religion are more important.  All of the actors in the play 
were young men, including the ones who portrayed the transvestite and the old 
woman.  Acting is not considered to be a masculine activity, and some of the actors 
were accused of being homosexuals.  They played the characters in over-the-top 
comedic styles to distance the behavior of the characters from their own personas. The 
gringo--dressed like a slob in shorts, sandals, and a tank top--and the transvestite 
represent the inverse of ideal Honduran masculinity.  These men are long-haired, 
effeminate, messily dressed, and rude.  The old woman doesn’t seem bothered by 
them, because she wants their business and is protected by the saint statues.  The 
    
 199
transvestite, the gringo, and the anciana are all distracted--the two men by their 
interest in the shared newspaper and the old lady by her belief that the saints will 
protect her business.  The men’s attention to the newspaper parallels the woman’s 
faith in the saints.     
 
The written word and the statues of the saints represent forms of authority--the first 
being associated with the modern intellectual power of the gringo and the latter with 
the traditional religious power of Catholicism.  Both are opposed to the physicality of 
the young men.  Hence, the gringo is associated with the transvestite.  They sit 
together and flirt.  The newspaper draws the attention of the gringo and transvestite 
away from their food.  The saints’ theft of food is a critique of the efficacy of words 
and icons and an affirmation of materiality, which is associated with males.  The 
newspaper readers are effeminate buffoons, implicitly contrasted with the young male 
actors who portray them.  Honduran men are present only as the critical authors and 
performers of the skit. The actors are saying that the transvestite, the gringo, and the 
old woman are too caught in their respective forms of false consciousness to notice 
that they are being robbed of the substance of life (food) by their belief in media.  The 
symbolic (words and icons) is associated with a benighted, somewhat benign, 
femininity while the material (the production of food) is associated with masculine 
physicality. 
 
The message of this skit bears much in common with the extreme materialist view of 
religion as mystification, an interpretation that Marxian anthropologists have long 
struggled to overcome.  This view separates social reality into a "base" of relations of 
material production that determines symbolic representations and social 
consciousness.  These representations ultimately reinforce the dominant relations of 
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production, "mystifying" dominated classes so that they accept the terms of 
domination as the way of the world.   
 
One virtue of this theory is that it links collective representations with social relations 
and emphasizes the fact that religious beliefs can have ideological effects.  However, 
this theory understands society primarily as a system of material production, rather 
than one that also produces values, beliefs, and collective representations that are 
equally important to the organization of social life and not secondary to material 
production.  The interplay between religious doctrines in La Quebrada shows that the 
desire for a sense of power is not only about materiality, but about the ability to give 
meaning to social reality.  In times of great doubt, the experience of individual power 
provides religious believers with a comforting certitude.  Both the Pentecostal church 
and CEG provide adherents with a sense of power and control over their lives.  For the 
Pentecostals, this power comes from the ability to access a transcendent Holy Spirit.  
Members of CEG are empowered by the liberating doctrine of the Apostle José.  
 
Analysis of Religious Concepts of Power 
 
Here, I will employ three theoretical concepts--charisma, mediation, and alienation--
to describe the relationship between the representation or perception of religious 
power by believers and its ultimate source in social processes.  Each is important to an 
understanding of why religions of "self-help" tend to externalize the source of power 
while simultaneously believing in the power of the individual to act.  
 
In his classic essay on the origins of religious authority, Max Weber wrote that in that 
times of social, political, or economic distress, "natural leaders…have been holders of 
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specific gifts of the body and the spirit; and these gifts have been believed to be 
supernatural, not accessible to everybody" (Weber 1946:245).  His concept of 
charisma was based on the idea that the most fundamental form of religious power is 
the ability to perform miraculous acts--"specific gifts of the body and spirit."  
Charismatic power is wild, transcendent, and unstructured.  It is directly opposed to 
any social hierarchy, and is rooted in the capacities of a specific individual who is able 
to transcend the dominant social order.  In periods of perceived crisis, when the social 
order is in question, people whose power is not determined by position within power 
structures become appealing leaders.  Individual unstructured power is the basis of 
charismatic authority.  For Weber, all religion begins with charismatic power, which 
becomes routinized when it is turned into religious doctrine with accompanying 
formal hierarchies.     
 
Charisma is only given meaning when it is witnessed and communicated by a social 
group. Recently, Jacques Derrida (2001) has argued that Christianity rests upon a 
uniquely mediated religious experience of charisma.69  Mediation, in this context, is 
experience that is perceived by an audience through the prism of religious icons, 
priests, televised services, photographs and, perhaps, language itself.  In contrast, 
unmediated belief is based on a direct experience of divinity.  Unlike Judaism and 
Islam, Christianity rests upon knowledge of divinity through a "third"--Jesus Christ.  
Derrida argues that Christianity is uniquely dependent on mediation--the 
communication of religious experience through symbols--rather than direct 
experience.   
 
                                                 
69 Jacques Derrida 2001 "Above All, No Journalists!" in Religion and Media, Hent de Vries and Samuel 
Weber, eds. Palo Alto, CA:  Stanford University Press, 56-93. 
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In this text, Derrida makes a broader point about the relationship between televisual 
media and religion that is beyond the scope of this discussion.  His key point is that in 
periods of doubt, social bonds must be reconstructed on the basis of mutually 
recognized faith.  In the absence of collective ideologies that seem to "fit" reality, 
people look for direct sensory experiences that establish certitude.  When belief in a 
specific ideology or doctrine is in doubt, faith can only be re-established by 
experiencing the "truth" of religion.  For Christians, this involves bearing witness to 
miracles as a spectator.  The "truth" of religious power is established through a 
performance.  On American televangelists, he writes:  
To return to those American sessions of miracles on the set, one sees there a very 
elegant person who speaks well, a star of the stage.  He comes and all of a sudden he 
makes ten persons rise, fall, get up again, falling and rising at the very instant he 
touches them, or even looks at them.  There is no need to believe; one believes; no 
effort is necessary because no doubt is possible.  Like the ten thousand persons in the 
auditorium, one is confronted with the thing itself. 
 
This is the argumentative strategy that is actually used in all the milieus of 
proselytism, of conversion…It bets…on the fiduciary structure that enjoins that in any 
case faith is irreducible, that there is no society without appeal to faith, without 
"believe me, I am telling you the truth, believe me!"…certitude is there, in the 
immediacy of the senses. (Derrida 2001:64) 
 
Christian proselytizers "prove" the validity of their faith by performing magical acts.  
Certitude is there, in the immediacy of the senses. This certitude is therapeutic in times 
of great doubt. According to Derrida, Christians witness miracles performed by 
another person rather than by directly reciting prayers (as in Judaism or Islam).  The 
spectators experience the miracles of the evangelist qua  medium.  The mediated 
nature of evangelical Christianity makes it especially well-suited to television.   
    
 203
 
Putting aside the question of whether the mediation of religious experience is unique 
to Christianity, Derrida’s argument emphasizes that charisma attains meaning in 
mediated form, but the process of mediation is elided or hidden behind the appearance 
of directness.  The shortcoming of this argument is that it fails to account for the fact 
that charismatic power is often directly experienced by afflicted people during healing 
rituals and trances.  As Csordas (2002) has emphasized, religious belief is often 
grounded in bodily experience rather than acts of witnessing.  In these cases, the 
worshiper feels that he or she can directly access transcendent power.  Derrida would 
likely argue that the experience of directness obscures the medium of the healer, but 
Pentecostals consistently believe that the holy ghost directly touches them and heals 
bodily afflictions.  The healer may be present, but the act is experienced as the direct 
intervention of divinity.    
 
The third relevant concept is alienation.  This word is the English translation of the 
German word entfremdung first used by Hegel to describe the separation of God 
(Spirit) from people and nature. For Hegel, the entire process of human history moved 
towards overcoming the alienation of Spirit, ending in the self-conscious recognition 
of the world as Spirit.  Feuerbach presented a humanistic reinterpretation of Hegel’s 
idealist version of alienation, arguing in The Essence of Christianity (1841) that gods 
were alienated representations of humans, and that divine power was alienated human 
power.  Marx then expanded and critiqued Feuerbach’s concept of alienation,  arguing 
that the latter's concept of humanity was itself alienated from actual sociohistorical 
processes.  Marx’s concept of alienated labor under capitalism is his most famous use 
of the term, but his critique of Feuerbach’s materialism was more general.  He argued 
that Feuerbach failed to see that human social life consisted of various institutions 
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(such as the family, the state, and the market) that were social products understood as 
being natural, and therefore external to society.  He agreed with Feuerbach that 
religious objects were alienated representations of humanity, but he argued that 
Feuerbach did not understand that his concept of humanity was historically-
determined, itself a product of various escalating levels of alienation.    
 
Within the anthropology of religion, Steven Sangren (1991, 1993, 2000) has employed 
the concept of alienation to describe how venerated collective representations disguise 
the individual and/or social origins of power.  Sangren’s theory combines 
Durkheimian notions of the relationship between the sacred and the social with a 
Marxian emphasis on society as the product of individual activity.  On the one hand is 
the Durkheimian emphasis on the sacred as a representation of the power of the 
collectivity: "society imagines itself in representations of transcendence" (Sangren 
1993:577 n.4). On the other hand is the Marxian idea that these representations are 
alienated images of the creative power of the individual subject.  Despite the 
incorporation of Marxian and Durkheimian concepts of sociality, Sangren’s theory of 
alienation is quite similar to Feuerbach’s original formulation. Individuals imagine 
their own power as an external force that governs their lives.  Sangren writes: 
 
[Divine] intervention is typically constructed around those events or crises that would 
seem most threatening to the boundaries or viability of the self (for example, illness, 
family, tensions, and career or school problems).  Worship thus employs and helps to 
produce an alienated representation of the subject’s own powers of self-production and 
self-transformation; by engaging divinity, the subject in reality produces a 
consciousness of him-herself as a subject with powers to act, but in the process also 
produces an alienated representation by attributing this creative power to the god. 
(Sangren 1993:569) 
 
Compare this to the first chapter of Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity: 
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Thus, man becomes conscious of himself through the object that reflects his being; 
man’s self-consciousness is his consciousness of the object… What man calls 
Absolute Being, his God, is his own being. The power of the object over him is 
therefore the power of his own being. Thus, the power of the object of feeling is the 
power of feeling itself… (Feuerbach 1843:2). 
 
This theory of religious power is especially relevant to proselytizing religions that 
explicitly believe in the power of faith to resolve life’s problems.  The fact that 
proselytization is so-often based upon access to miraculous power suggests that the 
people are drawn to faiths that present them with the power to assert greater control 
over their lives.  They experience this power in relatively unalienated form, because it 
is not mediated by priests, icons, or formal church rituals, and this is part of its appeal.    
 
In La Quebrada, the new churches emphasize what Sangren calls the "subject’s own 
powers of self-production" in totally different ways.  Taken to its logical conclusion, 
the idea that relatively "un-alienated" religions emphasize individuals’ power to 
determine the course of their own lives suggests a libertarian philosophy that runs the 
risk of becoming a doctrine of absolute autonomy.  As the interplay between ascetic 
and libertarian faiths in La Quebrada suggests, the way that religions conceptualize 
this very problem can contribute to an anthropological understanding of the 
relationship between religious power and sociopolitical processes. The challenge of an 
anthropological concept of alienation is to understand why collective representations 
take specific alienated forms in different cultural situations.  The fact that both the 
Pentecostals and members of CEG conceive of divinity as the power to improve the 
lives of individuals reflects a desire for solutions to social crisis that are based upon 
individual acts.   
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Conclusion: Evangelical Religion and Postmodernity 
 
Placed in historical context, these representations of power fit well with contemporary 
social reality.  As a point of comparison, I began this chapter with a description of the 
popular religious movements that developed during the era of modernization and 
agrarian reform in the sixties and seventies.  Robert White (1977) argued that the 
secularization of Honduran society, and specifically the rise of modern, national 
political parties in the mid-twentieth century, changed the nature of religious practice.  
Various religions embraced "popular empowerment," understood as the expanding 
involvement in a broad coalition of classes to reform society for the collective good.  
Reformist groups promoted co-operative agricultural production and land reform, 
while radical groups focused on overcoming economic dependency and class 
inequality, leading land-seizures and projects that "brought the peasantry to 
consciousness."  Despite their  philosophical differences, these populist movements 
envisioned power within the sphere of national society.  In the reformist case, Catholic 
leaders stressed the need for a democratic class compromise to be achieved through 
agricultural modernization and land reform.  In the radical case, they stressed the 
power of the campesino class that would be led by a revolutionary vanguard, taking 
violent action in order to be liberated.  The key similarity is that both the reformist and 
radical versions of Christian Social Movements had some over-arching vision of 
"society."  In contrast, the contemporary religious movements ignore "society" and 
focus exclusively on individual power, however conceived.  For this reason, I have 
called them post-modern. 
 
"Traditional"  Honduran Catholicism placed great emphasis on the power of certain 
patron saints that protected a specific community.  These saints, represented in carved 
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wooden statues or icons,  were collectively worshiped during annual communal feasts 
that guaranteed divine protection while cementing social bonds between different 
sectors of a community.  The integrative function of saints' feasts has been well-
documented in the ethnographic literature on Mesoamerica (e.g. Cancian 1965).  The 
collective power of local communities was embodied in the saints and worshiped each 
year, and the religious fiestas functioned to redistribute wealth and bring various 
sectors of the community together.  The specific representation of power was based on 
a localized vision of the social whole.   
 
As the modern state developed, the Virgin of Suyapa became the symbol of the 
Honduran nation, replicating the relationship between saint and community at a 
national level.  Fittingly, the shrine of Suyapa was on the outskirts of Tegucigalpa, the 
city that became the country's political capital after independence.  The Catholic 
clerical elites remained in the country's colonial capital, Comayagua, while the new 
secular center of the country was constructed around mining concerns in Tegucigalpa.  
It was no coincidence that the "miracle of Suyapa" happened to occur on the outskirts 
of Tegucigalpa at the same time (late eighteenth century)  that new national elites were 
wresting power from the colonial aristocracy in Comayagua.  The story of Suyapa 
allowed the post-independence leaders to shift the country's symbolic center away 
from Comayagua and to the new capital of Tegucigalpa.  Throughout the modern 
history of Honduras, the symbolic expression of religious power has tended to follow 
patterns in the development of the nation-state.   
 
 As the role of secular government expanded, political parties replaced territorial 
communities as the basic unit of social affiliation, and secular, diachronic visions of 
progress guided sociopolitical life.  Religion, of course, remained an important part of 
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everyday life, but the state clearly surpassed the church as the fundamental social 
institution in all but the most isolated parts of the country.   
Through the sixties, popular religious movements followed the basic fault-lines of 
secular politics--Democratic modernization theory and Marxism.  By the eighties, 
"popular Christianity" slowly withered away, alongside popular politics in general.  
Evangelical Christianity developed in its wake, assisted by the US/Honduran military 
alliance, which feared any form of populist politics in the countryside.  To repeat the 
key question that guided this essay: Why has evangelical religion remained such a 
vibrant and popular force in rural Honduras into the twenty-first century, even after 
the end of the violence?   
 
I believe that the answer lies on the way that these religions formulate power, and its 
fit with contemporary Honduran politics.  By viewing individual choice as the source 
of social problems and  their potential solution, these religions translate the ideology 
of economic postmodernity into the religious sphere.  There is no notion of "the 
popular" or "the social," beyond the immediate kin-group and the local church.  
Secular political debates have been replaced by a focus on depoliticized individual 
morality.  At a time where the Honduran state has given up on agrarian reform, and 
the logic of market competition has replaced any overarching vision of collective 
progress, this individualized concept of power reflects secular changes in the 
relationship between nation and state.  Just as "modern" political theories were 
reflected in popular religious movements in the sixties and seventies, "postmodern" 
theories now have a religious counterpart in the evangelical movements.  
 
Therefore,  the key theoretical question is not whether these religious representations 
of power are alienated or not, but how these particular representations ideologically 
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reproduce the dominant vision of society.  In this case, the historically-specific form of 
religious symbolism is clearly related to the absence of a guiding political project for 
rural Hondurans and the severance of the pact between state and nation.  Both the 
sober, morally-upright Pentecostals and  the libidinous, libertarians of CEG, view 
themselves as iconoclasts.  Their respective faiths restore the power to act to 
individuals, abstracted from any wider totality.   
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Chapter 6 
Justice at a Price: Fair Trade and the Apotheosis of Market Rationality 
 
At this point, I will return to the subject of coffee, which was the reason I started 
working in La Quebrada in the first place.  As I mentioned in the Introduction, my 
focus is "fair trade" coffee, which I believe to be a quintessential postmodern social 
movement, for reasons I will make clear.  "Fair trade" is analogous to evangelical 
religion because it rests upon a notion of "social justice" that views individual choice 
as the basic engine of social reform.  Both movements have developed since 1989, and 
have become increasingly popular in the nineties.  Like evangelical religion, fair 
trade's recent popularity derives from its depoliticized message of individual choice.  
In this case, coffee consumers are able to reform society by making individual moral 
decisions.  Fair trade rests upon a theory of society in which states play no role in 
mediating between the global market and national society, and individual consumers 
develop and enforce normative standards of justice.   
This subject requires a change in the format of the argument.  For one thing, fair trade 
involves both coffee consumers in the developed world and coffee farmers in 
Honduras.  Although the ethnographic component of this chapter is based on research 
in Honduras,  it is necessary to explain fair trade's intellectual, cultural, and historical 
origins before delving into the specifics of coffee production in La Quebrada.   I have 
begun previous chapters with ethnographic descriptions that led to theoretical 
conclusions.  Here, I will begin with a theoretical discussion that shifts the discussion 
away from the specific case of Honduras.  Over the course of the argument, I will 
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present ethnographic information about coffee production in La Quebrada within a  
discussion of theories of capitalism and social justice.   Because "fair trade" seeks to 
integrate capitalist exchange with contemporary concepts of economic justice, it is 
necessary to begin with a summary of how classic social theory has framed the 
relationship between the market and morality, and then explain how these modern 
theoretical visions relate to fair trade's postmodern concept of social justice.    
 
Part I.  Is Fair Trade Possible? Capitalism and Social Justice 
The possibility of creating equitable social institutions within capitalist economies has 
been a central problem in modern social theory.  In the modern theoretical tradition of 
Weber, Durkheim, and Marx, the capitalist economy has long been treated as 
fundamentally incompatible with what Weber called the "ethic of brotherliness."70 All 
three theorists believed that the ethical requirements of capitalism (impersonal rules, 
competition, and calculation) clashed with the requirements of collective social life.   
The central crisis of modernity lay in the social disintegration, class conflict, 
alienation, and anomie brought about by the rise of industrial capitalism and 
bureaucracy.  
These thinkers sought to explain the radical cultural shifts that followed the Industrial 
Revolution in Europe, focusing on the rise of capitalist modernity in relation to 
                                                 
70 Dated language aside, we may safely assume that "brotherliness" applies to women as well, since the 
word was intended to refer to generalized human compassion. My discussion of Weber draws greatly 
from Robert Bellah, "Max Weber and World-Denying Love: A Look at the Historical Sociology of 
Religion" Journal of the American Academy of Religion, June 1999, Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 277-304. 
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previous world-historical epochs.  Each one focused on some form of social decay 
brought about by the Industrial Revolution: Marx felt that the rise of capitalism led to 
individual alienation and class polarization; for Weber, capitalism brought the 
rationalization of social life through bureaucratization; and for Durkheim, the rise of 
capitalism led to the breakdown of social cohesion, which was manifested in 
individual anomie caused by an increasingly fragmented and complex division of 
labor, which caused people to lose touch with their place within a collectivity.  All 
three theorists shared a common concern for how best to resolve the tension between 
capitalist competition and the public good.  They sought to understand how the 
incredible productive forces brought about by capitalism might lead to a more 
equitable, egalitarian society. 
Of the three thinkers, Max Weber was the most pessimistic about the possibility of 
resolving the crisis of capitalist modernity.  Although he clearly and brilliantly 
identified the crisis, he saw no way out of it.  Industry, technology, and bureaucracy 
were here to stay, and he saw no reformist or revolutionary platform that might make 
capitalism more equitable in the future.  In Weber’s words, "The more the world of the 
modern capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, the less accessible it is to 
any imaginable relation with a religious ethic of brotherliness" (Weber 1958:331).  For 
Weber, the value-spheres (wertsphären) of the market and religion were oriented 
towards completely different types of action, the former towards impersonality and 
rational individual maximization, and the latter towards human compassion and 
morality.  Market logic was inherently dispassionate--based on abstract principles--
and moral logic was inherently compassionate, based on human "brotherhood," the 
affective bonds formed between members of a community.  For Weber, modern 
formal rationality was unique in that it relied upon universal abstract laws, which, in 
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pure ideal-typical form, were completely impersonal and therefore contrary to the 
"ethic of brotherliness."  Modern social relationships were governed by impersonal 
legal contracts rather than affective principles of personal status (an idea first 
developed by Henry Maine in Ancient Law [1959].) 
Economic rationality denied the ethic of brotherliness, and there was no way out of 
this trap.  In Robert Bellah’s words, modernity was characterized by "the increasingly 
irreconcilable conflict between [value-spheres], a differentiation which leads to the 
‘polytheism’ of modernity, a ‘war of the gods,’ which is the result of the entire process 
of rationalization, Weber’s central preoccupation during his last and most fruitful 
period" (Bellah 1999:277). The war of modernity pitted the god of the market versus 
the god of love, and the market was winning the war.   
Bellah argues that the essay "Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions" 
is "perhaps the key text in explaining Weber’s entire corpus" (Bellah 1999:277). 
Weber’s bleak view of humanity’s future as an "iron casing" came from his belief that 
the ethic of capitalist competition would progressively destroy the ethic of 
brotherliness, which, to some degree, had organized all pre-capitalist societies. 71  This 
ethic gradually lost its relative importance as humanity moved towards rational 
modernity. The future would hold an impersonal, unfeeling world in which the cold 
objectivity of calculative rationality would dissolve the personal bonds between 
people, the social contract voided by the laws of the market.   
Rationalization was, for Weber, based on politics that had become depersonalized via 
bureaucracy and written law, an economy which was depersonalized through the use 
of money, and a religious morality which was depersonalized through belief in sacred 
                                                 
71 Here, I follow Eric Wolf’s suggestion that the standard translation, "iron cage," is incorrect (Wolf 
1999:41) 
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texts that applied laws to all people.  In all three cases, abstract logic replaced 
personalistic bonds.  Following Sir Henry Maine, Weber argues that "the sib" or the 
kin-group is the historical basis of all social identification.  He believed that society 
developed from simple forms to more complex ones, but he did not have an evaluative 
evolutionary position.  That is, modern complex societies were not "higher" than 
simple ones, but they did develop from more simple forms.  Historical sociology could 
determine how existing sociocultural forms emerged dialectically from previous ones.   
Weber, like Durkheim, argued that individuals in small-scale societies have reciprocal 
obligations to the kin group, which are legitimated through ritual.  People become 
conscious of their place in a social collectivity through ritual practice and more 
mundane forms of reciprocal action.  As cities began to develop during the so-called 
Axial Age, salvation religions replaced kinship ties with ties of faith to an abstract 
"brotherhood" of believers.  Such an allegiance required a person to renounce 
"organic" ties to the immediate kin group in the name of the bonds of faith and 
symbolic brotherhood, usually established through belief in a religious text.   
The  "world religions"--Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism--gave ultimate value to 
abstract "acosmistic" love, which is a concern for all people, regardless of language, 
nationality, or social position.  Such a belief requires one to behave in ways that may 
conflict with the interests of the immediate kin-group in the name of religious creed. A 
person’s allegiance expands beyond the boundaries of the "sib," because it is based on 
faith in a religious text which applies to all believers.  This requires an inherently 
abstract concept of the social totality. 
For Weber, the central problem of modernity was that nationalism had become the 
most important form of collective social identity, and that nationalism served the 
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interests of bellicose states that strove for power and rarely acted in the interest of the 
nation.  Rhetoric aside, states were only concerned with the expansion of their own 
power.  During Weber’s lifetime, the modern welfare state began to rein in "pure" 
competitive capitalism in the name of the public good by enforcing labor laws and 
using taxes to benefit the citizenry as a whole (education, health care, recreation, arts, 
etc).  Germany, for example, developed the world's first social security system in 
1889.  But Weber was cynical about the welfare state.  Weber saw the measures of the 
welfare state as coercive policies designed to enhance state power, which were 
ideologically disguised as disinterested ethics.  He wrote, "In the final analysis, in 
spite of all ‘social welfare policies,’ the whole course of the state’s inner political 
functions, of justice and administration, is repeatedly and unavoidably regulated by the 
objective pragmatism of ‘reasons of state’" (Weber 1958:334). He drew an analogy 
between bureaucratic law and money--both created an abstract, impersonal system. He 
writes, "…the political man acts just like the economic man, in a manner of fact 
manner ‘without regard to the person’…without hate and therefore without love" 
(1958:334).  Weber's pessimistic attitude towards the welfare state demonstrates his 
general pessimism towards the future of capitalist society. 
 
Weber’s work has clear parallels with Durkheimian sociology, although Durkheim had 
much greater faith in society's ability to manage capitalism for the greater good.  
Durkheim argued that all concepts of morality were based on an individual's 
awareness of his or her place within a social collectivity.  Moral concepts formed the 
basis of all religious thought, which was a predecessor of scientific thought.  Science 
and religion were abstract ways of explaining the world that recognized human 
collectivities as governed by forces that reached beyond individuals.  The human 
faculty for abstract reasoning was a product of social relations, and universal logic 
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required a universal concept of humanity to which such logic would apply.  Unlike 
Weber, Durkheim saw the trend towards more abstract and expansive understandings 
of society as a positive development. In the conclusion to The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life, he writes that, 
 
There is no people, and no State, that is not engaged with a more or less undelimited 
society that includes all people and all States with which it is indirectly or directly in 
contact; there is no national life that is not under the sway of an international 
collective life.  The more we advance in history, the larger and the more important 
these international groupings become" (428).  
   
He continues, 
 
As that international life broadens, so too does the collective horizon; society no 
longer appears as the whole, par excellence, and becomes part of a whole that is more 
vast, with frontiers that are indefinite and capable of rolling back indefinitely.  As a 
result, things can no longer fit within the social frames where they were originally 
classified; they must be organized with principles of their own" (446) 
  
The great challenge of modernity was to develop legitimate social institutions to 
integrate an ever-expanding complex society.  Durkheim believed that social science 
could contribute to the development of a political institution that would rise above 
national interests and class struggle, and his sentiments at the end of The Elementary 
Forms, written on the brink of World War I, presage the idea of "world government" 
that would grow out of that war and lead to the establishment of the United Nations.  
For him, modern states had the potential to act in the interests of society, but only if it 
was guided by positivist social science.   
 
Durkheim did not directly discuss the rationalization of economic life, but his nephew 
Marcel Mauss applied his theories of social life to economics.  The concept of the 
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capitalist market as impersonal vis á vis non-capitalist economic systems is famously 
argued Mauss in The Gift, which argues that non-capitalist gift economies are based 
on the establishment of social bonds through exchange.  In non-capitalist economies, 
material objects are always associated with their creators and recipients, and value is 
only realized through the social distribution of objects.  There is no abstract, 
impersonal measure of value to establish equivalency between all objects.  Value 
cannot be separated from individual people.   
The impersonality of capitalist exchange is a central element of Marx’s definition of 
commodities as well.  Marx defined commodities as representing a specific quantity of 
abstract (and therefore impersonal) social labor.  The universal exchangeability of 
goods requires a quantifiable abstract measure of value, symbolically expressed in a 
specific quantity of money. Similarly, Weber writes that "money is the most abstract 
and ‘impersonal’ medium which exists in human life" (331).  Money, as a symbolic 
expression of a specific quantity of abstract labor, allows capitalism to function as a 
rational system, because, through the symbolic medium of money, value can be 
objectively quantified according to universal standards.  
Despite the vast theoretical differences between Weberian sociology, the Annee 
Sociologique, and Marxian theory, all three approaches agreed that an abstract, 
impersonal standard of value was a defining characteristic of the capitalist economy.  
When value is expressed in abstract terms, the human (i.e. personal) element of market 
behavior falls to the background, or, in Weber’s more bleak predictions, disappears 
completely.  Mauss recognized that the personal element of exchange still existed in 
the practice of luxury expenditures, gift-giving and reciprocity, but bemoaned the 
facelessness that had come to define the artificially separated "economic sphere" of 
modern capitalism.  
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In the past two decades, universal or global social movements have expanded the ethic 
of brotherliness beyond the boundaries of nation-states, adapting the religious ideal of 
universal brotherhood to secular international politics.  Secular concepts of universal 
human rights and global standards of fairness have transcended individual countries or 
regions in the name of social justice.  These universal concepts of morality existed in 
the past within the religious sphere, but only recently have the so-called global New 
Social Movements developed a secular, transnational moral platform.  Jurgen 
Habermas is the most important theorist of this philosophy of justice, and he has 
generally espoused a form of politics that creates the conditions for rational 
communication between social groups.  One consequence of Habermas' theory of the 
"transformation of the public sphere," (1989) has been renewed attention given to 
public participation in politics.  However, the ideal Habermasian public sphere 
develops outside of the institutional confines of the nation-state.      
"Fair trade" is one of the most well-known examples of this transnational secular 
concept of social justice.  It is a form of international market exchange that combines 
normative concepts of fairness with liberal economics.  "Fair trade" is a process that 
certifies and labels commodities, notably coffee, that are produced under "fair" 
conditions, as determined and enforced by a non-governmental auditing body, the 
International Fairtrade Labeling Organization (IFLO).  In general, "fair" certification 
guarantees that farmers have been paid a minimum price of $1.29 per pound of coffee 
and that workers are treated fairly on farms.  Fair trade producers must fit into 
country-specific definitions of "small farmers" developed by the IFLO.  "Fair trade" 
explicitly presents itself as an alternative to agro-industrial food production and is 
marketed towards urbanites who can afford to pay between ten and thirteen dollars for 
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a pound of coffee.  With the addition of a "fair trade certified" label, "fairness" 
becomes an attribute of the commodity, similar to its country of origin, flavor 
characteristics, or caffeine content.  Under fair trade, consumers enforce labor 
standards outside the boundaries of any national political system, using market choice 
rather than legal means.  In its rhetoric, fair trade rests upon affective bonds between 
producers and consumers in international commodities markets.  The question is: Is 
this possible?  Can international consumers develop and enforce a standard of fairness 
outside of political institutions? 
Scholars who have written about fair trade, such as Renard (1993) Raynolds (2000, 
2004), and Barham (2002) tend to see it as a corrective to contemporary free-market 
economics that "re-embeds" commodity exchange in concrete social relations. I 
believe that fair trade in fact represents the apotheosis of calculative rationality 
masquerading as moral sentiment. By comparing fair trade with consumer boycotts 
and national trade policies, in Part I of this chapter I argue that fair trade places the 
responsibility for the maintenance of justice upon individual consumers and thus 
represents the epitome of market-driven thought.  Under fair trade, justice is quantified 
into the terms of money.  Fair trade assigns a cash value to morality and sociality, 
synthesizing the two incompatible value-spheres of market and religion, objectivity 
and affect, as originally conceived by Max Weber.   
 
Though ideologically concerned with social justice and the well-being of commodity 
producers in the developing world, fair trade actually plays into the hand of the very 
process it seeks to redress.  By incorporating morality into the exchange value of a 
commodity, "fair trade" reinforces the terms of pure calculative rationality by 
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expressing fairness in terms of exchange value.  In this sense, it epitomizes what I 
have called post-modern theories of social justice. 
 
In Part II of this chapter, I use ethnographic material from Honduras to argue that fair 
trade is based upon a mythic construction of the global marketplace that has 
ideological effects. Fair trade simplifies the terms of participation for various 
stakeholders in the coffee market, and provides a rather myopic version of the 
relationship between coffee producers and consumers that fails to grasp the productive 
system at its highest levels. Although fair trade claims to create a direct relationship 
between commodity producers and consumers, it is a highly mediated relationship that 
does not accurately represent the complexities of the coffee trade.  By shifting the 
responsibility for the maintenance of social justice from states and citizens to 
individual consumers, fair trade is essentially a private act.  Fair trade’s conception of 
social justice is unfortunately hindered by its emphasis on private action. 
   
Part II. Contemporary Social Justice in Historical Perspective 
 
What a difference a century makes.  In the early twentieth century, a consumer 
movement called "fair trade" emerged among urbanites in the United States.  It was 
intended to challenge the power of large corporations who paid coffee growers an 
"unfair" price.72  Consumers in the United States became involved in the affairs of 
coffee growing countries in Latin America, and they clamored for political changes 
                                                 
72 The twentieth century "fair trade" movement was not limited to coffee, but the coffee industry was 
one of its targets. See Mark Pendergrast’s discussion of the trade war between Brazil and the U.S. over 
Brazil’s "unfair" attempts to regulate the coffee market (1999:77-94) 
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that would establish a fair coffee price.  American politicians leveled charges of 
exploitation against Latin American coffee growers, whom they considered 
exploitative profit-mongers. 
A hundred years later, the issue of "fair trade" coffee emerged again among consumers 
in the US.  It was also an urban-based consumer movement that challenged corporate 
power and the prices paid to coffee growers in Latin America.  However, these two 
movements had completely opposite concepts of fairness.  "Fair Trade I" believed that 
coffee-growers were paid unfairly high prices that hurt consumers by price-gouging; 
"Fair Trade II" believes that coffee producers are paid unfairly low prices that threaten 
the livelihood of small-scale farmers.  Under Fair Trade I, coffee-producing nations 
instituted subsidies or price floors that stabilized the industry and helped their own 
agricultural sectors. Under Fair Trade II, coffee consumers establish price floors and 
voluntary subsidies for coffee growers outside of the borders of their own countries.  
Under Fair Trade I, the standards of "fairness" were determined by political processes 
within individual nation-states; Under Fair Trade II, non-governmental institutions, 
rather than states, establish and maintain the definition of fair trade through a non-
political process.  Both movements were led by consumers fighting for moral concepts 
of fairness, but there could hardly be a more drastic reversal of philosophies of social 
justice.  The difference between these two understandings of "fair trade" is a telling 
example of the differences between modern and postmodern concepts of justice. 
Under "Fair Trade I," states developed various policies that ran counter to abstract 
"pure" capitalism, such as protectionist tariffs and subsidies intended to benefit 
particular nation-states or classes within them.  Although specific policies may have 
been international, as in the case of favorable tariff rates for strategic allies or 
investment in international development projects, such endeavors were promoted in 
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the name of national security or strategic interest, rather than moral obligation. 
Although moral rhetoric has often been used  (e.g. "promoting the cause of freedom"), 
the political interests of the Cold War overshadowed the moral element of these efforts 
until the 1990s. The rhetoric of moral obligation was often used to justify economic 
aid, but such policies were clearly guided by national interest rather than a 
disinterested concept of right. 
 
Agricultural subsidies are perhaps the clearest example a policy that abandons pure 
market logic in the interest of national economic stability.  Tariffs and duties are other 
means by which individual nation-states can protect their own citizens, or those of 
strategic allies, through policies that counteract pure market forces.  Subsidies provide 
a stable supply of goods for consumers, while also protecting producers from foreign 
competition and market volatility.  Most state-directed social policy has been 
conducted in the name of national interests, or as a means for democratic governments 
to curry the favor of certain interest groups within the population.   
In contrast, fair trade is transnational.  The centers of demand for fair trade are 
Western Europe, the United States, and Japan, three places where coffee is not 
produced (with the exception of the U.S. state of Hawaii and Puerto Rico).  These 
countries are the world’s largest coffee consumers by volume.  Fair trade consumers 
are thinking about the well-being of people outside of their own nations and trying to 
develop transnational strategies to address their concerns.   
In addition, fair trade is a trans-class movement.  The people fighting for fair trade are 
educated, wealthy consumers who can afford to pay twelve dollars for a pound of 
coffee beans, yet they are supporters of agrarian politics.  From a purely economic 
standpoint, fair trade raises the price of coffee for consumers.  In Fair Trade I, 
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producers fought for higher prices and consumers fought for lower prices, acting in 
accordance with economic interests. 
Fair trade is non-political. The standards of fair labor practices are determined through 
a non-democratic, non-governmental process.  Fair trade is based on raising incomes 
for producers without the involvement of political structures in the producing 
countries.  Fittingly, fair trade grew in popularity in the nineties, precisely after the 
International Coffee Agreement, an international political cartel that stabilized the 
industry through quotas and price supports, fell apart (Bates 1997). 
The fact that the movement originates among coffee consumers in non-producing 
countries, coupled with its non-democratic decision-making process, open it to the 
accusations of feel-good paternalism that tend to be leveled against any populist 
movement driven by elites.  I have heard these criticisms of fair trade many times, 
especially in Honduras, and here I have simplified them for dramatic effect.  First, 
there are the accusations of naïve moralism, e.g. "Why don’t you look at the low-paid 
workers in your own country, like the janitors who clean up after you at Starbucks?  
Why turn coffee brokers into the bad guys?"  Second are the accusations of 
paternalism, e.g. "What do Americans (or Europeans) know about what’s best for 
coffee farmers?  How do you know if your version of fairness is the same as theirs?"   
These criticisms raise important questions about the viability of fair trade.  Not 
incidentally, they parallel criticisms of "internationalist" meddling that are leveled 
against human rights workers, environmentalists, and other activists working in the 
developing world that perceive transnational movements as challenges to national 
sovereignty. The final line of criticism questions the consumerist elements of the 
movement, e.g. "How can you save the world by shopping? Isn’t this just a form of 
instant gratification that ignores the ‘big questions’?"  These are all important 
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questions, and I analyze each of them in turn, beginning with a discussion of the 
contradictions of consumer based movements, which I believe to be fundamental to an 
understanding of contemporary fair trade. 
 
Can Shopping Change the World? Consumer Politics and Symbolic Redefinition               
The fact that the plight of the world’s coffee farmers has become a symbol of the 
injustices of global capitalism and a cause célèbre for progressives is, in itself,  worthy 
of anthropological interpretation.  Why has coffee (rather than, say, petroleum, 
diamonds, sugar, or root beer) attracted so much attention from progressive groups 
and consumers in the past decade?  Why have students on college campuses 
throughout the world rallied in support of small coffee farmers, demanding that their 
campuses serve only fair trade coffee?  Coffee has always been a volatile industry, 
with exploitation at various links of the supply chain, from agriculture, to distribution, 
to retail.  Yet only recently has it become a key symbol in public discourse about 
global capitalism. Why do people see the web of global capitalist relations in the 
murky depths of an espresso? 
Economics are a necessary but insufficient cause of the rising popularity of fair trade; 
coffee’s changing meaning to consumers is far more important.  As Roseberry (1996) 
has ably described, since the 1980s, coffee has shifted from a staple commodity to a 
highly symbolic expression of social identity.73  The gourmet coffee phenomenon is an 
example of a new form of acquisitive connoisseurship which, for Roseberry, is a way 
for educated professionals to establish a class identity that differentiates them from 
other class factions.  This phenomenon speaks to a more fundamental transformation 
                                                 
73 Also see journalist Mark Pendergrast’s cultural history of coffee, Uncommon Grounds (1999) 
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that has occurred in the past few decades, as commodity consumption has become one 
of the principle means by which westerners (and, increasingly, non-westerners) 
express themselves and create their social identity.   
Increased prosperity and consumer choice have created new possibilities for people to 
fashion themselves according to their own values, but tying one’s identity to the fruits 
of the capitalist market can lead to profound contradictions.  In a world where 
individuality is valued, how does one simultaneously depend on mass-produced goods 
and assert individual creative autonomy?  Relying on commodities to express oneself 
can provoke ambivalence if the objects of desire are contradictory to the values people 
use to define themselves (Turner 2002).  How can the emphasis on individuality that is 
so vital to modern capitalism be reconciled with a world that has been standardized by 
the unprecedented power of a few large global corporations to guide consumer tastes, 
and where  spontaneous expressions of individuality are often snatched up and 
"massified" in the search for profit?74   
One consequence of the increased symbolic importance of commodities is that the 
process by which commodities are produced has drawn considerable popular attention. 
This has given rise to the anti-sweatshop movement, the organic and ‘slow foods’ 
movements, as well as the anti-mass consumerism expressed in popular books like No-
Logo and Fast Food Nation.  In addition, we have seen the rise of "pop-commodity 
chain studies"--television shows, articles, and best-selling books that trace the origins 
of mass-produced foods from farm, to factory, to market.    
                                                 
74 On this point, Starbucks is a good example.  A company that began as a movement against mass 
consumerism became one of the most hated symbols of cultural homogeneity.  Thomas Frank has called 
this process "the conquest of cool."  
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The ambivalence over commodity-dependence is especially common among the 
professional classes, who tend not to be directly involved in the material production of 
commodities and are alienated by mass consumerism, searching for a way to add an 
aura of uniqueness and individuality in a massified consumer world.  Coffee has 
become such a powerful symbol of the contemporary upper-class, schooled in the 
countercultural values of the sixties, that American journalist David Brooks famously 
referred to new wealthy/highly-educated communities as "latté towns" (Brooks 
2000:104).  Brooks struck a nerve by coining the term "Bobo" or "bourgeois 
bohemian" (Brooks 2000).  The "bobo" ideology is rooted in a value of the 
"particular," "the unique," and "the authentic," but, contradictorily, the practices 
associated with this ideology center on the consumption of mass commodities. 
The result of these processes has been an ever-expanding search for "authentic" 
commodities in a homogenized world.  The fact that much of the anti-corporate 
movements of the past few decade have been specifically targeted at ubiquitous 
consumer brands like McDonalds, The Gap, Nike, and Starbucks reflect the 
valorization or heterogeneity, which is often considered to be an important aspect of 
postmodernity.  Interestingly, a large proportion of the "brand bullies" (Klein 1999) 
are food or clothing companies.  Universally-recognized brands like Kodak, Gillette, 
or Samsung do not arouse ambivalent feelings like Nike, The Gap, or McDonalds.  
Food and clothing are important elements of the creation of one’s social identity, so 
they are the most targeted symbols of homogenization.  Food and clothing companies 
are disproportionately singled out as the agents of globalization, so coffee is a natural 
target. 
Educated, cosmopolitan people are especially ambivalent about their coffee--it is an 
addictive necessity for the professional lifestyle.  Every office has a coffee maker, and 
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it is often the fuel that powers intellectual work.  The coffee habit is hard to kick.  
Addiction is bad enough--addiction to a product that compromises one’s sense of 
justice is even worse--a physical and moral vice.  To resolve this ambivalence, "fair 
trade" has turned buying habits into political action in a particularly novel way.  
Whereas earlier forms of consumer activism, such as boycotts, avoided products for 
ethical reasons, "fair trade" promotes the purchase of "moral" or "ethical" products.  
Fair trade does not call for a personal sacrifice, rather, it calls for virtuous indulgence--
changing the world by shopping. 
Compared to other tropical food products, the "story" of coffee is easy to tell. Sugar 
provides a useful comparison, since it is also a mild stimulant mainly grown in the 
tropics.  Sugar is  a relatively undifferentiated product.  Although there are a few 
"boutique" sugars on the market and a few types of fair trade sugar, it is far more 
standardized than coffee.  There are only a few brands of sugar on the supermarket 
shelves, and no brand carries any symbolic message about status or lifestyle.  Unlike 
coffee, sugar is used as an ingredient in hundreds of processed foods like soft-drinks 
and candy.  Coffee is consumed in relatively unadulterated form, and it is not used in 
many processed foods.  It would be almost impossible to try to know the origin of the 
sugar we consume, since it is found in so many products and in so many forms 
(fructose, glucose, dextrose, sucrose, etc), and is produced all over the world, 
including the United States.  Coffee is easy to follow from plantation to cup because it 
is purchased as a whole or ground bean with relatively little modification. 
For fifty years, the image of the coffee farmer in the United States has been Juan 
Valdez, the trademark of Colombia's National Federation of Coffee Growers (FNC) 
since the 1950s, when the image was created by advertising agency Doyle Dane 
Bernbach.  As an idealized version of the rural producer, this image is a nostalgic nod 
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to the Jeffersonian rural tradition, a man and his mule (see Figure 6). In an age where 
industrialization and the global expansion of corporate food production make the small 
farmer into a valued nostalgic category, this image of the small coffee farmer is 
appealing.  As Jackson Lears points out, the rural ideal has a long history in American 
advertising (1994:124).  Some of the earliest ads were Currier and Ives style prints that 
idealized rural family life, and some of the most endearing U.S. ad campaigns, such as 
Uncle Ben’s rice, the Cream of Wheat man, Aunt Jemima, and the Corn Flakes girl, 
have all used nostalgic depictions of rural life to sell industrial food products.  The 
relatively unadulterated form in which we consume coffee, coupled with an idealized 
version of the small farmers who grow it, make it easy to put a "face" behind coffee, 
especially when compared to commodities like sugar (or tea and bananas) that are 
associated with plantation agriculture.  However, the early Juan Valdez image was an 
iconic reference to coffee farmers, whereas the faces of fair trade are supposed to 
correspond to real individuals whom the consumer is supporting with his or her 
purchase. 
Raymond Williams makes a related point in The Country and the City (1973), arguing 
that the rise of industrial capitalism led to the valorization of poetic descriptions of 
"nature" in English literature.  The inverse of industrial urbanization--an edenic 
concept of nature--became fetishized, and this led to the development of parks, 
gardens, and other examples of "controlled nature." Similarly, small-scale production 
can only obtain its nostalgic value under advanced capitalism, in which mass-
produced goods are the norm.  Although this valorization of "simplicity" is founded on 
principles of social justice and progressive politics, it has an inherently conservative 
component, in that it requires coffee farmers to fit within a nostalgic cultural category 
derived from contemporary ideological trends in the developed West. The image of  
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Figure 7 The Faces of Coffee 
 
Photos from Fair Trade coffee promotional pamphlets, Global Exchange
Juan Valdez, logo of the Colombia National Coffee 
Growers Federation 
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the umediated, direct linkage between coffee grower and coffee drinker not only 
obscures many of the complicated intermediaries between the two parties, it is itself a 
mediated product of marketing and branding. 
 
Two Forms of Consumer Politics: Sacrifice and Virtuous Indulgence 
The fact that the fair trade movement is based on the  changing symbolic meaning of 
coffee does not, by itself, limit its potential as a political project.  Indeed, two of 
modern history’s most important revolutionary movements, the American Revolution 
and the struggle for Indian independence, were both dependent on the power of 
consumers to redefine the meaning of commodities.  These two movements provide 
instructive points of comparison to fair trade.  
Since the late eighteenth century, boycotts have been a common and effective form of 
public political action.  Fair trade follows in the tradition of the boycott, but shifts the 
politics of consumption from the public to the private spheres.  Previous types of 
consumer activism were inherently public, such as the anti-English boycotts leading 
up to the American Revolution (Breen 2004) and the Swadeshi movement in India 
(Cohn 1996; Goswami 1998).  Both are historically important examples where citizens 
effected political change by harnessing their purchasing power.  Both boycotts were 
successful because individuals communicated their political affiliation through 
"conspicuous non-consumption."  Because boycotts are based on a prohibition, they 
are representative of the "sacrifice model."  
Here, I use  the word "sacrifice" in the mainstream sense, meaning abstinence for the 
sake of a higher principle.  People commonly say, "I make sacrifices for my family," 
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"my country," etc.  This sense of the word differs from the anthropological definition 
of sacrifice developed by Robertson Smith and Durkheim, which refers to communal 
feasts and other "positive rites," that are not based on prohibition but are based on 
communal consumption.  The mainstream definition of "sacrifice" is more like a 
prohibition or abstinence, which Durkheim described as "negative rites" (1995:303-
329).  In the case of boycotts, the prohibition is not a ritual practice but a matter of 
choice that establishes a like-minded community. 
 
Durkheim saw positive and negative rites as directly related.  Negative rites 
(boycotts/prohibitions) presuppose communal sacrifice, because abstinence permits a 
person entrance into to a specific cult by "fleeing the profane world" and "foregoing 
sensuous interests" (1995:321).   By abstaining from profane things, a person showed 
respect for the sacred collectivity by suppressing egoistic desire (1995:326).  
"Negative rites" are necessary to establishment of a cult, which, for Durkheim, was the 
most basic form of collective social unit beyond the immediate kin-group.  A person 
must demonstrate that he or she acts according to the principles of the group through 
prohibition.  
 
Durkheim believed that the practices of the totemic cult served to represent the moral 
force of society.  In this sense, they formed the basis of all religious thought, which 
was, in its most elementary form, the moral code of a given collectivity.  Boycotts are 
based on collective abstinence for the sake of a moral principle, and groups of people 
display their allegiance to a particular moral code through participation in a boycott.  
Though the decision to participate is an individual one, it is oriented towards a 
collectively-held belief. This symbolic element of boycotts is often more effective 
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than their economic component.  Boycotts are public spectacles that admit one into a 
group of people who share certain values,  through a display of personal discipline.   
 
T.H. Breen’s The Marketplace of Revolution (2004) provides a detailed history of how 
a boycott of English goods shaped the American Revolution. Breen makes a strong 
argument that the decision to forego the purchase of imported British goods was a key 
idiom through which American colonists expressed support for the revolutionary 
cause. The language of personal sacrifice and the ability to overcome temptation were 
important parts of this movement.  Tea, an addictive drug-food, was an especially 
tempting product, so the ability to forego tea-drinking displayed political commitment.  
Breen writes; 
 
…the colonists’ shared experience as consumers provided them with the cultural 
resources needed to develop a bold new form of political protest.  In this 
unprecedented context, private decisions were interpreted as political acts; consumer 
choices communicated personal loyalties.  Goods became the foundation of trust, for 
one’s willingness to sacrifice the pleasures of the market provided a remarkably 
visible and effective test of allegiance (xvi). 
 
To not drink tea was a show of commitment to the revolutionary cause.  It required 
great discipline and restraint.  Breen’s book is filled with passionate quotations from 
people speaking about the moral danger of tea drinking: A sermon published in 
Lancaster, Pennsylvania decried: 
 
This baneful wicked herb is the match by which an artful wicked ministry intended to 
blow up the liberties of America…Continuing to purchase tea, under present 
circumstances, is high treason against three million Americans (qtd. in Breen, 306) 
 
Another writer from South Carolina exclaimed: 
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‘the baneful chests’ of tea forced on America by the East India Company contained ‘in 
them a slow poison, in a political as well as physical sense. They contain something 
worse than death--the seeds of SLAVERY.’ (306) 
 
Breen continues: 
 
By mid-1774 drinking tea had become equated in the popular mind with political sin.  
No longer could one pretend that private enjoyments within one’s own family did not 
have public consequences.  Anyone could see that tea, like an insidious drug, allowed 
conspirators in the mother country to erode colonial rights….As ‘a woman’ informed 
readers of a Massachusetts journal, "In the present case the use of tea is considered not 
as a private but a public evil; so the arguments used against it should be of a public 
nature" (306).    
 
Breen offers a sophisticated account of the Boston Tea Party (December 6, 1773), one 
of the iconic events in American history.  U.S. schoolchildren learn at an early age that 
American colonists boycotted English tea to oppose "taxation without representation." 
During the Tea Party, a group of Bostonian merchants who called themselves the 
"Sons of Liberty" disguised themselves as Mohawk Indians and boarded an English 
merchant ship docked in Boston Harbor.  They dumped a shipment of tea overboard, 
in a statement against the recently passed Tea Act, which imposed a small customs 
duty on tea in order to raise revenue for the struggling East India Company.  Breen 
argues that the Tea Party was one in a series of events where consumer choice served 
as a public display of political sentiment, and that such acts were an important 
stimulant for collective anti-English action in the then-inchoate nation.  Breen argues 
that the Tea Party and other public acts served as "symbolic redefinitions."   
 
Within barely a generation, the meaning of the items of everyday consumption had 
changed substantially…imported items…had served as markers of a British identity, 
and as they flooded into the homes of yeoman and gentry alike, they linked ordinary 
men and women with the distant exciting culture of the metropolis…By taxing these 
goods, however, Parliament set in motion a process of symbolic 
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redefinition…straining the colonial relationship to the breaking point…Private 
consumer experiences were transformed into public rituals (329). 
 
Whereas tea had been a valued sign of refinement, civilization, and status (like most 
other imported goods), the tea boycott turned it into a symbol of dependency and 
tyranny, inverting the symbolic order of colonialism.  The emergence of a capitalist 
market had created a new language of consumer choice in the expanding colonies, and 
Breen argues that this new language was used to communicate revolutionary political 
sentiment. 
 
The Indian swadeshi movement is an another example of a boycott which redefined 
British goods in protest to colonial dependency.  Swadeshi was a call to purchase 
locally-made goods and boycott imported ones, so it could be seen as both a sacrifice 
and a virtuous indulgence. Its power clearly came from the decision to forego imports 
that could not be substituted with Indian-made ones. The locally-made textiles were 
simple, homespun garments, as opposed to the prestigious Lancashire cottons that 
were worn by the British.  Goswami (1998) cites a popular swadeshi song written in 
1870 which exemplified the movement’s spirit of abstinence, saying "We will eat our 
own coarse grain and wear the rough, home-spun cloth, What do we care for lavender 
and imported trinkets?" (625).  The public display of sacrifice became even more 
apparent after 1907, when, under Gandhi’s leadership, the swadeshi movement 
became even more radical.  Cohn (1992) writes: 
 
The [goals of the swadeshi movement in Bengal 1903-1908] were complex, but one 
aim was to encourage the development and use of indigenously produced goods 
through a boycott of European manufactures.  As the movement developed, there was 
increasing discussion and propaganda to encourage Indian weavers and to revive the 
hand spinning of cotton thread.  These ideas were taken up and formalized by 
Mahatma Gandhi in the next decade…Gandhi continually articulated and elaborated 
on the theme that the Indian people would only be free from European domination, 
    
 235
both politically and economically, when the masses took to spinning, weaving, and 
wearing homespun cotton cloth, khadi (148-149). 
 
Unlike the American boycott, there is no fine-grained history of how swadeshi spread 
through the Indian masses.  But Goswami and Cohn’s work makes clear  that a 
collective boycott of English goods played an important role in communicating anti-
English sentiment.  Like the American "symbolic redefinition" of tea, the Indian 
boycott of imported English goods turned the symbols of virtue into markers of 
tyranny.  The success of boycotts rests in their power of "symbolic redefinition."  By 
turning imported goods from signs of wealth and refinement to signs of dependency 
and injustice, they shift the terms of political debate.  Non-consumption signified 
solidarity with nascent nationalist movements. 
 
The Virtuous Indulgence Model 
 
The virtuous indulgence model is the opposite of the boycott.  Rather than calling for a 
prohibition of certain goods, this type of action calls for consumers to purchase 
products that conform to a particular set of values.  This type of action has been less 
successful than boycotts in effecting political change, mainly because it is a private act 
that does not establish a community through the suppression of individual 
gratification. In these cases, individual choices are interpreted as political acts, but 
these acts do not communicate a message outward. 
   
The union-labeling movement, which began in the 1870s, presents an illustrative 
comparative case to fair trade.  One of the most important unions in U.S. history, the 
Cigar Makers’ International Union of America, initiated a campaign to advertise 
certain cigars as "union made" in order to differentiate them from cigars made by 
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Chinese immigrant labor.75  This union was led by a young Samuel Gompers, who 
would later become the most influential figure in U.S. labor history.  In 1872, the 
Cigar Cutters International Union placed a blue stamp on boxes of cigars that said 
"This certifies that a cigar has been made by a first-class workman, a member of the 
Cigar Makers’ International Union of America."  This program was an attempt to 
improve  union-members’ working conditions by appealing to anti-Chinese sentiment 
and nationalism.  At that time, large numbers of Chinese immigrants were producing 
cheap cigars in New York City, and the CMIU, consisting of mostly European 
immigrants, used both racism and nationalism to promote their cause.   
 
By the early twentieth century, the union label discourse had changed, using public 
outcry against monopoly trusts--rather than cheap immigrant labor--to arouse support.  
Badges and posters in support of the Cigar Makers Union read, "Don’t Support the 
Trust. Buy Blue Label Cigars" in 1905.  At that time, there was considerable 
controversy surrounding the monopolistic control of the American Tobacco Company, 
a trust controlled by the Duke family.  The "union label" purchase was a statement 
against big business, and it came at a point in history when the U.S. government was 
enacting anti-trust legislation and other Progressive-era policies, such as the Pure Food 
and Drug Act, designed to curtail the power of large corporations in the interest of the 
public good.  This is the political platform that I have earlier referred to as "Fair Trade 
I." 
 
                                                 
75 Indeed, "it was his own union that in 1872 introduced in San Francisco the usage of the union label 
to distinguish for consumers the cigars produced by workers employed under a union agreement from 
those made by non-union Chinese immigrant workers" (Vernon Briggs, "American Unionism and U.S. 
Immigration Policy" Center for Immigration Studies Backgrounder, August 2001 ). 
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In the late-twentieth century, the Union Label reappeared, and moved back towards an 
explicitly nationalistic agenda.  Through the sixties and seventies, U.S. manufacturing 
had lost considerable clout as production moved overseas and the domestic economy 
became oriented towards the service sector.  In 1975, the "union label" advertising 
campaign appeared in TV and radio spots.  It’s lyrics are: 
 
Look for the union label 
when you are buying that coat, dress or blouse. 
Remember somewhere our union's sewing, 
our wages going to feed the kids, and run the house. 
We work hard, but who's complaining? 
Thanks to the I.L.G. we're paying our way! 
So always look for the union label, 
it says we're able to make it in the U.S.A.!  
 
This song is clearly meant to appeal to nationalism and "family values."  The 
International Ladies Garment Union highlights the fact that wages are "going to feed 
the kids, and run the house" and that its products are made in the U.S.A.  This effort 
would lead to the "Made in the U.S.A" or "Buy American" campaigns which became 
popular in the 1980s.  These movements developed within a recessionary economic 
climate and a cultural milieu that stressed the sunset of American economic power and 
the escalating power of Japan.  As economic integration made foreign manufacture 
and assembly an inescapable part of life, "patriotic spending" became the latest 
incarnation of the "virtuous indulgence" model.   
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By the nineties, economic prosperity and the sunny future of "globalization" had 
turned such nationalistic projects into anachronisms, and the "Made in the USA" 
movement faded considerably after the passage of NAFTA in 1992.  Even the 
Democratic Party, longtime advocates of protectionist measures, began to embrace 
free-marketism.  By 2000, at the height of the millennial optimism towards 
globalization, the New York Times Magazine published a feature article by Nicholas 
Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn, arguing that American consumers could do their part to 
help the cause of global development by purchasing goods from foreign sweatshops.76  
Global economic integration became the dominant vision of progress, and protection 
of the economic interests of particular nation-states was seen as an obstacle to global 
prosperity and stability. As images of McDonalds in Moscow flickered across the 
screens of American households,   "Made in the USA" disappeared from public 
discourse.   
 
Returning the Durkheim’s distinction between positive and negative rites, these cases 
show that "negative" acts of prohibition, such as boycotts, have had considerable 
political impact, while "positive" acts of virtuous consumption have had less success.  
Non-consumption is far more public than virtuous consumption.  The decision to 
forego tea or imported clothing is visible to other people, and sends a powerful 
symbolic message.  In contrast, only the consumer knows if he or she has "looked for 
the Union Label" or bought fair trade coffee, because these are not apparent in the 
physical properties of the commodity, and the consumer still smokes cigars or drinks 
coffee.  Only the buyer and seller witness the quasi-political act, making virtuous 
indulgence a basically private phenomenon.  
                                                 
76 "Two Cheers for Sweatshops," September 24, 2000 
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In order to fair trade to have a lasting impact, it must be based upon a clear theory of 
social justice and exploitation.  This would require an accurate understanding of the 
coffee commodity chain.  The coffee industry is an exceptionally complex case.  
Coffee is traded on the global commodities market, and its price is determined by a 
complex set of forces that reach far beyond basic supply and demand, including 
currency exchange rates, the investment strategy of hedge funds and other structured 
financial products, weather, and political factors.  To determine who is exploited, if 
anyone, one must look at all the links in the commodity chain in order to understand 
how surplus value is produced. Sociologist John Talbot (1997) addressed this very 
question in his analysis of the production and retention of surplus along the coffee 
commodity chain.  Talbot's analysis was based upon statistical data about the costs of 
the production, processing, and retailing of coffee.  It does not contain any micro-level 
informational about individuals.  In the following section, I will describe the coffee 
commodity chain by focusing on two very different farmers from La Quebrada.  When 
viewed on conjunction with the macro-level perspective provided by Talbot (1997), 
their experiences show that the "fair trade" narrative relies on an overly simplistic 
version of the relationship between coffee growers and consumers.  
 
 
Part III:  Who Determines Fairness? Coffee Production from La Quebrada to 
Queens  
I came to La Quebrada in 2001 as a very marginal part of a development project that 
was designed to help coffee growers establish an ecological co-operative and access 
the fair trade market in the U.S. and Europe.  I was "marginal" because the organizers 
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of the project knew that I was skeptical about fair trade, and encouraged me to be 
critical in my own writings about the project in the interest of institutional self-
critique.  At the time, I was planning to begin a coffee commodity chain study as 
doctoral research, and this project provided a convenient point of entry.  Although the 
project paid my way to Honduras, I was not "inside" the project in a bureaucratic or 
professional sense.  I had no professional commitment to the project's organizers.  
Like many graduate students looking for a research topic, I was an unusually fortunate 
academic tourist, poking around a small town for selfish reasons, trying to do some 
good, but not sure how to do it.  To the people in Honduras affiliated with the fair 
trade project from the beginning, I was probably more of an annoying interloper than 
anything else. 
As I described in the Preface of this work, the fair trade cooperative in La Quebrada 
never really got off the ground.  Without dwelling on the minutiae of the project, let 
me briefly explain what happened:  First, the cooperative was never fair trade 
certified.  The average land-holdings of the co-operative members were too high for 
them to be considered "small farmers" by the standards developed by the IFLO for 
Honduras.  In theory, they could have denied membership to large and medium-sized 
growers, but Prudencio Flores, one of the co-op’s leaders, was also its largest 
landholder.  He could not pursue this strategy without being labeled a hypocrite.  
Given his already polarizing presence in town politics (described in Chapter 4), this 
would have only confirmed the suspicions that he was a fraud.  The co-op could have 
tried to attract small landholders, thereby lowering its average acreage, but small 
coffee-farmers lived on the edge of survival and were the least likely group to join a 
risky, fledgling cooperative that had a strong chance of failure.  After a year or two of 
successful harvests, they may have been willing to join, but the first group of co-op 
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members were embarking on an unknown path.  As it happened, the cooperative’s 
members were stuck between two categories: They were too small to profitably 
produce export coffee, but they were too large to be eligible for "fair trade." 
The second cause of the co-op’s failure (and one that I cannot emphasize enough) was 
the worldwide crisis in coffee prices that occurred between 2000 and 2003.  During 
these years, the average price paid to Honduran coffee farmers dropped from a dollar 
to fifty-three cents.  Because the co-op could not be "fair trade" certified, they tried to 
be certified as "organic." Organic certification would have enabled them to receive a 
higher price for their crop.  The transition to organic production takes at least two full 
crop-seasons.  During this transition, yields dropped significantly at the exact moment 
when prices were at historic lows.  During its first crop season, the co-op had to sell 
for far below the cost of production.  After this failure, almost all of the members quit 
the co-operative, and could no longer trust its leadership.  When I returned to La 
Quebrada in 2003,  Prudencio had retired from local politics, and there was no popular 
initiative to reform the co-op. 
I continued to pursue my interest in the coffee industry alongside my research on 
migration and religious change. My key informant was Javier Montoya, a returned 
migrant who owned about fifteen acres of coffee. I continued my relationship with 
Prudencio, who had moved to Tegucigalpa but lived in La Quebrada during the coffee 
harvest. He allowed me to work as a picker on his farm for a day, partnered with one 
of his seasonal workers.  I also became friendly with a large coffee-grower named 
Tony Chan, who grows his coffee in La Quebrada, but sells it near his home in 
Queens, New York.  I will focus on the cases of Javier and Tony, because they are 
growers who have spent considerable time living and working both in the U.S. and 
Honduras, and have particularly cosmopolitan perspectives on the industry. 
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Javier Montoya is a medium sized grower by Honduran standards, owning about 
fifteen acres of land; Tony is a relatively large-scale grower.  At 125 acres, Tony’s 
farm is large by Honduran standards, but small compared to the large fincas found in 
other parts of Central America.  Unlike Guatemala or El Salvador, Honduras has no 
class of coffee elites, and the majority of farms are in the hands of smallholders.  Both 
Javier and Tony have lived an worked in the United States, and both have seen the 
coffee trade from a variety of perspectives.  Their worldly experiences have given 
them insight about the inequalities inherent in the world coffee market, but neither is 
an advocate of fair trade.  I detail their experiences to provide a sense of the 
complexity of the coffee industry that is obscured by the direct farmer to consumer 
narrative of fair trade, and to ask who sets the terms of farmer participation in the 
market under fair trade and mainstream coffee production. 
 
Javier Montoya: Culture of Risk       
 
A coffee economy is inherently risky.  Prices swing wildly.  Bad weather or disease 
can kill an entire crop.  Farmers have assets--such as land, buildings, machinery, and 
vehicles--that are not insured.  In case of fire or theft, they have nowhere to turn.  
Many live in a perpetual state of debt, so the profits of the boom years go to paying off 
interest accrued during the bust years.   
 
For hired pickers, the risks are omnipresent as well.  There is always a chance that a 
fall in the fields will put a picker out of work for the season.  The slopes are steep and 
slippery, and it is common for people to trudge up and down them with hundred pound 
loads on their backs.  Injuries are common, and there is no "safety net" for workers, 
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save the generosity of kin, friends, neighbors, or church-members.  Coffee farmers 
accept the fact that they will have some bad years and some good years, and accept a 
great deal of risk as a fact of life.  The idea of "stability" or economic security is so 
contrary to their lived experience that I never heard a coffee-farmer mention it as a 
goal.  The business is inherently volatile, and, in general, coffee growers do not 
consider risk to be a problem. 
 
Javier was my closest friend in the field, and I had great respect for his honesty and 
business-savvy. I spent virtually every day with him for six months, and he became 
my de facto guide to life in La Quebrada.  He taught me about the risks of coffee 
farming and continually assured me that there was nothing wrong or unfair about the 
business--I just didn’t think like a coffee farmer.  
 
Javier is a realist who never mentions any abstract principles in which he believes.  He 
believes in Jesus, but does not go to church often.  His home contains religious posters 
and he listens to religious music, but he never talks about the content of his religious 
beliefs.  He does not complain about the coffee business, and sees it as a speculative 
endeavor with a potential for great individual success or failure, depending on some 
combination of personal ability, fate, luck, and Providence.  To me, Javier seemed 
almost ridiculously comfortable with risk, and I once told him that I couldn’t handle 
such risk.  He laughed and said,  "Uiii (laughing)….if you only knew how many times 
I’ve made money and then lost it all…That’s the way life is when you grow coffee. 
That’s how it works here."  He felt that people who complain about low coffee prices 
simply do not understand that every bust is followed by a boom.  He had lost his shirt 
several times, but that was the nature of the business.     
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Javier sees nothing "unfair" the coffee industry in general.  I asked him about whether 
low prices to growers are fair and he said, "Look, when I worked in the US, I looked 
for the cheapest coffee I could find….We all [the Honduran migrants] bought the huge 
refillable mug from the gas station mini-mart or Sam’s Club.  It was like ninety-nine 
cents and you keep the cup…If I’m buying coffee, I want it cheap.  If I’m selling it, I 
want it to be expensive."  For Javier, coffee was a business with clear rules.   
 
Javier inherited three acres of low-quality coffee land from a grandparent in 1996, 
when he was still in his teens.  During the 1997-1998 harvest, coffee prices were 
extremely high, with growers being paid as much as $2.00 per pound.  Javier, then 
only nineteen years old, made a significant amount of money.  Reminiscing about 
those days of plenty, he told me that at one point he had $15,000 cash stored under his 
bed in a cardboard box.  Thinking that coffee prices would remain high, he took out a 
loan from a local moneylender to purchase an additional plot of high-grown coffee at a 
time when land prices were high due to the optimism in the coffee sector.  Javier and 
his wife, who was then pregnant, built a nursery and replanted thousands of high-
yielding catuai plants themselves, "on their hands and knees," banking on a positive 
future for coffee.  He thought that he was making a wise investment.    
 
In the 1998-1999 harvest, coffee prices dropped to only 75 cents per pound, and 
Hurricane Mitch hit in October, just before the start of the harvest.  Although Mitch 
did not destroy Javier’s crop, it made the roads impassable for almost a month, making 
it costly to transport his crop for sale.  Even if his crop arrived at a mill or wholesaler, 
they could not transport it to the coast for export, so many exporters stopped buying 
coffee altogether.  Javier could not pay his debt (at 5% monthly interest), and decided 
to immigrate temporarily to the U.S. to make some money to pay off the debt.  Javier 
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was able to secure a tourist visa because he owned a considerable amount of land, and 
employed the common strategy of using the funds of friends and family members to 
pad his bank account so that it would appear to embassy officials that he was far 
wealthier than he actually was, therefore helping his chances of obtaining a visa. 
 
Javier ended up in Denver, Colorado, where a friend from vocational school lived and 
worked. A trained electrician, he worked as an electrician’s assistant in the suburbs 
and earned enough money in one year of work in the U.S. to repay his debt and return 
to Honduras.  In 2003-2004, he did not need to borrow money to fertilize his field in 
the off-season, which is quite uncommon for all but the wealthiest farmers.  He hired a 
year-round foreman for an annual salary of 24,000 lempira (about $1500 US), who 
managed the pruning, weeding, and fertilization of the fields, as well as the timing of 
the harvest. Javier paid his pickers 35 lempira ($2) per hundred pounds of coffee 
cherries.  This was the "going rate" at the height of the harvest.  Some of the pickers 
were relatives or neighbors, and some were migrants that come to La Quebrada during 
the harvest season.  He paid his cousins and other relatives the same amount that he 
paid strangers, indicating his lack of sentimentality when it came to coffee production.   
 
In 2003, he sold hundred pound bags of unprocessed cherries for 120 lempira ($7.50) 
to a local miller. This would yield about 18-20 pounds of processed beans. He sold at 
a guaranteed price, known as a deposito, which is essentially an unwritten futures 
contract.  Prior to the harvest, he agreed to sell his whole crop to the miller at that rate 
in order to mitigate risk.  Both he and the miller were satisfied with that price, 
although either one could lose out depending on how the price moved in the following 
months.  If it rose above 120, Javier would lose, and if it dropped below 120, the 
miller would lose.  Both sides use the deposito contract as a hedge against price 
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volatility.  In this case, the market price dropped to 100 lempira, so Javier came out on 
top by 20%.   
 
Assuming that Javier sells one hundred pounds for 120 lempira, he makes a modest 
profit.  Subtract the costs of harvesting, fertilizer, transportation, and the labor of a 
foreman, which I calculate at 66 lempira, he makes a profit of 54 lempira (US $3) per 
hundred pounds of cherries, which is only marginally more than the pickers earn.  He 
produced about 100,000 pounds of coffee in 2003, so his profit would be about $3000 
for the year.  This provides a relatively high standard of living in rural Honduras. It 
requires little physical labor for the landowner and provides several months of leisure 
time.  Javier wasn’t getting rich, but he had no reason to complain. 
 
The miller is responsible for washing, depulping, fermenting, drying, bagging, and 
transporting the beans to be exported in San Pedro Sula, a large industrial city near 
Puerto Cortes, the Caribbean port from which coffee is shipped to New York, 
Hamburg, or New Orleans.  The exporter processes the beans a second time for quality 
control, and then sorts and bags the beans for export.  Once the coffee arrives in port, 
it is sold at auction. The price set by the New York Board of Trade is the most 
important determinant in the going-rate for coffee.  The buyers at auction could be 
small boutique roasters or multinational corporations.  Javier’s coffee is a mild, 
washed arabica, which is more valuable than the bitter robusta variety.  However, his 
crop is not specialty-grade, so it is most likely sold to big roasters that blend coffees 
from all over the world, like Folgers, Maxwell House, Nescafé, or Chock Full O' Nuts. 
Folgers is owned by Kraft Foods, which is owned by the Altria Group, formerly 
Phillip Morris.  Maxwell House is a brand owned by Procter and Gamble.  Chock Full 
O' Nuts is owned by Sara Lee Foods, and Nescafé is part of Nestle Foods.   
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The local miller has a large capital investment in the mill machinery, and pays labor, 
overhead, and transport costs.  During the 2003-2004 harvest, the miller was selling 
beans to the exporter at 650 lempira per hundred pounds.  At this price he lost money 
on Javier’s coffee.  Like Javier, he was constantly speculating, buying coffee low and 
holding it until he could make a modest profit.  He had to sell small amounts at the 
low prices to cover his operating costs, but he held a lot of his stock in anticipation of 
increases.  Although he lost money on Javier’s coffee, he purchased from other 
growers at lower rates, and ended up making a small profit for the season. 
 
Javier is a small-scale grower, but he earned more profit than the miller.  I document 
their case to show that coffee intermediaries, such as the miller, are not making great 
profits in the coffee trade when compared with people on the distribution and retail 
side of the business.  Although the common name coyote suggests that intermediaries 
like the miller are greedy outsiders who profit off the labor of others, this may be an 
unfair characterization. In this case, the coyote sells his coffee to Molinos de 
Honduras, an exporter that is a subsidiary of Volcafe, the world’s third-largest green 
coffee trader.  Volcafe sells to the major coffee roasters--publicly-traded corporations 
like Procter and Gamble, Sara Lee, Nestle, and Starbucks. Volcafe is a subsidiary of 
London-based ED&F Man Holdings, one of the world’s largest corporations and 
operator of a hedge fund worth tens of billions of dollars. It would be futile to trace the 
chain of profit across all of these intricate networks, from Javier’s farm, to New York, 
to the bank accounts of ED&F Man’s investors or shareholders in Altria or P&G.  It is 
clear, however, that is arbitrary and myopic to focus on the local coyote or miller as 
the exploitative middleman in this process, and it is equally myopic to suggest that 
merely paying a farmer a bit more for his crop is "fair."  
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Additionally Starbucks, Procter and Gamble, and other multinationals  purchase "fair 
trade" certified coffee from exporters like Volcafe.  For these companies, the true 
value of "fair trade" derives from its role in a public relations strategy that deflects 
accusations of exploitation without hurting profits.  In these cases, fair trade growers, 
represented in brochures and advertisements as fetishized small farmers, provide 
unpaid advertising to multinational corporations that puts a "human face" on their 
coffee.77  How can the small-scale, local, intermediaries be seen as exploitative 
middlemen in this system that involves participants at the highest levels of the global 
economy?  
 
Javier has no interest in fair trade because he would never join a cooperative, a 
requirement for fair trade certification.  In La Quebrada, personal trust is absolutely 
essential to the coffee business, and it is hard for Javier to think of the business in non-
personalistic terms. Personal trust is especially important within  the weak Honduran 
legal system.  If someone writes a bad check or fails to comply with a contract, the 
dispute is rarely settled in court, except in the cities, due to corruption, a lack of legal 
titles, and high levels of illiteracy, which make people prefer verbal agreements over 
written ones.  Sometimes, disputes are resolved by the threat of violence, or, at times, 
violence between disputing parties. Usually, one party just loses out and the offending 
party’s reputation is damaged through local gossip.  In such a situation, business is 
always personal.  Javier will only sell his coffee to buyers who have not burned him in 
the past, people with whom he has an established friendship, and who are known as 
                                                 
77 Terence Turner makes this point in relation to the Body Shop’s incorporation of Brazil nut oil made 
by the Kayapó in its hair conditioner.  See Turner "Neoliberal Ecopolitics and Indigenous Peoples: The 
Kayapo, the "Rainforest Harvest," and The Body Shop" Yale School of Forestry and Environmental 
Science Bulletin, 113-127.  
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honest brokers.  For this reason, he would never join a cooperative, because he values 
his own independence above all else.  He could never trust the leaders of a co-
operative with his crop.  
 
Javier was against fair trade because he would rather have independence than stability.  
The risk of losing everything was a part of life, and he used his temporary migration to 
the U.S. as a hedge against financial risk.  The only injustices in the coffee industry, 
for him, were products of the weak rule of law in Honduras.  His rather positive view 
of the coffee trade should not be attributed to a narrow perspective, because he had 
experience in almost every aspect of the business and had lived and worked in the 
United States, where he was a habitual--and frugal--coffee consumer.  He understood 
the business quite well, but he accepted the risks and inequalities as the rules of the 
game.  In this sense, his vision of "fairness" basically paralleled the neoliberal vision, 
in which a strong rule of law, and legal transparency assures that "the rules of the 
game" are upheld, and individuals can freely compete in an inherently risky 
marketplace. 
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Coffee Under the Radar--Tony Chan 
 
Building 45 in the cargo area of JFK Airport is, aesthetically, about as far as one can 
get from a Starbucks.  It looks like a warehouse on the outside, and the inside has the 
feel of a decrepit public school--lots of fluorescent lights, tiled walls, and squeaky 
floors obsessively buffed by bored-looking janitors.  The building houses Port 
Authority Police and U.S. Customs officials, and holstered pistols far outnumber 
laptops.  A yellow sign outside the building advertises Star Mountain Coffee, a 
glorified break-room on the building’s first floor, where Tony Chan sells some of the 
world’s most interesting coffee.  
 
Behind a door simply marked "Coffee," Tony sells his product for $1.25 per cup, one 
size only.  The coffee is grown on Tony’s farm in La Quebrada.  A Taiwanese 
immigrant who became a coffee farmer after being fired from McDonalds, Tony ships 
his coffee to the US, roasts it himself in the JFK cargo area, and sells it to airport 
workers from three small outposts, one of which is run by his wife.  His coffee is 
specialty-grade, grown at high-altitude and under shade, and meticulously managed at 
all stages of the production process.  He has one paid employee in the US, a full time 
field boss in Honduras, and serves the coffee himself, seven days a week.   
 
Star Mountain Coffee is of excellent quality, a high-grown, hard-bean arabica suitable 
for both Espresso and American breakfast styles. The story of Tony Chan’s coffee is 
almost completely opposite to the complex web of transactions that Javier’s coffee 
passes through.  In this case, the coffee chain is completely vertically-integrated--it is 
grown, shipped, roasted, and sold by the cup by Tony.  He has seen the coffee trade 
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from almost every angle and, like Javier, he is an unsentimental realist who values his 
independence above all else.  
 
I first met Tony in La Quebrada late in my fieldwork.  Since 2001, I had heard rumors 
about el chino, a "Chinese" coffee farmer living up in the mountains who had 
supposedly made millions selling his product in the United States.  Given the fact that 
this rumor was told amidst the most severe coffee crisis in the past half-century, I 
doubted its veracity.  It was unlikely that anyone was getting rich off coffee, because 
the market price was so low.  At first, I chalked the rumor up to small-town jealousy 
and the myth of easy money in the United States.  There was clearly an element of 
xenophobia to the rumors, blaming one of the community’s only ethnic outsiders for 
exploitative practices.  
 
I also doubted the rumor that Tony exported his own coffee; it is rather difficult for a 
coffee farmer to obtain an export license from the Honduran government. They 
usually must work through several established companies, selling to a miller or an 
exporter, as in Javier’s case.  Although I had heard farmers speak wishfully about 
exporting their own coffee, I had never seen it done.  Later, I learned that the story 
was not entirely false.  Tony did grow, transport, roast, and retail his own coffee.  He 
had spent several years working to get the export license, and had finally done so, but 
he was not getting rich.  Far from it.  He barely broke even. 
 
Tony is a hardened entrepreneur. He became a coffee farmer after being fired from 
McDonalds in 1993 after eighteen years of employment. He began working at the 
restaurant at sixteen, making minimum wage.  He worked his way up the ladder at 
McDonalds, eventually becoming a regional supervisor in Queens.  He hoped to one 
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day own a McDonalds restaurant himself, but he was fired, replaced by a younger 
employee as a way of cutting costs.  As he puts it, "I was making too much money for 
McDonalds.  I had been to Hamburger University [a McDonalds training center] 
twice. I knew everything.  How many napkins to order, how many ketchup packets we 
needed….I had it down to a science.  But I made too much money, man.  They threw 
me out and hired some kid out of college making twenty thousand." 
 
Tony ’s wife, a Honduran woman whom he had met at McDonalds, heard about a 
coffee farm for sale in her home country.  Out of work but fueled by a mix of ambition 
and bitterness, Tony used all of his savings and much of his McDonald’s pension to 
buy the property.  At first, Tony  knew nothing about coffee, and viewed his farm 
merely as a way to turn a profit. But he soon became caught up in the romance of 
farming, and now seems to make a constant effort to repress his sentimentality and 
view his livelihood with the cold objectivity of the shrewd businessman he desires to 
be. He tells me, "You don’t know what being a farmer is like until you do it.  You live 
and die with your plants.  If they die, my family dies.  I didn’t know anything about 
coffee, but now I love my farm.  It’s my life."  But then he catches himself, and says, 
"Man, I just want to grow this stuff, bring it to the States, and sell it.  That’s it, man."   
 
The romantic side takes over while we walk through his farm, early one morning 
during the harvest.  Set in a beautiful cloud forest where the temperature rarely rises 
above 75 degrees, Tony ’s farm is twenty miles from a telephone, and about ten miles 
from the electrical grid.  His fields are filled with tropical fruit trees, birds, and snakes.  
Pure spring water bubbles out of the ground near his mill, and he has built a house 
with beautiful views in a clearing at the high point of his farm.  In every sense, it is the 
opposite of his bustling, workaday life in Queens.  Families walk up the dirt roads 
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with their picking baskets, on the way to work.  Schools are closed during the harvest, 
and people come from all over the country to participate in the harvest.  In his Queens-
by-way-of Taiwan accent, he describes his property as, "paradise, man" and tells me 
how he wants to move here permanently with his family and lead a pastoral farmer’s 
life.     
 
Tony would do so, if only people did not want to kill him so badly.  In the past few 
years, his home has been burned down three times, his crop has been stolen out of his 
barn, and he has been attacked by a family of machete-wielding thugs in the central 
plaza of a nearby town.  While I was in Honduras, his field boss was attacked while 
driving through the farm by two men who shot at him with pistols, leaving bullet holes 
in the driver side door of his red Nissan pickup.  Fortunately, Tony ’s right hand man 
was unscathed, but the next time Tony goes to visit his farm, he will wear a bullet-
proof vest. 
 
The causes of the violence against Tony are complex, but they reveal quite a bit about 
the politics of the global coffee market.  From 1994 to 1999, coffee prices were over 
$1 per pound, but they dropped below 60 cents from 2000 to 2003.  Tony pays his 
pickers slightly above the going rate of about $2.50 per hundred pounds of coffee 
cherries, but he is singled out as an exploitative outsider, while other coffee growers 
are not, due to the fact that he is an absentee landlord, and the impression that he 
makes millions selling coffee in New York.  He balks at the idea that he is exploiting 
workers, since he is losing money himself.  If he were making a profit, they would be 
paid more.  But how can he pay them any more when he is not making a profit?  Tony, 
who arrived in the U.S. as an unskilled immigrant worker, sympathizes with his 
employees, but feels the violence against him is motivated by a misunderstanding of 
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the system, for which he is unjustly singled out.  He says to me, "Picking coffee all 
day in the sun, carrying sacks on your back up and down hills, that’s no life, 
man…And then they got nothing to do for the rest of the year, it’s no wonder they hate 
us."  I sense some tinges of guilt and ask him if he feels any. "Fuck it, man. I feel 
nothing.  I’m just trying to run a business and support my family.  I don’t want to live 
like a dog.  I’ve done it before.  It’s the system we live in." 
   
Tony dreams of expanding his business to the JFK passenger terminal, but concessions 
for spots in the terminal are only open to national brands.  He currently is only 
roasting about 10,000 of the 100,000 pounds he produces each year, and the rest is 
sold to a Honduran exporter for the market price of about 65 cents a pound (2002 
price).  Although Tony  would love to receive a higher price for his coffee, he is 
against fair trade.  As he sees it, "fairness" should be based solely on the quality/cost 
ratio of coffee, without regard for sentiment or altruism. He takes pride in the fact that 
he can manage every part of the process himself, and would hate to involve 
intermediaries like certification outfits or cooperatives in the process.  
 
He believes that a "fair" market would be one where marketing and branding were not 
part of the value equation.  He cringes when I mention Starbucks, saying that their 
coffee is over-priced and over-hyped by advertising, and that, in a taste test, he is sure 
customers would prefer his brew.  Tony believes that his coffee could compete with 
the Starbucks of the world if he was given a concession to open in the passenger 
terminal.  His coffee is the most unmediated product imaginable, but unless he tells his 
story through clever marketing, his coffee has little cachet.  "Directness" must be 
mediated in order to have symbolic value.  As it is, Tony  is struggling.  He expects to 
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make a decent profit this year, since he now has three locations in the airport, but he 
has lost money in two previous crop years. 
 
The common theme in both Javier and Tony’s stories is the belief that the coffee 
business is inherently risky.  One party always wins at the expense of another, and 
that’s just the way it is.  This is most apparent in Tony’s resigned acceptance of the 
violence directed against him.  He understands what is like to be an exploited worker, 
and he understands the hopelessness the pickers on his farm face.  Yet he feels 
powerless to change anything. ("I feel nothing…It’s the system we live in.")  Tony has 
created a totally efficient and direct coffee production business, but he is barely 
scraping by.  He treats his workers the same as other growers in La Quebrada do, but 
he is perceived as a carpet-bagger who makes millions in the US.   
 
Just as Tony's workers unfairly target him as the source of their problems, he directs 
his anger towards the advertisers and marketers who, as he sees it, hype inferior coffee 
and keep him from relocating to the JFK passenger terminal.  The symbolic side of the 
coffee value chain is the one element that he does not understand or control.  He is 
frustrated by the fact that he grows, transports, roasts, and sells his own coffee yet still 
loses out to the Starbucks of the world, who claim to have close relationships with 
coffee farmers, yet rely on "hype" to sell their coffee.  If people really cared about 
coffee farmers, he reasons, they would avoid the flashy brands altogether, because 
farmers barely participate in their business.  
 
Javier, on the other hand,  locates the problems in the coffee trade at the most 
immediate level.  He would like to see a better enforcement of contracts in Honduras, 
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and a less corrupt legal system, so that he would not have to deal only with the small 
circle of people whom he trusts.  He sees the structure of the coffee industry as being 
inherently unequal and risky, but there is nothing "unfair" about it.  
The term "fair trade" assumes that the exchange conforms to normative standards of 
justice. In contemporary society, profit in itself is not considered immoral, but extreme 
cases of exploitation are (Foley 2003).  The standards of just and unjust profit are 
ambiguous.  There are clear cases of exploitation--such as child labor and slave labor--
but outside of these extremes, there is no uniform opinion on what constitutes fair 
labor practices.  Normative standards and legal standards may overlap, but they are not 
the same (Bell 1996:284-285).  As these descriptions illustrate, normative standards of 
fairness are based upon particular cultural values and a person's place within the 
global division of labor.   The coffee pickers that work on Tony's farm see him as an 
exploitative outsider, and blame their low wages on his greed.  They direct their anger 
at Tony, but he is basically powerless to change the system. 
 
Conclusion: Justice at a Price 
 
Over the course of this study, I spoke with many fair trade consumers who expressed a 
sentiment that rang true to my own experiences as an occasional fair trade buyer. 
Consumers recognized the great inequalities inherent in global capitalist markets, but 
didn’t really know any way to ameliorate them.  They realized that fair trade was only 
a small symbolic step in the right direction, but it felt good and had a simple 
philosophy that seemed to produce tangible benefits.  It did not solve the problem of 
global inequality, but it surely didn’t add to it. 
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The main argument of this essay is that "fair trade" is a basically private act that has 
no adequate political platform to address systemic inequalities. It is a movement 
without a guiding theory.  The desire to know the conditions under which one’s food 
is produced is a result of the alienating aspects of life in the post-industrial world, and 
the direct producer/consumer narrative upon which "fair trade" depends is a mythic 
construction that simply explains the incredibly complex nature of the global economy 
with a reassuring image of the coffee farmer, living a life of rustic tranquility.  Like all 
myths, it provides a coherent yet simple explanation of social reality, and much of 
meaning comes "in the telling" or, in this case, "in the buying, brewing, and drinking."  
Buying fair trade gives the consumer a reassuring--even empowering--feeling of 
control over the seemingly incomprehensible system.      
 
I described the cases of Javier and Tony to provide a sense of the complexity of the 
global coffee trade, which is dominated by transnational corporations that are 
themselves beholden to large-scale investors and commodities hedge funds.  Fair 
trade’s efforts to pay coffee farmers a bit more money is a pragmatic, local-level 
solution, but it makes no attempt to grasp the system at its highest levels.   Its version 
of "social justice" is too simple to truly "re-embed" exchange in social relations.  Like 
the narratives of exploitation developed by the workers on Tony's farm, or Tony, or 
Javier, this concept of "fairness" is based upon a limited perspective, that locates 
social problems and their possible resolutions at an immediate level. 
  
For almost a century, nation-states developed various protectionist measures and 
international alliances to regulate coffee.  This political process culminated with the 
institution of the International Coffee Agreement, which regulated coffee prices for 
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almost thirty years, from 1962 to 1989.  The ICA involved stakeholders from all 
aspects of the coffee trade in its organization, which allowed it to grasp the industry at 
a systemic level.  The ICA’s demise was largely due to the fact that its most powerful 
member states placed their own national political interests over the interests of the 
industry as a whole, and it became dominated by internal conflicts and the hegemonic 
interests of the two largest coffee-producing nations, Brazil and Colombia (Bates 
1997).  Additionally, the centralized marketing boards that controlled the coffee trade 
in many countries were beset by corruption and inefficiency. The most notorious 
examples of coffee rentierism were in Zaire (Talbot 1997:77) and Uganda (Bates 
1997:167), where the government paid coffee farmers a fraction of the international 
coffee price and used the surplus to enrich themselves.   The ICA was far from perfect, 
but as Robert Bates has convincingly argued, it did provide a relatively effective 
system of international regulation for several decades. 
 
 In contrast, the most recent International Coffee Agreements, signed in 1994 and 
2001, have turned away from the entire regulatory project that guided the first ICA.  
The International Coffee Organization, mandated by the second International Coffee 
Agreement, provides statistical information about the industry, promotes coffee 
consumption, and formulates strategies for farmer competitiveness.  It is designed to 
stimulate and streamline the coffee trade according to free-market principles, but it has 
no regulatory power at all.  In its wake, "fair trade" consumers attempt to regulate the 
coffee market by choice.   
 
Here, it useful to return to Talbot's (1997) study of the production and retention of 
surplus value in the global coffee commodity chain.  Talbot has shown that the major 
consequence of the cessation of the International Coffee Agreement was a transfer of 
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income from coffee producing countries to consuming countries.  Five transnational 
corporations control over 60% of the world coffee market (Talbot 1995:120).  These 
companies, Nestle Foods,  Procter and Gamble, Kraft (Altria/Phillip Morris), Coca 
Cola, and Sara Lee, have seen their share of the total surplus created along the coffee 
commodity chain rise by about 20% since the end of the International Coffee 
Agreement, while the share of the surplus retained in the producing countries has 
fallen. Talbot concludes that the collapse of the ICA led to a "huge transfer of surplus 
out of the producing countries" towards transnational corporations (86).  But Talbot's 
analysis does not attempt to explain how the profits of the transnational corporations 
are used.  More than half of the outstanding shares of stock of Procter and Gamble, 
Sara Lee, and Altria are owned by financial institutions (as much as 73% in the case of 
Altria), which include mutual funds and private capital funds.  The dividends created 
by growing profits are concentrated in large banks and brokerage firms.  A tiny 
percentage of this income may wind up in the hands of small individual investors, but 
this is insignificant compared to the profits of the financial companies.  The key point 
is that any theory of fair or unfair forms of exchange must account for the 
financialization of the economy, but this aspect of the commodity chain is mystifying 
to most consumers, and does not play a part in contemporary theories of just and 
unjust profit.         
 
The universalist version of the social contract that guides "fair trade" suggests great 
potential for a form of transnational (as opposed to international) regulation of the 
coffee trade that might be able to avoid the flaws of international cartels, but it 
provides no coherent vision of what would such an institution look like.  In fact, 
proponents of fair trade almost never acknowledge the existence of the ICA, and tend 
to downplay the fact they are performing a similar regulatory function.  Not one 
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promotional flyer or information packet on fair trade mentions the existence of the 
ICA, or the fact that it collapsed at the same time that fair trade began to grow in 
popularity.      
 
The tendency to rely on private action to address systemic concerns derives from the 
incredibly complex and fragmentary nature of the contemporary global division of 
labor.  In the absence of a viable theory of how post-industrial capitalism works, 
individual solutions become the best available option for change.  The rising concern 
over transnational labor issues, expressed by advocates of fair trade, demonstrates the 
popular potential for the formation of new social bonds between international 
producers and consumers.  Unfortunately, this potential has been focused on private 
consumer behavior rather than governmental strategies, such as trade or labor policy.  
Consumers do not have a guiding theory to support their political agenda, and 
therefore resort to marketing campaigns, mass protests, or market decisions  to give 
voice to their cause.  They embrace a symbolic opposition to neoliberalism, but 
provide no alternatives other than individual acts.  To be clear, I am not taking the 
absolutist position that small steps are not worth taking; nor am I espousing a 
totalizing solution to the injustices of capitalism.  However, I do believe that the 
contradiction that limits the potential of fair trade--recognition of an expansive global 
economy that can only be managed at the individual level--is characteristic of more 
general tendencies of contemporary social theory and political practice.    
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Conclusion 
Global Sociality and the Politics of the Particular 
 
Migration, religious change, and fair trade coffee production/exchange are three ways 
that people in La Quebrada responded to ongoing economic and social crisis between 
2001 and 2003. The proximate cause of the crisis was a severe decline in world coffee 
prices, but its effects were exacerbated by a long-term process of depoliticization that 
had weakened the political power of the Honduran rural sector.  La Quebrada was on 
shaky ground before the coffee crisis, due to the ongoing effects of structural 
adjustment and many other historical factors, but coffee’s decline was the "trigger" 
that brought the community to the brink of collapse.  The strategies that various 
groups developed to cope with this crisis are based upon a particular, historically 
contingent understanding of the social world that I have tried to understand and 
explain in this work.   
 
These three responses to crisis exemplify the postmodern tendency to view individual 
choice as the basic engine of social change and to ignore or downplay political 
philosophies that reach beyond the individual.  I call these movements "postmodern" 
because they recognize the individual’s participation in an expansive global society, 
but locate the source of the potential transformation of that society at the most 
personal level.  As I argued in Chapter 6, modernity has been based upon an ever-
expanding concept of the social whole and a belief in the possibility of true popular 
sovereignty, conceived differently by various political philosophies.  The key 
contradictory tendency of postmodernism is the recognition the existence of a single 
"global" society without any adequate "global" theory or political platform to regulate 
or transform society, beyond the logic of the market.  Under these conditions, the logic 
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of the market, individual choice, becomes the basic organizing principle of social life.  
Even movements that try to assert coherent principles of sociality, such as new 
religious movements and fair trade, ultimately reflect this essentially individualist 
ethos, albeit in vastly different ways.  
 
In each of the cases I have described, people attempt to assert collective principles of 
sociality or justice. People in La Quebrada struggle with social disintegration caused 
by transnational migration and try to articulate principles of sociality through gossip 
and personal accusation.  They blame individual migrants for their community’s crisis.  
The evangelicals try to counter social disintegration by cultivating adherents’ personal 
relationship with god. Their solutions to social ills are based on individual moral 
conduct.  Fair trade tries to regulate the global coffee industry through consumer 
choice, enforcing principles of economic and social justice through individual acts of 
consumption.  In all of these cases, collective social projects are framed as the 
consequences of individual choices.  When viewed in historical context, the narrow 
ideology upon which these practices rest is clear.   In each case, the declining 
importance of the nation-state as a category of social identification reverberates 
through various domains of social life.  The key theoretical question is: What has 
caused the narrowing basis of social identification and the politics of particularity? 
And, why has is occurred at the historical moment when the world is becoming more 
integrated--socially, culturally, and economically--than ever?   
 
One way to understand the origins of depoliticized postmodernity focuses on the 
particular history of Honduras.  The violence of the seventies and eighties foreclosed 
most secular and religious platforms for change that focused on "society" and could 
therefore be linked to socialism.  Specific actors--supported by the CIA--fostered the 
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growth of Evangelical religion as an ideological counterweight to Marxism in the 
1980s.  Despite their questionable origins, new churches offered many tangible, 
realistic benefits for rural people at a time of great insecurity and crisis, and they have 
outgrown their early association with the U.S. military.  The breakdown of the 
International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1989, and the more sweeping structural 
adjustment platform of which it was a part, led to great economic instability in La 
Quebrada.  In the years that followed, communications and travel became cheaper and 
easier, the U.S. economy prospered, and migration presented an attractive alternative 
to coffee farming.  The post-ICA turmoil and the damage caused by Hurricane Mitch 
added to the appeal of migration, which offered socioeconomic rebirth, and 
contributed to the growth of the new religious movements, which offered spiritual 
rebirth.  By the time the most recent coffee crisis hit in 2000, migration was perceived 
as the most viable "way out" for many people, and the Honduran government basically 
agreed, viewing migrant remittances as a short-term resource that would benefit the 
poor and inject badly-needed dólares into the struggling economy.   
 
The imprint of all of these experiences lives on in the memories of people in La 
Quebrada and certainly shapes their perceptions and actions.  Given the turmoil of the 
past fifty years, there is good reason why this historical process has precipitated a 
culture of individualism and politically resigned pragmatism.  Similar processes of 
depoliticization have been observed around the world since the end of the Cold War.  
When participation in collective political movements puts people at risk of 
imprisonment, torture, or death, these movements will tend to wither away.  Given the 
history of corruption and false promises that has marked recent Honduran political 
history, people have turned to other philosophies that offer more pragmatic solutions 
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at the individual or local level.  The story of Prudencio Flores, presented in Chapter 4, 
is an instructive case in point.   
 
This explanation of cultural change focuses on how historical experience informs the 
present-day activity of people in La Quebrada.  It explains the demise of collective 
politics by focusing on the cultural meaning of political participation in a specific 
context.  However, it fails to capture the systemic nature of the changes observed in La 
Quebrada.  After all, this pattern has been found all over the world, not only in places 
that directly experienced Cold War violence.  In addition, the failures of previous eras 
of statist democratic development or Marxism do not necessarily lead to the rise of 
their depoliticized opposites, though in reality this has tended to be the case.  Under 
different conditions, the new economic and social bonds formed through globalization 
could just as likely have produced some sort of transnational secular challenge, rather 
than the narrowly-oriented movements that have actually emerged.  Why has 
economic integration systematically led to ideological involution, rather than a trend 
towards reinvigorated international governance or some other platform for 
transnational regulation of the international economy akin to a global New Deal?    
 
At this point, I must return to the theoretical questions that I posed at the beginning of 
this work: How do we best understand the relationship between the economic and 
cultural dimensions of globalization?  The combination of socioeconomic integration 
and cultural/political involution is too widespread to be explained only by an analysis 
of particular cases.  We must look at these processes from a macro-structural 
perspective.  
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The rhetoric of globalization is based upon the idea that we live in a single global 
society organized by the market, in which states should basically enforce the basic 
laws that enable markets to function, such as financial transparency and protection of 
property rights.  At the same time, the logic of consumer choice has underlain the 
ideology of globalization since its very beginnings.  Recall that Theodore Levitt, a 
prominent management scholar, coined the term "globalization" in 1983 in an article 
that boldly proclaimed that, "Companies must learn to operate as if the world were one 
large market--ignoring superficial regional and national differences" (1983:92).  
Levitt’s basic point was that multinational companies could succeed by using mass 
marketing to homogenize consumer tastes around the globe.  The drive for expanded 
corporate profits that drove the process of globalization from its beginnings during the 
recession of  the late-seventies/early-eighties has been lost in the shuffle, and the 
global spread of Western products now tends to be seen as a natural (and neutral) 
historical consequence of technological integration, giving people what they already 
want (Applebaum 2000).   
 
Economic postmodernity acknowledges an integrated global whole, but the collective 
institutions that mediate between individuals and the market are somehow abstracted, 
leaving only individuals qua consumers, as agents of transformation.  As the case of 
fair trade demonstrates, even people who seek to regulate the market try to do so 
through an imagined "direct" producer/consumer connection that ignores mediating 
institutions--such as nation-states.  This is the economic analogue of  the process of 
"ideological involution."  The declining power of the nation-state has led to a belief in 
the power of the autonomous individual, rather than the creation of  more expansive 
social collectivities. 
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Here, the analysis of globalization by Duménil and Lévy (2004) is particularly useful.  
They analyze the rise of globalization as the project of a particular class-fragment, 
finance, that managed to achieve political hegemony in the late-seventies and early-
eighties.  Their interpretation basically traces the origins of neoliberalism back to a 
single day, October 6, 1979, which serves as something like the Eighteenth Brumaire 
of financial capital.  On that day, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States 
radically changed its policies in an effort to curb long-term inflation and low real 
interest rates that had led to a crisis in profitability for financial companies.  Rising 
wages had led to high rates of inflation in many of the core countries, and finance was 
losing profits due to low (in some cases, negative) real interest rates.  According to 
Duménil and Lévy, the so-called "coup of 1979" allowed finance to overcome a 
structural crisis that had led to declining profit rates through the seventies.  In their 
decision to fight inflation by "shock therapy," the Federal Reserve basically re-
established the hegemony of finance that had existed during the nineteenth century but 
had weakened through much of the twentieth due to Keynesian policies designed to 
promote full employment and social stability.     
 
The virtue of Duménil and Lévy’s analysis is that it views one aspect of contemporary 
globalization--the liberalization of financial markets and the subsequent drive to 
decrease the role of the state in order to fight inflation--as the project of a particular 
class, enabled by purposeful political decisions that could be potentially transformed 
or undone under the right conditions.  In this respect, they agree with Terence Turner, 
who has written: 
 
Concerted action by states remains the most likely basis for the imposition of a new 
global order, capable of regulating financial and corporate capital for social and 
political ends.  This would take a concerted political movement that could re-take 
control of state-policy making from the current neoliberal hegemony.  This, in turn, 
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would require a more coherent social and political vision than the current array of 
NSMs and fragmented oppositional movements (including working class 
organizations) have thus far been able to produce (Turner 2002:79). 
 
       
I agree with Turner on this point, but must emphasize that the renewed role of the state 
in management of the global economy does not require a return to economic 
nationalism.  I appreciate the incredible potential that economic integration holds for 
both the developed and developing countries.  However, globalization, as presently 
constituted, has overwhelmingly benefited a small class of financial elites at the 
expense of the majority.  The great political challenge of the contemporary world is to 
apply the principles of social equity that guided modernist policies at the national level 
to the transnational realities of globalization.  The only way to do this is through the 
coordinated involvement of nation-states.     
 
Throughout this work, I have shifted back and forth from the micro-level (individual 
biographies) to abstract theoretical topics.  Most of the ethnographic profiles highlight 
processes of global sociocultural integration in La Quebrada: From Santos Orellana, 
the man who used an internet phone to call a Long Island deli from Honduras looking 
for work, to Tony Chan, the Taiwanese-immigrant coffee farmer who roasts his coffee 
at JFK Airport, to the members of Creciendo en Gracia who huddle together in a 
small, dusty room at night to watch their apostle give sermons over the internet from 
Miami, all of these stories demonstrate that we are truly living in a uniquely 
interconnected world in which space and place take on new meanings. I greatly value 
the work of anthropologists of globalization who have studied "global flows" like 
these in order to elucidate the complexities of the contemporary world.  At the same 
time, I have tried to describe common features of these phenomena and their origins in 
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concrete social processes.  I do not claim to have developed an all-encompassing 
theory of the structure of global society, but I have argued for the need for such a 
theory, and suggested some preliminary steps in that direction. 
 
I have suggested that the recognition of an integrated global whole with no consequent 
theory of its form or function is a basic contradiction of postmodernity.  This same 
contradiction underlies much of the contemporary anthropology of the local and the 
global. If globalization is truly a "system of interconnections," than that system must 
have some structure and governing logic beyond "movement" itself.  The negation of 
older theories of the global economy has occurred for understandable and pragmatic 
reasons, but it is not inevitable. Without new theory, the term "globalization" will 
continue to be met with skepticism. 
 
In their de-emphasis of the mediating role of the state and the celebration of the 
individual, critics of globalization are following intellectual currents that are found on 
both the left and right.  On the right and center, proponents of market liberalization 
have seen states as perpetuators of a static, inefficient, bureaucracy that can be 
slimmed down through privatization and liberalization.  The view of the state as an 
ossified obstacle to capitalist growth fueled the "privatization" boom that followed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.  In Latin America, this philosophy guided most 
the structural adjustment programs developed by the IMF in the nineties, and 
continues to guide most economic policy.   
 
On the left, post-1968 intellectuals have tended to see the state as an agent of 
oppression, following in the tradition of Foucault.  "State power" is seen as a 
controlling, dehumanizing, violent, force from which people cannot escape, but can 
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only "resist" to a limited degree.  "The" state infiltrates every aspect of life to further 
its own power.  More recently, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have tried to develop 
a collective political platform to reform the global economy, synthesizing the 
Foucaultian celebration of "resistance" with a more optimistic Marxian belief in the 
power of the populace to collectively reform society.   But Hardt and Negri explicitly 
deny the power of states to act in the interest of national societies, arguing that new 
"multitudinous" social formations must develop in the place of modern nation-states 
for true reform to take place (Hardt and Negri 2004:222-227).  They see the source of 
potential reform in "the common" a transnational group linked through technology and 
shared participation in a global sociocultural whole.  From a different perspective, also 
on the left, David Graeber (2001) has argued in favor of anarchism, the establishment 
of new social bonds outside of authoritarian state structures.   
 
I believe that the state can and should play a role in managing globalization in the 
interest of a broader segment of the populace.  For example, one of the most obvious 
ways to combine economic integration with social equity is immigration reform. 
Globalization will remain a one-sided affair until people are able to relocate legally, 
along with their families, with the same ease enjoyed by capital.  Immigration reform 
is one way that governments can live up to the "borderless world" rhetoric of 
globalization.   One way to accomplish this would be through the WTO, which should 
require immigration reform as a precondition for countries to enter into bilateral free 
trade agreements like NAFTA and CAFTA.  Additionally, individual states should 
increase immigration quotas in accordance with the estimated number of 
undocumented immigrants already living within their borders, and provide legal 
citizenship to non-criminal immigrants.  These are not revolutionary suggestions; they 
are merely two examples of political initiatives that could have a broad impact.  More 
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importantly, immigration is an issue that draws popular attention to the gulf between 
the ideology of free markets and the ways that actual markets function. This issue 
highlights the ideological aspects of contemporary globalization.  
 
As a more general goal, governments must not lose sight of the place of the economy 
within the total process of social production.  Although capital may be 
"deterritorialized," and therefore able to relocate with ease, this process comes at a 
tremendous social cost for people.  La Quebrada exemplifies the type of social 
disintegration that occurs when people have to be separated from families and 
communities in order to earn a decent wage.  The care and education of children and 
the elderly, the integration of families into broader communities, and the maintenance 
of some form of collective life cannot be sustained in a totally deterritorialized 
economic system.  The constant search for increased profit and efficiency that drives 
the movement of capital comes at a tremendous cost for society. 
 
In La Quebrada, the social costs of migration are just beginning to appear.  I noticed a 
palpable sense of anger and frustration among young people who depended on their 
parents remittances for their survival.  They felt no bond with Honduras, knowing that 
their absent parents left the country to earn a decent wage, and that the government 
had no real platform for rural development beyond migrant dependency.  Yet these 
young people had great animosity towards the United States as well, knowing that US 
immigration laws kept them separated from their parents, and prevented them from 
accessing the economic opportunities for which they longed.  In most cases, these 
people just plodded along, hoping to save the money to go to the U.S. with a sense of 
bitter detachment.  When these young people mature,  they will have to migrate in 
order to support their own children.  If they cannot, the stage will be set for growing 
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popular resentment and hostility, unless some political platform is developed to 
provide some sense of optimism and hope for rural Hondurans.  Honduras was, to a 
certain extent,  able to avoid the revolutionary violence that plagued its neighbors in 
the eighties, due to policies that attempted to integrate rural society into the national 
community, such as agrarian reform.  Although the modernist reform projects did not 
achieve their lofty goals, they were, at least, based upon a philosophy that believed in 
the potential for people to collectively change society and provided people with a 
limited sense of optimism.  The failure of the modernist project must not lead to a 
rejection of its guiding spirit.  Instead, we must learn from previous mistakes so that 
they are not repeated.   
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